

ANGOLA

TRANSITION AND DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT



Ex-UNITA Military Force leaders at Ndele Quartering Area, August 2002 (Photo by Karen M. Poe). The sign says:

THE WAR IS OVER, PEACE IS HERE TO STAY



U.S. Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

In response to the opening brought about by the recent and unexpected peace in Angola, USAID undertook a review of the current USAID/Angola program. A multi-sector team was fielded to assess the need for modifications and/or expansions of selected activities to better support Angola's transition from war to peace in an uncertain post conflict environment. The "Angola Transition and Development Assessment" was undertaken from July 29 to August 23, 2002, and the report is summarized herein.

Context

Angola is emerging from 40 years of war, its struggle for independence from Portugal in 1975 followed by a 27-year civil war between the Movement for the Liberation of the People of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Twice in the civil war, negotiations between MPLA and UNITA resulted in peace agreements, first in 1991 (the Bicesse Accord) and then again in 1994 (the Lusaka Protocol). Neither ushered in a lasting peace.

The death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002 provided the impetus for the negotiation of a third agreement (the Luena Accord) that has already produced an end to hostilities and a more rapid than expected demilitarization and demobilization. Some 80,000 UNITA soldiers and their families have turned in their weapons and moved to quartering areas. Of these, over 5,000 of all ranks have been absorbed in to the Angolan army. The remainder was formally demobilized on August 2, 2002 as UNITA's armed force was dissolved. In parallel, thousands of civilians who had been isolated by war began moving in search of food and medical assistance resulting in a near-overwhelming humanitarian crisis as the caseload for humanitarian assistance rose to more than 2.9 million. By August 2002, while many of the major internal land routes were open, access to large parts of the country remained difficult-to-impossible, due in part to the presence of millions of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). In spite of such difficulties, work on rehabilitation, resettlement, and reconciliation had begun.

Timing and Key Challenges

In 2003, the humanitarian community will need to address the difficult issue of when to close the internally displaced person (IDP) camps and transit centers, and/or declare them 'communities' to be assisted in the same manner as resettled communities. The team's discussions with members of the humanitarian community suggest that this 'weaning process' of humanitarian aid will be done on a sliding scale, with assistance cut by half during 2003, and half again following the harvest in early 2004. This scenario suggests that the transition from emergency to development will take at least three years.

The assessment team identified four key challenges for the next 12 to 36 months. The team's recommendations are geared to take advantage of opportunities to address these challenges in the next 18 months to lay a solid foundation leading up to a new country strategy (2006-2010). These are: i) completing the demilitarization, demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration process by implementing the remaining provisions of the Lusaka Protocol; ii) capitalizing on the state of peace to advance more participatory and transparent governance; iii) settling IDPs and returning refugees; and iv) assisting the country's physical and economic recovery and rehabilitation, and psycho-social reconciliation.

Findings

1. Seize the Narrow Window of Opportunity

The team found consensus among the many groups interviewed that the current state of peace provides an important, but narrow, window of opportunity to revive Angola's stalled democratic transition and introduce more transparent governance. The window may only be open until national elections

anticipated in 2004. After that another decisive victory by the ruling party combined with expanded oil production that could double government revenues would further insulate the government from international or domestic pressure for meaningful macroeconomic or political reform. Now is the time to act to expand political space, promote more transparent and accountable governance, and lay the foundation for free and fair elections. Further focusing the Mission's democracy and governance (DG) program on key transition issues will be a start, but would benefit from additional DA and ESF funding. The resumption of an Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI) program would provide important additional opportunities to expand work with civil society, opposition political parties, and the independent media to act as a counter weight to the national government. An OTI program would also allow USAID's DG program to redirect its resources in ways that would support community-based reconstruction and reconciliation activities. [Note: OTI is preparing a separate analysis on the appropriateness of re-engaging in Angola, *Democratizing the Peace: The Case for an OTI Program in Angola* that will be available from OTI in September 2002.]

2. Stem a Potential HIV Explosion

While HIV prevalence rates are lower than neighboring countries, estimated at 8.6% by the Government of Angola (GRA), with the opening up of the country made possible by the peace process, several factors are converging to contribute to a potential HIV explosion. The team recommends an immediate increase in HIV/AIDS funding to help mitigate the impact of these factors and take advantage of the large concentration of population groups in Quartering and Family Areas (430,000) and IDP camps (380,000) to increase awareness of HIV prevention. In addition to the demobilized soldiers and their families, there are over 4 million IDPs and 478,000 refugees in high incidence neighboring countries. Given high population mobility of these groups over the next 6-36 months, the team strongly recommends that Angola be given "Expanded Response Country" status for HIV/AIDS programming. The following contextual factors add a potentially explosive dimension to the risk of populations in transit: multiple sex partners is condoned, condom use is low, sexually transmitted infection (STI) rates are high and treatment facilities are rare, and HIV prevalence is high among commercial sex workers, with an estimated current rate of nearly 34%.

3. Narrow USAID's Geographic Focus and Increase Cross Sector Synergies to Improve Food Security

The assessment team reviewed the current USAID Country Strategic Plan for FY 2001-2005 and found that it provides an excellent framework for the transition from emergency to development. However, to increase impact in a resource scarce environment, the team recommends a slight narrowing of geographic focus and increase in cross sector synergies for transition and development activities. The geographical focus would be the six provinces with the most IDPs and demobilized UNITA Military Forces (FMU) plus Luanda, the largest population center. The six provinces are Bie, Huambo, Huila, Kuwanza Sul, Malanje, and Benguela. Opportunities to increase synergy among all USAID-funded partners -- including those funded by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Food For Peace (FFP), Regional Center for Southern Africa (RCSA) and OTI, if it re-enters Angola -- should be pursued. In particular, closer collaboration with RCSA in all sectors is beginning and should be maximized.

Angolan health statistics for mothers and children are amongst the worst in the world. Additional funding to expand maternal-child health (MCH) programs into the focus provinces should be considered, especially safe motherhood, routine immunization systems, malaria, and family planning services.

Angola's rich agro-environmental resource diversity offers enormous agricultural production potential for domestic and international markets. Tapping into this potential will offer opportunities to improve the food security of the large numbers of IDPs and other populations currently being served by humanitarian assistance. New P.L. 480 Title II development programs should be encouraged to incorporate direct feeding, MCH, HIV/AIDS, food-for-work (FFW), non-farm rural income generation and continue focus on agriculture linked to on-going programs to increase production and market access for small producers.

Approval should be expedited for these new P.L. 480 Title II funded programs in Angola. To provide much needed predictive information for famine prevention in Angola and to complete regional coverage, consideration should be given to opening a Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) office in Angola. Finally, to protect the interests of local communities and to guarantee the tenure security of small farmers, greater public debate of the new draft land law should be encouraged.

Management Implications

The large and rapid expansion of humanitarian resources and the need to effectively link to on-going programs to enhance transition to more stable development has strained the management capacity of the small resident mission. Given the large humanitarian and development P.L. 480 resources in the USG response, the team recommends addition of one USDH or USPSC Food For Peace Officer. In addition, a FEWS Coordinator, funded jointly with USAID/RCSA, would need to be fielded through USAID's FEWSNET program to direct the proposed new Angola Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS) unit. If OTI re-enters Angola, it would place – and fund – an additional off-shore personal services contractor (PSC).

Team Composition and Methodology

The Transition and Development Assessment team comprised representatives from USAID's Africa Bureau (AFR) Office of Southern African Affairs (AFR/SA) and the Office of Sustainable Development (AFR/SD); the Office of Food For Peace (FFP) and Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) of the Pillar Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA); the Pillar Bureau for Global Health; the Regional Center for Southern Africa (RCSA) and the resident USAID/Angola Mission. Washington-based team members spent approximately three weeks in Angola, in Luanda and the war-affected provinces of Bie, Huambo, Huila, and Malanje. In the provinces, team members visited and interviewed persons in IDP camps and residential areas; two ex-FMU quartering areas; and a number of return/resettlement areas. In Luanda and the provinces, they reviewed key documents and interviewed the GRA, political parties, civil society organizations, media professionals, international organizations, bilateral and multilateral donors, Angolan and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), IDPs, ex-combatants, village-based community organizations and other key informants.

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Glossary of Terms Used

AIDS	: Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome
AFR	: Bureau for Africa
ARV	: Anti-Retroviral Therapy
CCA	: Common Country Assessment
CDC	: Centers for Disease Control
CEPPS	: Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening
COIEPA	: Inter-Ecclesiastical Committee for Peace in Angola
CORE	: Collaborations and Resources Group
CRS	: Catholic Relief Services
CSH	: Child Survival and Health
CSO	: Civil Society Organization
CSP	: Country Strategic Plan
CY	: Calendar Year
DA	: Development Assistance
DAP	: Development Assistance Program
DCHA	: Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
DCOF	: Displaced Children and Orphan's Fund
DfID	: Department for International Development (British aid)
DG	: Democracy and Governance
DOD	: Department of Defense
DPT3	: Diphtheria-Pertussis-Tetanus
ESF	: Economic Support Funds
EU	: European Union
FAA	: Angolan Army Force
FAO	: Food and Agriculture Organization
<i>Fazenda</i>	: Large plantation
FMU	: UNITA Military Force
FFP	: Food for Peace
FY	: Fiscal Year
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
GH	: Global Health
GRA	: Government of the Republic of Angola
GURN	: Government of National Unity
HIV	: Human Immunodeficiency Virus
ICRC	: International Society of Red Cross and Red Crescent
IDP	: Internally Displaced Person
IEC	: Information-Education-Communications
IFES	: International Foundation for Electoral Support
IMC	: International Medical Corps
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
INE	: National Institute of Statistics
IOM	: International Organization for Migration
IPMP	: Institute for Preventive Medicine
I-PRSP	: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
IPT	: Intermittent Presumptive Treatment
IR	: Intermediate Result
IRSEM	: Social Re-integration Institute for Ex-Military
Kuanza	: Angolan currency; as of mid-August 2002, 50 kuanza=US\$1.00
LPV	: Fight For Life

MCH	: Maternal-Child Health
MICS	: Multi-Indicator Cluster Survey
MOH	: Ministry of Health
MOU	: Memorandum of Understanding
MPLA	: Movement for the Liberation of the People of Angola
MSH	: Management Sciences for Health
MT	: Metric Ton
MTCT	: Mother-To-Child Transmission
NDI	: National Democratic Institute
NIDS	: National Immunization Days
NRC	: National Reinsertion Commission (short name for the National Commission for Social and Productive Reintegration of Displace and Demobilized)
OCHA	: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	: Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OTI	: Office of Transition Initiatives
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
PEPARR	: Provincial Reintegration and Resettlement Plan
P.L. 480	: Public Law 480, of the U.S. Agriculture Trade Development Act of 1954, as amended
PMTCT	: Prevention of Mother-To-Child Transmission
PVO	: Private and Voluntary Organizations
SADC	: Southern Africa Development Community
SARRNET	: Southern Africa Regional Research Network
Save/GB	: Save the Children Federation – Great Britain
Save/US	: Save the Children Federation – United States
SMIP	: Sorghum-Millet Improvement Program
SMP	: Staff Monitored Program
SO	: Strategic Objective
<i>Soba</i>	: Traditional leader
SRSG	: Special Representative of the Secretary General
STD	: Sexually Transmitted Disease
STI	: Sexually Transmitted Infections
SW	: Short Wave
TB	: Tuberculosis
TOT	: Training-Of-Trainers
UNAIDS	: United Nations Agency for AIDS
UNDP	: United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	: United Nations Childrens’ Fund
UNFPA	: United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	: United Nations High Commission on Refugees
UNITA	: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
USAID	: U.S. Agency for International Development
USDA	: U.S. Department of Agriculture
USG	: United States Government
UXO	: Unexploded ordnance
VAM	: Vulnerability Assessment Monitoring
VCT	: Voluntary Counseling and Testing
VOA	: Voice of America
WFP	: World Food Program
WHO	: World Health Organization
WLI	: World Learning International

MAP of ANGOLA



INTRODUCTION

Angola is emerging from 40 years of war. The bloody liberation struggle that began in 1961 to rid the country of Portuguese rule ended with independence in November 1975, but conflict continued. Two leading liberation movements – the Movement for the Liberation of the People of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) – pursued a civil war that lasted 27 years. Although the people of Angola and the international community were optimistic about ceasefires following the 1991 Bicesse Accord and the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, neither brought enduring peace. It was not until the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in February 2002 that the opposition lost its momentum, and the UNITA military leaders agreed to what all expect to be a permanent cease-fire on March 19, 2002.

On April 4, 2002, representatives of the Government of the Republic of Angola (GRA) and UNITA signed a Memorandum of Understanding – the Luena MOU -- that ended the civil war and reinstated the 1994 Lusaka Protocol.¹ Following the Agreement, on August 2, 2002 the UNITA army ceased to exist. Its soldiers have been granted amnesty, demilitarized, and demobilized, and are living in quartering areas as civilians, known as ex-UNITA Military Force, or ex-FMU, thus completing the military implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. UNITA is to be transformed into a legitimate political party. In parallel with demobilization, thousands of civilians who had been isolated by war began moving in search of food and medical assistance. The period of April-July 2002 was one of peace, but also of vast internal population movement and near-overwhelming humanitarian crises: 79,000 ex-FMU and 350,000 of their family members moved into quartering areas throughout the provinces; 300,000 of the estimated 4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) began to return home, and about 1 million people in areas that had been isolated by the war were suddenly accessible and needed urgent food aid and/or medical assistance. By August 2002, while many of the major internal land routes were open, access to large parts of the country remained difficult-to-impossible, due in part to the presence of millions of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). In spite of such difficulties, work on rehabilitation, resettlement, and reconciliation had begun.

The U.S. Government (USG) has been closely involved in the enactment of the Lusaka Protocol, both in its 1994 and 2002 manifestations. The U.S. is an official observer nation, along with former Angolan allies Russia and Portugal (forming “the Troika”), and as such monitors compliance with the political and military implementation of the protocol. The USG has also provided substantial humanitarian and transition assistance and more limited development assistance to the Angolan people. Since the April 2002 signing of the Luena MOU there is new impetus for the U.S. to work with Angola to stabilize the peace, promote transparent and accountable governance, restore livelihoods, and establish conditions for equitable social and economic development.

The USG Inter-Agency Task Force on Angola has collaborated closely since the cease-fire, deploying additional Department of Defense (DOD) advisors for military guidance, senior State Department analysts for political consultation, and providing over 40% of the total of humanitarian assistance through USAID and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA, primarily food aid). The Task Force established a specific “Angola Action Plan” for USAID, which focuses on the short (0-6), medium (6-12) and long term (beyond 12 months).

The USAID Action Plan comprises three key axes: i) addressing the humanitarian crisis; ii) containment and treatment of HIV/AIDS; and iii) consolidating long-term peace. The Plan commits USAID to

¹ The Luena MOU overrides some provisions of the Lusaka Protocol related to demilitarization and demobilization, but retains all provisions related to political space, the constitution, elections, reintegration, and reconstruction. Summaries of the two agreements are provided at Annex D.

undertake two assessments, one to *address humanitarian needs* and the other to *review the current Mission program and make recommendations for modifications and/or expansions of selected activities to better support Angola's transition from war to peace in an uncertain post conflict environment*. The “USAID/DCHA Humanitarian Assessment to Angola” was undertaken from June 10-July 9, 2002, and the report is available from USAID/DCHA and USAID/Angola. The “Angola Transition and Development Assessment” was undertaken from July 29 to August 23, 2002, and the report is presented herein.

The Transition and Development Assessment is based on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of team members from USAID's Africa Bureau (AFR); the Office of Food For Peace (FFP) and Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) of the Pillar Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA); the Pillar Bureau for Global Health (GH); the Regional Center for Southern Africa (RCSA); and the resident USAID/Angola Mission. Washington-based team members spent approximately three weeks in Angola, in Luanda and the war-affected provinces of Bie, Huambo, Huila, and Malanje. In the provinces, team members visited and interviewed persons in IDP camps and residential areas; two ex-FMU quartering areas; and a number of return/resettlement areas. In Luanda and the provinces, they reviewed key documents and interviewed the GRA, political parties, civil society organizations, media professionals, other USG agencies, international organizations, Angolan and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), IDPs and ex-combatants (MPLA and UNITA), and other key informants. The team's Statement of Work, persons contacted, and documents reviewed are found at Annexes A-C of this report.

2. CONTEXT

2.1 Angola Country Setting

Two major factors – oil and war – have driven Angola's development in the past two decades. Prior to independence, agriculture was the base of Angola's robust economy. It sustained a high GDP growth rate, was the world's fourth largest coffee exporter, and exported over 400,000 MT of maize annually. However:

Since the late 1980s, oil receipts have accounted for more than half of [Angola's] GDP and caused distortions typical of oil exporting economies commonly known as “Dutch Disease.” This refers to the problems of exchange rate overvaluation and relative price distortions that result in strong urban bias and stagnation of non-oil exports and import competing sectors. Diamonds constitute an additional factor. The activities most adversely affected are those most exposed to competition from abroad, in this case, agriculture and light manufacturing and agro-processing sectors which have been virtually 100% replaced by imports in the large urban markets on the coast. Angola's exports of both of its major pre-oil export crops, maize and coffee, are now near zero.²

The activities affected by “Dutch Disease” are also those most affected by the war. Vast areas of the country have not been cultivated in decades due to displacement caused by combat, and many of those fields have been mined, preventing cultivation in the near future. Major light industry and agro-processing plants, notably in Huambo and Malanje, were destroyed by bombing. Market access was cut off as roads and bridges were destroyed. Because the oil is exploited off-shore, it has been protected from

² Steven Kyle, “The Political Economy of Long-Run Growth in Angola – Everyone Wants Oil and Diamonds but They Can Make Life Difficult,” Working Paper, Department of Applied Economics and Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, USA, WP2002-07, April 2002, pp. 5-6.

the war. By 2001, oil dominated the economy, accounting for 54% of GDP, followed by trade (16%), agriculture (8%), diamonds (6%), manufacturing (4%) and other (12%).³

The volatility of oil prices leaves Angola susceptible to extreme swings in fiscal revenue, making macroeconomic management more difficult than in a country with a more diversified economy. In 1999-2000, the GRA floated the exchange rate and instituted a number of public expenditures controls, which brought down inflation from a peak of 12,035% (on a year-on-year basis) in July 1996 to 116% in December 2001. However, observers have noted that the reduction in 2000-2001 was facilitated by a surge in Government revenue and international reserves made possible by the high oil prices.⁴ It is not yet clear what the combined effects of the decreased oil prices of 2002 and the peace will have on the economy.

Oil and war have also exacerbated a number of historical axes of polarization in Angola. These include tensions between the ports versus the interior; rural/agricultural areas versus urban/ industrial areas; ethnic tensions (the coastal Mbundu/Mestiço versus the upland Ovimbundu); and followers of the MPLA versus UNITA.⁵ In very gross summary, Angola's coastal, urban, Mbundu/ Mestiço, MPLA-dominated areas have survived the war much better than the interior, rural/agricultural, Ovimbundu, UNITA-dominated areas.

With the exception of the small elite that control the oil and diamond receipts, however, both of these groups suffer greatly due to the twin effects of the "Dutch Disease" and war. Even by sub-Saharan African standards Angola's overall socio-economic indicators are dismal, ranking among the worst in the world. The Angolan National Statistics Institute (INE) estimates the 2002 population as 14.2 million, with an estimated 60% of the population living in urban areas (2001) and 22% -- or about 3.1 million people -- living in Luanda (2000). Of the urban population, in 2001, 63% -- or 5.4 million people -- lived below the poverty line and 24.7% -- or about 2 million people -- lived below the extreme poverty line. Most of the urban population is self-employed, with about 63% in Luanda and 43% in urban areas nationwide engaged in the informal sector.⁶ The proportion of female-headed households was high, with 29% in urban areas and 33% in rural areas. Reliable income data are not available for the rural population, but in most areas of the country they are engaged in agriculture -- crop production, livestock, and fishing -- and no better off than their urban counterparts in terms of income. About 960,000 Angolans are totally destitute, with 430,000 in IDP camps and transit areas, and 430,000 in ex-FMU quartering areas (August 2002). Approximately 478,000 Angolans are refugees in neighboring countries (August 2002).

According to a Multi-Indicator Cluster Study (MICS) conducted in accessible urban and rural areas by INE in 2001 -- and thus limited to those areas not cut off by the war -- the total fertility rate was 7.1 in 2001, and the population growth rate was 3%, both of which are among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa. The contraceptive prevalence rate was low, estimated at 8% nationally, with 6% in urban areas and only 2% in rural areas. The 2001 MICS also found that the infant mortality rate was 150 per 1,000 and the under-five mortality rate was a shocking 250 per 1,000. By comparison, the levels for sub-Saharan Africa were 108 and 175, placing Angola, with all of its oil wealth, among the lowest ranking countries on the continent. UNICEF, WHO, and UNFPA estimated the 1995 maternal mortality rate at 1,300 per 100,000

³ United Nations System in Angola Common Country Assessment 2002, "Angola: The Post-War Challenges," p. 61, citing the IMF.

⁴ United Nations, p. 63.

⁵ Kyle, pp. 13-22.

⁶ The Household Income and Expenditure Survey (IDR) was carried out in Cabinda (city), Luanda, Benguela (cities of Benguela, Lobito and Catumbela), Lunda North (cities of Dundo and Chitato), Huila (city of Lubango), Namibe and Cunene. Data cited here are presented in the UN Common Country Assessment, p. 102.

live births (model-based estimate), again worse than the sub-Saharan Africa average of 1,100. The GRA estimates that 8.6% of the Angolan population is HIV positive, indicating a generalized epidemic.

Improving these social indicators and the living conditions for such a vast number of people living in severe poverty would be a daunting task in the best of circumstances, and Angola's post-conflict setting is certainly less than ideal. Mines and other UXO are scattered throughout the country, some of which will take years to clear. Roads are mine-infested and/or in very poor shape, and many will be closed once the rains begin in September-October. Bridges critical to intra- and inter-provincial trade have been destroyed. Only about 10 miles of the Benguela-Lubumbashi railroad across the high plateau, and about one-third of the more southerly Namibe-Menongue railroad, are open, depriving small farmers in the interior of much-needed market access. Electricity in several provincial capitals and many municipalities is severely limited or non-existent. Basic services, including public health, basic education, agricultural extension, telephone, and post, have been decimated.

In June 2002, Angola's President dos Santos publicly stated that the consolidation of peace, with a speedy and firm resolution of the immediate consequences of war, is the country's main priority at this time. This includes completing outstanding provisions of the Lusaka Protocol, including, *inter alia*, the reinsertion of about 79,000 ex-FMU combatants and 350,000 family members back into civilian communities, creating safe conditions for and resettling an estimated 1.7 million IDPs (although these numbers are moving targets), working on a new Constitution, revising electoral legislation and registration procedures, and re-establishing civil administration in all territories. The GRA must grapple with these difficult social and political challenges while at the same time re-establishing schools and health services essential to improve the dismal socio-economic indicators above, and rehabilitating infrastructure to provide access to markets and promote more balanced and equitable economic growth. Finally, the GRA must complement attention to tangible improvements with serious work on policy and the enabling environment, particularly economic reform. Whether there is political will to do any of the above is discussed in section 5 below.

The U.S. national interests in helping Angola address these challenges are based on substantial U.S. economic interests and on the need to promote stability and development in southern and central Africa. The U.S. is the largest foreign investor and producer in Angola's oil industry, making Angola one of the U.S.'s largest investment sites in sub-Saharan Africa. Angola is one of the U.S.'s largest trading partners in Africa and supplies about 5% of the U.S.'s oil. It is also slated to assume the chair of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in September 2002, which will give it more of a voice in regional policies and programs. U.S. goals in Angola promote the achievement of lasting peace; a successful democratic transition with the protection of human rights; Angola's economic development and integration in the region; U.S. economic interests and commercial interests; reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS; and humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance to those affected by the conflict.

The USG is committed to facilitating Angola's consolidation of peace and implementation of all stages of the Lusaka Protocol, working both with the GRA and with other international and national partners. Determining priorities among the urgent competing needs, and between the urgent and longer-term requirements for Angola's sustainable development, will require continued consultation and commitment among all involved during this critical post-conflict period.

2.2 Emerging Post-Conflict Challenges

The UN Common Country Assessment (CCA) identifies seven key challenges for post-conflict recovery in Angola that should form the core focus of the forthcoming Interim Poverty Reduction and Strategy Paper (I-PRSP). These challenges are:⁷

- Post-conflict measures: reconciliation, demobilization, return of IDPs and refugees, mine action, and community recovery.
- The reduction of urban and rural poverty through policies that promote improved access of the poor to employment, land, and other resources.
- An adequate response to the high levels of urbanization and the country's other demographic problems.
- The diversification of the economy, away from extreme oil dependence through policies that promote development of the non-oil sectors.
- The rebuilding of the social sectors, with particular emphasis on basic social services.
- The mounting of an effective national response to HIV/AIDS.
- The development of political participation and democratic accountability, and the strengthening of public administration, including systems for ensuring rigor and transparency in the management of public resources.

As noted in the CCA, these challenges are inter-related and long-term, and should form the basis of the GRA's poverty reduction program. The GRA is working on a longer-term I-PRSP and it is hoped that it will be completed in early 2003, prior to a donor conference. The GRA is also collaborating with the donor community to develop both short- (6-12 months) and longer-term (over 12 months) plans to address the urgent needs brought about by the peace. For discussion purposes, these can be grouped into four major imperatives: 1) implementation of the Luena MOU and Lusaka Protocol; 2) advancing more participatory and transparent government; 3) settlement of IDPs and returning refugees; and 4) physical, economic, and psycho-social recovery, rehabilitation, and reconciliation at the community, municipal, provincial, and national level. Each of these imperatives has both short- and longer-term dimensions which are briefly summarized below.

2.2.1 Implementation of Luena MOU and Lusaka Protocol

In the short term, the GRA's implementation of the Luena MOU and the related Lusaka Protocol is focusing on the military processes, including demilitarization (completed), demobilization (completed), reinsertion, and reintegration of about 79,000 ex-FMU soldiers and about 350,000 of their family members. About 5,000 ex-combatants have been absorbed into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). The balance, with their families, are living in quartering areas around the country, supported in part by the GRA but with significant assistance from the international humanitarian community.

The agreements call for their reinsertion into civilian life and reintegration into communities to happen within 262 days, but both participants in and observers to the process agree that achieving this short timetable will not be possible. The demilitarization and demobilization processes were completed on August 2, 2002. The assessment team found general consensus that decisions on the reinsertion (into civilian life) and reintegration (into communities) processes would take some time, and that the ex-combatants were likely to stay in the quartering areas at least through the 2002-2003 rains.⁸ Subsequent

⁷ United Nations Common Country Assessment, p. 50 ff.

⁸ The rainy season in Angola runs from September – March, depending on the province, with a break in January-February when a first harvest generally occurs.

to the team's visit, however, there were indications that the GRA would try to move them out in the last quarter of CY 2002. It is clearly a fluid situation that needs careful monitoring.

The institution charged with day-to-day management of the reinsertion and reintegration process was to be the Institute of Social Reintegration for Ex-Military, or IRSEM, which falls under the Ministry of Social Reinsertion (MINARS). In June 2002, however, the GRA created a higher-level body to "ensure articulation between the Government and other institutions implementing the Lusaka Protocol," including coordinating GRA reintegration programs for both demobilized soldiers and IDPs. This body, the National Commission for Social and Productive Reintegration of Displaced and Demobilized, is informally known as the National Reintegration Commission, or NRC. The NRC is essentially a "super-ministry," chaired by the Minister of the Interior and including most other relevant Ministers. The NRC has an Executive Committee, chaired by the Minister of MINARS, and a Technical Group. As of August 2002, it was not entirely clear what the relationship of IRSEM was to the new Commission. It was also not clear what the relationship of newly created Provincial Commissions were to the central organizational structure.

This array of institutions is in the process of developing a plan for the reinsertion and resettlement that would begin in late CY 2002 or early CY 2003, involving cash reinsertion payments and a range of "packages" to help families re-establish their lives. The type and extent of the packages (food, non-food items, seeds and tools, training, etc.) are still being worked out. The international community is exposing the parties to the experience of other countries, notably Mozambique and Sierra Leone, to help them understand the complexity of the reinsertion/reintegration process so that it is carried out with minimal potential for conflict.

The World Bank is expected to assist with the reinsertion payments and some of the packages, with a Project Preparation Facility expected to guide early planning and procurement beginning late 2002 and the full project beginning in early-to-mid-2003. The humanitarian community is gearing up to provide food and non-food items, including seeds and tools, to sustain the quartering areas until the reinsertion phase begins. As of early September 2002, however, the situation was described as "deteriorating,"⁹ with humanitarian food and other supplies not reaching the quartering areas. Again, the situation needs close monitoring as plans evolve.

Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol calls for a host of political and administrative processes, including: establishment of a Joint Commission to maintain the political space for UNITA to establish itself as a political party¹⁰; drafting of a new constitution; revision of electoral legislation and registration procedures; undertaking a national reconciliation campaign; and numerous other actions. United Nations Resolution 1433 (2002) passed on August 15, 2002 establishes a UN Mission in Angola (UNMA) with a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to Angola to chair the Joint Commission and help move these processes along. As of the team's departure from Luanda (August 16, 2002) it was not clear how soon this will happen, nor how the GRA will organize to work with the SRSG. Annex D includes information available to date on Resolution 1443.

2.2.2 Advancing More Participatory and Transparent Governance

The end of hostilities in the long-standing Angolan civil war presents a unique yet challenging environment to advocate for more participatory and transparent governance. While the political liberalization of 1991-92 opened the way to pluralistic politics, greater independent media and the

⁹ LUANDA 2248 dated 5 September 2002, paragraph 3.

¹⁰ Of interest is that the Lusaka Protocol talks only about two parties, UNITA and the MPLA-dominated GRA. Planned representation of other political parties and civil society is noticeably absent.

emergence of civil society organizations, the GRA was able to justify the lack of movement on implementing many of the political reforms because of the resumption of the conflict with UNITA at the end of 1992 and the corresponding high levels of insecurity and humanitarian crises which continued until the signing of the ceasefire on April 4, 2002.

For a broad cross section of Angolan society, including civil society organizations, opposition political parties, the independent media, and the churches, the end of the war provides an important and timely opportunity to expand political space, promote more transparent and accountable governance, and lay the foundation for free and fair elections. Indeed, because of GRA statements about holding elections in 2004 or 2005, the period leading up to elections should be viewed as a real but limited window of opportunity to pursue greater democratization. While the Lusaka and Luena agreements contain commitments to certain political reforms, these mainly focus on UNITA and a widely held view outside the government is that there needs to be a broad national discussion of Angola's future and more comprehensive efforts at reconciliation.

Engaging the government and the ruling party in this dialogue and eliciting much needed political reforms will not be easy. The existing political structure is highly centralized, the MPLA controls a majority in the National Assembly, and more than a billion dollars in off-budget oil revenue provides the political elite with substantial resources to co-opt opposition forces. Nevertheless, the current state of peace deprives the government of one of its standard rationales for tight political and economic control.

One of the most fundamental development challenges facing Angola is to ensure that the country's large public revenues, generated mainly by oil, are used to meet the priority needs of the population and begin a transition towards long term development. Supporting civil society and opposition parties to mount a unified campaign for greater accountability and transparency will be an important challenge for the short and medium term.

The GRA will be re-establishing state administrations in numerous municipalities and communes where IDPs and other vulnerable groups will be returning to during the next year or two. Community-based approaches to support reintegration efforts should include efforts to get the beneficiaries to interact with local authorities in a participatory manner to identify priority needs and foster more transparent governance.

2.2.3 Settlement of IDPs and Returning Refugees

The third imperative of the GRA is to settle or resettle the IDPs and returning refugees. The GRA estimates that there are 4 million IDPs. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported in mid-August 2002 that approximately 380,000 of these were in IDP camps or transit areas, and about 150,000 had started to return home. The remaining approximately 3.5 million IDPs were clustered in residential areas near urban centers and/or food distribution sites throughout the country. There is general agreement that there were 478,000 Angolan refugees in neighboring countries in July 2002. There is no real consensus on the part of the GRA or international community on how many IDPs will return home or otherwise resettle, and how many will stay where they are. OCHA's estimate in August 2002, based on draft Provincial Reintegration and Resettlement Plans (PEPARRs), was that 1.7 million would resettle. Using the GRA's figure of 4 million as the total IDP population, this means that about 2.3 million will settle *in situ*.

In the short term, the goal is to stabilize the overall health of vulnerable populations so that they are strong enough to return home and begin to restore their livelihoods. The draft OCHA Planning Scenario for July-December 2002 assumes that the humanitarian situation will remain critical for that period, although improvements will occur: 1) the nutrition situation will stabilize in areas where humanitarian

assistance is provided; 2) the circulation of goods and people will continue to expand; 3) humanitarian agencies will be able to reach newly accessible areas; and 4) significant numbers of IDPs will begin returning to their points of origin or resettle in locations with access to land. The July USAID Humanitarian Assessment of July 2002 provides more detail on the humanitarian needs in this period.

In late July the GRA issued a plan for IDP and ex-FMU resettlement that the transition/development assessment team was able to review in summary. It envisages the return and resettlement of 1.5 million IDPs, corresponding to 310,000 families, and over 350,000 family members of ex-FMU soldiers. The plan foresees two phases lasting a total of six months, from July to December 2002, with a total cost of US\$90 million. It is not clear if the GRA intends to pay for this itself or to seek assistance of the donor community. The plan appears to be quite ambitious, given the state of provincial infrastructure and administration, and – if funded – will likely take much longer than the six months envisioned.

OCHA assumes that between July and December 2002:

- About 300,000 IDPs living in camps, transit centers and among resident populations will return to their homes. Between 100,000 and 150,000 IDPs will probably remain in camps and centers by the end of the year, with many more living among host communities.
- Up to 80,000 refugees may try to spontaneously return.

Key informant interviews suggest that the IDP settlement or resettlement process is already underway and will be fluid, with some adult family members likely to return and begin to cultivate land while more vulnerable family members remain in the IDP camps on food aid rations. The humanitarian community is well informed on the status of IDPs and is monitoring and facilitating the spontaneous return process. Of concern are those areas where there is fertile land but many anti-personnel mines and UXO; OCHA and its partners are working hard to inform potential returnees of the dangers and are trying to accelerate the de-mining process in those areas.

In the medium and longer-term, the GRA and the international community will need to work on facilitating the voluntary resettlement of IDPs who wish to return, assisting the resettled to restore their livelihoods and rebuild assets, and helping communities to revitalize social services and rehabilitate infrastructure. The focus would be on agricultural development in rural areas and micro-enterprise / informal sector development in urban areas, as well as provision of HIV/AIDS and basic health and education services. In early 2003, the humanitarian community will need to address the difficult issue of when to close the IDP camps and transit centers, and/or to declare them “communities” to be assisted in the same manner as resettled communities. The assessment team’s discussions with members of the humanitarian community suggest that this “weaning process” off of humanitarian aid will be done on a sliding scale, with rations/assistance cut by half during 2003, and half again following the harvest in early 2004. This scenario suggests that the transition from emergency to development will take at least three years.

2.2.4 Physical, Economic, and Psycho-Social Recovery, Rehabilitation, And Reconciliation

The humanitarian community and most of the media has focused on the political and humanitarian processes summarized above. At the same time, the GRA must begin the difficult process of rebuilding the country in all dimensions. Given the fact that the civil war began at independence, and some areas of the country have not been subject to a “national administration” since colonial times, this will take considerable effort. The assessment team saw some encouraging movement, in terms of road, rail, and bridge repair; reconstruction of public utilities and postal services; and restoration of market networks. The U.S. and international private sector is also providing needed assistance. An enormous amount remains to be accomplished if the country is to achieve its former robust, diversified economy.

In the short-term, the GRA must continue to focus on critical physical infrastructure, re-knitting the nation through a functional network of roads, rail, and telecommunications within and between provinces. This infrastructure is essential to both national security and to re-opening markets necessary to stimulate development. The GRA must also provide incentives to private banks to establish branches in the provinces to facilitate the movement of cash and to provide debt and equity capital for rebuilding. It needs to begin to mobilize public health (including HIV/AIDS), basic education, and agricultural extension services to provide support to the resettling IDPs and resident communities trying to restore their livelihoods. As stated in 2.2.2 above, it needs to advance participatory and transparent governance. Part of this will be to initiate a national information and reconciliation campaign to foster public understanding of and participation in the recovery and rebuilding process.

In the medium- and longer-term, the GRA needs to continue all of the above, and in addition focus on the more difficult challenges identified by the United Nations regarding poverty reduction in rural and urban areas, economic diversification, addressing HIV/AIDS, continued development of political participation and democratic accountability, and the strengthening of public administration, including systems for ensuring rigor and transparency in the management of public resources. It is likely that the “short-term” actions outlined above will take a minimum of three years to complete. The GRA needs to keep the longer-term needs on its agenda – presumably through a well-articulated Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, or PRSP -- so that it is poised to move forward as the recovery winds down.

2.3 USG Policies and Programs

As stated above, the USG has several national interests in Angola, and is committed to assisting its transition from the current post-conflict emergency to a more sustainable development status. Table 1 on the next page provides a summary of USG assistance to Angola in FY 2002. Based on the July 2002 Humanitarian Assessment and this August 2002 Transition & Development Assessment, and with some caveats noted below, it is likely that USG assistance in FY 2003 will be similar in levels and mix.

The table shows that the USG is providing significant food aid; when combined, the USAID/FFP Emergency Food Aid, USAID/FFP Monetization, and USDA Section 416(b) Emergency Food Aid reached almost US\$78.5 million in FY 2002, accounting for about 70 % of all food aid to Angola in the period. Although Section 416(b) resources are not available in FY 2003, it is likely that FFP will identify other means of meeting needs.

The USG is also providing significant non-food aid and transition assistance, of which approximately US\$20 million was provided through USAID’s Office of Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and almost US\$20 million through Development Assistance (DA), and Economic Support Funds (ESF). Depending on the pace of the short-term measures summarized above, it is projected that the emergency funding will gradually decrease in FY 2004 and out-years while the DA and ESF remain stable or increase slightly.

The Department of State provides significant support to de-mining, with US\$2.8 million in new funds provided in FY 2002 and US\$5 million planned for FY 2003. It also provides assistance to Congolese refugees seeking safety in Angola.

The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provided about US\$1 million in FY 2002 to support pilot efforts in HIV/AIDS voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) and plans to establish a field presence in Angola in FY 2003, with two expatriate staff. CDC is expected to be a valuable partner in the health and HIV/AIDS sectors, with FY 2003 funding projected at about US\$2 million. CDC will assist the GRA in establishing norms, standards, and protocols for VCT and, depending on progress, in the future will address prevention of mother to child transmission (PMTCT) and possibly tuberculosis (TB).

Figure 1: US Government Assistance to Angola FY 2002

ORGANIZATION	SECTOR	PROVINCES	AMOUNT
USAID/FFP Emergency Food Aid Title II P.L. 480	Food Assistance (World Food Program (WFP) & International Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC)	Countrywide	\$42,000,000
USAID/FFP Title II P.L. 480 Monetization	Food Assistance Agriculture	Planalto	\$ 7,798,000
USAID/Angola DA: \$14,226,600 (NOA) <u>1,750,000 (C/O)</u> \$15,976,600 ESF: \$ 3,000,000 (NOA) <u>691,000 (C/O)</u> \$ 3,691,000	Agriculture Health HIV/AIDS Democracy & Governance Land Tenure & Media	Planalto Countrywide Luanda, Cabinda Countrywide	\$19,667,600
USAID/Washington DA: \$ 1,400,000 (NOA) <u>301,730 (C/O)</u> \$ 1,701,730	Adult Literacy (ALFALIT) Child Survival (Christian Children Fund)	Luanda Huila	\$ 1,701,730
USAID/OFDA Non-Food Aid Emergency/Transition Assistance	Water/Sanitation; Emergency Health/Nutrition; Emergency Preparedness; Agriculture/Food Security; Demobilization Assistance; UN Field Coordination; UN Emergency Response Fund; UN Field Security; UN Air Services; UN Assessment & Mapping; UN Seeds & Tools Coordination	Countrywide	\$20,350,370
USDA - Section 416 (b)	Emergency Food Aid (WFP)	Countrywide	\$28,700,000
Department of State PRM ESF EDDI PM/HDP	Aid to Congolese Refugees Democracy & Governance, VOA Girls Scholarship Program Humanitarian De-Mining	Uige, Zaire, Luanda Luanda Countrywide	\$ 790,000 \$ 1,000,000 \$ 150,000 \$*5,800,000
TOTAL			\$127,957,700

NOA = New Operating Authority, C/O = Carry-Over

September 30, 2002

* Includes \$3M in FY 01 funds expended in FY 02

Although not governmental, the U.S. – Angola Chamber of Commerce is working closely with the U.S. Embassy to foster more diverse U.S. trade and investment in Angola. It hosted a trade mission to Angola in May 2002 in which twelve organizations participated, ranging from the field of data processing, environment and conservation, industry, water systems, transportation, aviation, legal services, shipping, and banking. Other activities to foster U.S. private investment in Angola are planned. Through the Chamber, members with business in Angola – BP, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Texaco, and others -- have

partnered with USAID to address HIV/AIDS, with over US\$1 million in contributions to date. Section 4 identifies other potential alliances between USAID and the private sector, and encourages the resident mission to pursue these vigorously.

2.5 Other Donor Policies and Programs

Donor coordination for humanitarian assistance has generally been productive in Angola. OCHA has routinely provided a strong lead for donors and NGOs to meet humanitarian needs, through the Consolidated Appeal and other technical and logistical coordination fora at the national and provincial levels. The broader donor community – humanitarian as well as development -- has recently begun more regular collaboration based on the strong leadership of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) resident representative. The UNDP and European Union (EU) recently sponsored a study of aid based on OECD data which found that total overseas development assistance to Angola in 2000 reached 346 million euros (US\$320 million). The study found that rehabilitation and development projects absorbed 44% or 148 million euros (US\$137 million) and 56%, or 194 million euros (US\$179 million), went to humanitarian aid, including 166 million euros (US\$153.5 million) for food aid.¹¹

The UNDP reports that total humanitarian assistance – the Consolidated Appeal plus bilateral aid --to Angola reached US\$137 million in 2001, with the US providing 40.37%, multilateral organizations with 10.95%, Sweden with 7.13%, the Netherlands with 6.9%, the EU with 5.62%, and smaller donors completing the rest.¹² For 2002, the UN reported that as of 15 July 2002, the total of humanitarian assistance in response to the Consolidated Appeal alone was US\$81 million, of which the US provided 53.31%, the EU 16.18%, Netherlands 7.23%, Sweden 7.08%, and Italy, the UK, Ireland, Japan, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Finland, Germany, and private/NGO/others 1.73%.

Data on rehabilitation and development assistance are not so readily available. In addition to OCHA and UNDP, UN system partners active in Angola include UNAIDS, WFP, FAO, and UNICEF. UNHCR may return to facilitate return of the refugees in neighboring countries. The UNDP has provided valuable assistance in planning, through the Common Country Assessment cited previously in this paper, and the Economic Development analysis cited in this section. The other UN agencies direct most of their resources to humanitarian efforts.

As shown in Table 1, the USG provided about US\$20 million in DA and ESF and almost US\$8 million in P.L. 480 Title II for development purposes in FY 2002, in maternal-child health, HIV/AIDS, democracy-governance, and food security. The U.S. is generally considered the largest rehabilitation and development donor, in parallel with the European Union. The EU is planning a five-year 120 million euro commitment to support the peace transition process. It is expected to be announced in October 2002.

The British Department for International Development (DfID) reports that for CY 2002 it has allocated 1.9 million pounds (US\$2.974 million) for its development program-urban poverty reduction, in addition to 2.3 million pounds (US\$3.6 million) for humanitarian assistance. DfID plans a one time spike in the near future to 6 million pounds (US\$9.4 million). Spain's levels for 2002 are 5.2 million euros (US\$5.163 million) for development and 0.7 million euros (US\$695,030) for humanitarian assistance, plus contributions to WFP. Their development activities include programs in health and education (1 million euros, or about US\$993,000, each) and some support to civil society, energy, environment, agriculture, fisheries, and financial services. Their education program is post-graduate university training.

¹¹ UNDP, Angola Economic Development in 2001, Office of the Resident Representative, UNDP, Luanda, Angola, 20-03-2002, p. 3.

¹² Ibid.

Norwegian aid (NORAD) is providing US\$13.3 million in development funding in addition to US\$6.6 million in humanitarian funds in 2002, with an additional US\$2 million available for shortfalls in either category. Their development activities include programs in DG and education as well as direct institutional support to the Ministry of Energy and Water, the Ministry of Petroleum, and the Ministry of Planning. Norway supported the elaboration of INE's 5-year program, and the UNDP reports that donors are ready to support it, but the Council of Ministers has not yet endorsed the program. Certainly a solid statistical base in order to plan and monitor progress will be essential as the country rebuilds, and the donor community is encouraging approval of the program.

The GRA has not been able to reach agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on performance evaluation of its reforms package. A Staff Monitored Program (SMP) was adopted in April 2000; it included an economic and financial component, plus a PRSP. The deadline envisaged for implementing the SMP measures was initially set for December 2000 but was extended by six months to give the GRA more time. But the July 2001 IMF review found that progress achieved was not sufficient. President Dos Santos wrote a letter to the IMF Managing Director reaffirming his intention to reach an agreement with the IMF by the end of the year, followed by a Paris Club session to examine the debt; the GRA requested extra time to comply. Progress by the end of 2001 was not deemed sufficient by the IMF and the SMP expired with no successor in sight.

The lack of an SMP with the IMF has restricted programming by the multilateral financial institutions that would normally be expected to assist in reconstruction. The World Bank, as mentioned earlier, is planning a project to facilitate reinsertion and reintegration of ex-FMU, but has no other projects active or in the pipeline. The African Development Bank is noticeably absent from the donor scene.

3. STRATEGIC ASSUMPTIONS


As stated above, since the April 2002 signing of the Luena MOU there is new impetus for the U.S. to work with Angola to stabilize the peace, reinvigorate the democratic transition, restore livelihoods, and establish conditions for equitable social and economic development. In light of this, the assessment team has reviewed potential adjustments to USAID's assistance strategy and tactics to meet the new conditions. Sections 3.1-3.4 provide a summary of the strategic framework. Sections 4 - 6 provide more detail on tactics to achieve results for each strategic objective (SO).

3.1 USAID Strategic Framework for FY 2001-2005

USAID started operations in Angola in 1996 after the 1994 Lusaka Protocol was signed. Its initial strategy ran from FY 1996-2000 and was based on a transition to peace scenario in the aftermath of the Protocol. In spite of the failure of the Protocol to provide lasting peace, USAID maintained a presence in Angola, providing emergency (OFDA and FFP), development (DA and ESF), and OTI funding primarily through NGOs and international organizations throughout the first strategic plan.

The current Country Strategic Plan (CSP) covers FY 2001-2005 with the goal of *Households and communities in targeted areas improve their food security, health status, and participation in political processes*. As shown in Figure 2 below, the strategy is based on a three-pronged approach that envisages a transition from emergency to development.

Figure 2: Emergency – to – Development Continuum



The strategy defines each of the stages, but emphasizes that the distinctions among the three are not clean, nor do they occur in linear fashion. The original strategy was prescient in assuming that it is possible, indeed likely, that two, possibly all three conditions will be present at any given time and at any given place. This is certainly the case in post-Luena Angola. It is helpful, however, to use the diagram to conceptualize the stages of a program and to identify results, activities, and indicators of success at each stage.

The FY 2001-2005 CSP has three strategic objectives with 11 intermediate results:

SO5: *Enhanced Household Food Security in Targeted Communities.*

IR5.1 Vulnerable households become more food self-sufficient.

IR5.2 High-value crops produced and marketed more effectively.

SO6: *Constituencies Promoting Democratic Governance Strengthened.*

IR6.1 Greater availability of information on key issues.

IR6.2 Improved civic advocacy on key issues.

IR6.3 Improved Government-constituency relations.

SO7: *Increased Use of MCH and HIV/AIDS Services and/or Products and Improved Health Practices.*

IR7.1 Increased access to MCH services.

IR7.2 Increased demand for MCH services.

IR7.3 Increased quality of MCH services.

IR7.4 Increased demand for condoms.

IR7.5 Increased access to condoms.

IR7.6 Improved enabling environment.

There is also one Special Objective (SpO), *More Market-Oriented Economic Analysis Used in the Decision-Making Process* that has not achieved results due to lack of funding. In its FY 2002 Annual Report Cover Memo, with emphatic Country Team backing, the Mission requested funding of US\$500,000 per year for long- and short-term assistance to the Central Bank. In the absence of such funding, the Mission proposed terminating the SpO at the end of FY 2002.

The team carefully reviewed the current strategy and identified the following strategic assumptions to guide the Mission in planning for the final three years of the CSP:

The Mission's Country Strategic Plan for FY 2001-2005 remains valid and should continue to guide the USAID program in Angola.

In spite of the lack of funding and the inability of the IMF and the GRA to agree on an SMP, the team urges USAID/Angola to retain the SpO so that it is well-positioned to address targets of opportunity should an SMP and/or PRSP be developed.

In light of significant planned funding in support of the electoral process, which is essential to fulfillment of the Lusaka Protocol, the Mission may consider adding one IR related to elections to its SO6, Constituencies Promoting Democratic Governance Strengthened.

3.2 Resources Available

The Africa Bureau advised the team to make the following strategic assumption:

Significant additional resources will not be available. A re-focused strategy and plans must be largely made within existing resource (DA, ESF, non-emergency P.L. 480 Title II) levels for FY 2003 and 2004. Some fall-out funding or regional programs may be available for compelling needs.

USAID/Angola should plan on receiving bilateral DA resources for FY 2003 at previously programmed levels. For FY 2003 and 2004, there may be some supplemental resources that could be accessed (e.g. regional monies, special initiatives) but recommendations should be cast in terms of what can/should be done within the existing program levels, and what could be done if additional resources are found. Resources may be less constrained in FY 2005.

This assumption has guided the conclusions and recommendations of the team. The assumption is that DA funds will remain relatively steady at about US\$13 million in new operating authority (NOA) per year throughout FY 2003 and 2004, with some increase possible thereafter, and that P.L. 480 Title II development resources will not exceed US\$10 million per year equivalent for the foreseeable future. Following the recommendations of the July Humanitarian Assessment, section 4 recommends opening a “second pipeline” for emergency food, to be managed by a consortium of P.L. 480 Cooperating Sponsor NGOs currently operating in Angola. OFDA funding is assumed to be available at least through FY 2003 at levels similar to FY 2002, and at lower levels thereafter. Annexes F-H present low, medium and high funding priorities should additional resources be made available in each sector to achieve results: democracy and governance both “with OTI” and “without OTI” funding, health and HIV/AIDS, and food security.

3.3 Demographic and Geographic Foci

The original focus for FY 2001-2005 was the provinces of Kuanza Norte, Kuanza Sul, Malanje, Bie, Benguela, Huambo, and Huila (ref. Map). The criteria used were: they are among the most war affected, the neediest, and have the greatest potential for agricultural and community reconstruction and development. While this focus has been maintained by the food security SO5, given the exigencies of the war, most of the democracy/governance (DG) SO6 work has been in Luanda. The DA-funded MCH and HIV/AIDS SO7 work has been underway in Luanda, with recent expansion to Benguela, Huila, and Cabinda. Using emergency resources, OFDA and FFP have provided significant support to MCH in the war-affected provinces.

The assessment team revisited the Mission’s current geographic focus in light of the demographic determinants of the current situation, i.e., attention to the needs of IDPs, ex-FMU and their families, and citizens in areas heavily affected by war. (Demographic variables related to the spread of HIV/AIDS were assessed separately.) It also reviewed the program coverage (current and potential new) to assure that it adequately responded to the needs of the GRA to meet the four imperatives summarize in section 2.2 above. With reference to Figure 3 on the following page, the team undertook an exercise ranking all 18 provinces in terms of three criteria: i) the number of ex-FMU and families currently in quartering areas in the province; ii) the number of IDPs in the province (it is assumed that about 80% of IDPs in a given province will end up settling in that province); and iii) the projected settling pattern of ex-FMU in the next one-to-three years, based on data from the earlier demobilization following Lusaka, and known UNITA strongholds.

Using this ranking system, the following provinces are in greatest need of assistance, in descending order:

Huambo, Bie, Benguela, Huila, Malanje, and Kuanza Sul. This incorporates all current focus provinces except Kuanza Norte, which had a low ranking for all criteria. The team, with key Mission staff, also decided that given Luanda's large percentage of the total population (reported at 22%, assumed to be closer to 30%), it should be retained as an area of focus, particularly for the HIV/AIDS program and for overall enabling environment issues.


Tactically, the Mission will focus transition and development efforts in Huambo, Bie, Benguela, Huila, Malanje, Kuanza Sul, and Luanda over the remainder of the current CSP. This does not mean that activities outside of those provinces will automatically terminate, or that exciting targets of opportunity will be ignored. The strategic assumption is that in order to marshal limited resources to achieve results and to foster inter-SO synergies across the emergency-transition-development continuum, increased geographic focus is indicated.

3.4 Timing

The assessment team devoted considerable time trying to arrive at projections of population movement and location, but in the end no crystal ball was found. Table 3 below provides a rough projection of what most key informants assumed the rate of population movement and transition to self-sufficiency would be on a national level. **The numbers should be considered indicative and not absolute.** *It is assumed that there will be considerable variation within and among provinces; the figure demonstrates, however, that a "quick fix" is not envisioned and the reintegration/resettlement process will take several years.*

Figure 3: Geographic Ranking

	Confirmed IDPs & Likely Settlement	Ex-FMU & Families in QAs	?? Settlement of Ex-FMU & Families	SUB-TOTALS
Bengo	9	6	3	18
Benguela	13	17	15	45
Bie	18	12	15	45
Cabinda	1	0	0	1
Cunene	3	7	2	12
Huambo	16	18	15	49
Huila	17	15	8	40
Kuando Kubango	8	16	2	26
Kuanza N	7	5	2	14
Kuanza S	14	10	7	34
Luanda	5	0	8	15
Lunde N	4	8	2	14
Lunde S	11	9	6	26
Malanje	15	11	7	33
Moxico	10	13	2	25
Namibe	6	0	2	8
Uige	12	14	2	28
Zaire	2	4	2	8
	Rank	Rank	100%	



NOTES: The shaded area represents the rainy season, which drives all settlement planning.

"100% support" is proxy for humanitarian support required to fully sustain destitute families.

"50% support" is proxy indicating that families are producing or earning about half of their requirements and humanitarian assistance is still required for the other half.

"25% support" indicates most families are self-sufficient but a "safety net" of humanitarian assistance is indicated.

The figure is based on the following basic assumptions:

- There were about 4 million IDPs in Angola as of August 2002.
- Approximately 1.7 million will want to return home and/or resettle, and approximately 2.3 million will stay where they are – in camps, transit areas, or residential areas.
- The **first cohort** is the 2.3 million who will stay where they are. The humanitarian community is only providing livelihood support to about 10% of these; the others may benefit from some health or other social services, but are living with relatives and/or supporting themselves as best they can. The 10% is assumed to require full support through the 2002-2003 rainy season, after which the GRA and international community will need to declare them "settled" rather than IDPs. They would then be shifted to 50% support through the 2003-2004 agricultural season, with complementary assistance in farming or non-farm micro-enterprise, to move toward self-support. A "safety net" estimated at 25% requirements would be maintained for the third year, 2004-2005, prior to assuming self-support.
- The **second cohort** of IDPs is estimated at 300,000, or almost 25% of those who chose to return home and/or resettle. This cohort is moving now (August-September 2002) in advance of the 2002-2003 agricultural season. They will require 100% support this year, and are likely to maintain the support by leaving one or more family members in camps or near food distribution sites while other family members farm the land.

- *The second cohort of 300,000 will have low productivity in their first year of production, due to inadequate time or labor to prepare the land. This cohort will thus require about 50% support through the FY 2003-2004 agricultural season, decreasing to 25% for the 2005-2005 season prior to achieving self-sufficiency.*
- *The **third cohort** of IDPs is estimated at about 1.4 million. It is assumed that this cohort will not move until mid-2003, and will thus be one year behind the assumed phase-down of support for the cohorts above.*
- *The **ex-FMU combatants** and their families will follow a similar pattern to the first and second IDP cohorts. The ex-FMU cohort is the most vulnerable to the political processes, however, and its conditions should be carefully monitored at all times.*

The figure does not include completion of the electoral process mandated by the Lusaka Protocol. This will be complex, and is on the agenda of the Joint Commission and SRSG. Currently, elections are planned for September 2004. Some observers suggest that these will be delayed until some unspecified date. It is assumed, however, that they will have an impact on program implementation and possibly on movement of populations. (Some observers suggest, for example, that it would be in UNITA's interest to slow down resettlement of the ex-FMUs until after the elections, so that UNITA voting blocks would be scattered throughout the country.)

It is assumed that some humanitarian assistance in FY 2003 and 2004 may be used for settlement and reintegration purposes – particularly seeds and tools – for IDPs (and possible ex-FMU) who chose to stay *in situ*. This situation will be assessed on a case-by-case basis in terms of suitability of locations for permanent settlement.

These assumptions, and the figure, lead to the conclusion that some IDPs will still be receiving limited humanitarian assistance -- a planned "safety net" for those who have difficulty resettling -- at the end of USAID's current strategy in September 2005. USAID's new strategy for FY 2006-2010 would thus be cast in terms of more durable rehabilitation and development actions.

4. HEALTH SECTOR FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Current Sectoral Setting

As summarized in section 2 above, the most current health indicators available for Angola, which only represent the accessible population areas, paint a grim picture for women and children. The under-5 mortality rate is 250 deaths per 1,000 live births. The infant mortality rate is estimated at 150 deaths per 1,000 live births. Contributing to the mortality rates are periodic measles epidemics. Only 33.9% of children aged 12-23 months have been vaccinated with DPT3. More than 45% of Angolan children suffer from stunting. Only 14% of children 0 to 4 months are exclusively breastfed. Malaria is the largest single cause of mortality in the total population, particularly among children and pregnant women.

Maternal mortality rate remains one of the highest in the world, reaching 1,300 deaths per every 100,000 live births (model-based estimate). Trained medical professionals assist in only 18% of live births and 80% of all deliveries occur at home. The contraceptive prevalence rate, representing both modern and traditional methods, is 6%. The total fertility rate is 7.1.

There has been a noticeable decay of the Angolan health system over the years. Poor management, logistical problems, low demand and inadequate funding are just a few of the reasons. The Government health expenditures in 2000 were 2% of the GDP. Only 20% of the population has access to essential drugs. 46% of the population using the government public health services cited the lack of medicines as

the major problem of the system. There are 5.5 doctors per 100,000 people, with the majority practicing in the capital city.

According to the Common Country Assessment 2002 done by the United Nations system in Angola, in 2001, the HIV prevalence rate among antenatal mothers has reached 8.6% in Luanda, compared with 2.2% only four years earlier. Similarly, studies of Luanda sex workers found a prevalence of 19.4 in 1999; 22% in 2000; and 33.8% in September 2001. The UN report postulates that at this rate of development of the epidemic, the adult prevalence rate will quickly reach the high levels currently seen across southern Africa: Namibia (22.5%), South Africa (20%), Zambia (21.5%), Swaziland (23.4%), Lesotho (31%), Zimbabwe (34%) and Botswana (38.5%) (UNAIDS).

The civil war which closed borders and roads, inhibited movement from rural to urban areas, and isolated Angola from bordering countries in southern Africa is thought to be one reason that Angola's prevalence rates are significantly lower than among its highly infected neighbors. With the end of the war in February 2002, borders are reopening to refugees, internally displaced populations are moving home, soldiers have been demobilized and are awaiting resettlement, and commercial trade with neighboring countries is being resumed. These factors could contribute to an explosion in HIV, particularly given the following contextual factors: multiple sex partners is condoned; condom use is low among both the general population and commercial sex workers; STI treatment facilities are rare; and knowledge about both the causes of HIV and its prevention are not widespread.

4.2 Current USAID Programs

Activities to address these dismal health statistics that are currently underway with USAID funding follow. All of these accrue results toward achieving SO7, *Increased Use of MCH and HIV/AIDS Services and/or Products and Improved Health Practices*.

- **Management Sciences for Health (MSH)**. The Mission's major bilateral MCH program was awarded three months ago to Management Sciences Health (MSH). MSH has two sub-grantees, International Medical Corp (IMC) and Save the Children Federation, US (SCF). The geographic focus of the program is Luanda. This was due to the insecurity found in the rest of the country when the cooperative agreement was awarded, the large population of Luanda and the technical assistance needs of the MOH. The major technical focus of the activity is primarily, maternal health and secondarily, child survival. The first year work-plan was approved in September 2002.
- **Child Survival Collaborations and Resources Group (CORE)**. Angola is one of the few remaining countries where polio has not been eradicated. Therefore, a coalition of five US-based Private and Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) have joined together to ensure the administration of polio vaccine. The PVOs represented in the agreement include Africare, CARE, CRS, Save the Children/US (SCF), and World Vision. Africare implements activities in Bie and Kwanza Sul provinces and reaches approximately 153,955 children. CARE works in Luanda, Huila and Bie provinces and reaches approximately 110,100 children. CRS focuses on Benguela province and reaches approximately 433,119 children. SCF works in Kwanza Sul and reaches approximately 149,921 children. Lastly, World Vision's activities target Kwanza Norte and Malanje reaching approximately 240,472 children.
- **WHO/Malaria**. This activity is a joint effort between MOH, WHO and USAID focuses on strengthening key aspects of the National Malaria Control Program and promote access to improved malaria treatment and prevention services in two of Angola's most malaria effected provinces: Malanje and Huambo. Luanda provides a special target of opportunity to pilot the promotion of intermittent presumptive treatment (IPT) for pregnant women in concert with the new USAID Maternal and Child Health program being implemented by MSH.

- **Displaced Children and Orphans Fund (DCOF).** These Congressionally earmarked funds support two activities in Angola. One, implemented by Save the Children/UK, supports family tracing and placement; strengthens the capacity of the National Children's Directorate within the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration for the effective management of the Family Tracing and Placement Program; formulates alternatives to institutionalization for children; and works at developing child protection legislation through social policy advice and advocacy. The other, implemented by Christian Children's Fund, improves the psychosocial well-being of children, reinforces knowledge of the psychosocial needs; improves adolescents' social integration; improves basic care for pre-school children; and influences public policy regarding the impact of violence on children and adolescents.
- **Leahy War Victims Funds (LWVF).** These funds are also Congressional earmarks. One activity is being implemented in Luena with these funds by the Vietnam Veterans American Foundation. This activity focuses on the distribution of prostheses for land mine victims. With the cessation of hostilities, the activities have recently been expanded into Moxico, Lunda Norte, and Lunda Sul provinces and refugee camps in Zambia.
- **Population Services International.** PSI will continue on-going activities within Luanda which targets commercial sex workers, adolescents, and police with behavior change interventions. Its current plans are to build a network of sales points to assure commercial distribution of condoms throughout the city. In FY 2003, PSI will expand its activities to Huambo, Benguela, and Huila where, with added UNICEF resources, it will build capacity of selected NGO partners to implement IEC programs, run community youth information centers, sell condoms and undertake other activities. In addition, to address the information and condom needs of the large numbers of persons in the quartering and family areas and IDP camps, PSI will work with the NGOs assigned to those areas to provide basic TA to these organizations so they can integrate HIV/AIDS programs into their on-going activities. Finally, PSI will put in place programs at the country borders of the main transport routes to educate both transport workers and returning refugees about HIV prevention and to sell condoms.

4.3 Opportunities and Challenges

With the end of the war, the GRA's need to expend large amounts of money in support of the conflict has disappeared. This theoretically should free up funds to begin to rebuild the health infrastructure and restore health programs which were ignored during much of the conflict. With the opening of the borders, Angolan refugees will be returning from surrounding countries, many of which have high HIV prevalence. Cross-border commercial transportation will be restored. Both of these facts could put Angolan citizens at higher risk of HIV infection. In addition, throughout Angola there are demobilized UNITA troops and families in quartering areas as well as thousands of people in IDP camps, presenting several time-limited opportunities for HIV/AIDS interventions.

Existing opportunities include:

- Strong coordination and collaboration between UNICEF, WHO and USAID. This coordination and collaboration can be expanded to support and strengthen work in other areas such as routine immunizations, a long-term strategic health plan for the Angolan government and family planning.
- Opportunities to leverage additional funding for HIV/AIDS through the Global Fund. PSI and a number of international and local NGOs have applied for Global Fund resources to work in such areas as VCT and care and support.
- Large population clusters receptive to change. With a large majority of the IDPs and ex-combatants in camps or clustered near Luanda and secondary cities, there is a window of opportunity to reach a large segment of the Angolan population. The next 12-36 months can be used to build a strong

foundation of knowledge and behaviors related to preventive health issues, including condom use, clean water, routine vaccinations, bednet use, etc.

The challenges include:

- Lack of physical and human infrastructure. The war has destroyed most of the physical health infrastructure in the interior of the country. Where there may still be a building standing, it is an empty shell. Rebuilding and equipping these buildings will take time and capital, both of which are scarce, given current conditions. At the same time, the lack of an education system to train and upgrade the skill level of health personnel has also been almost demolished. This void needs to be addressed at the same time as the physical infrastructure is rebuilt.
- Poor management and staff in the health sector. The Ministry of Health is seen as weak and ineffective. While there are a few shining stars, a vast majority of the public health sector personnel have no management or leadership skills and lack of commitment to their jobs.
- Lack of drugs and supplies. Paucity of essential medicines, including contraceptives, as well as a non-functioning distribution system, means that public sector facilities are unable to fulfill their mandate of free health care, particularly for the poor.
- The poor policy environment for HIV/AIDS. In 1999, the government adopted the National Strategic Plan for Sexually Transmitted Diseases, HIV and AIDS. The initial plan for 2000-2002 aimed to prevent transmission of STDs and HIV/AIDS and reduce the negative effects at family, community and national levels. The main emphasis of the plan included awareness raising especially for youth; availability of condoms; improved access to voluntary counseling and testing (VCT); prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) through anti-retroviral (ARV) therapy and blood screening. In addition, the government is exploring developing capacity to manufacture ARVs. There is a draft law on HIV under preparation. To date, however, little progress has been made to operationalize the plan. A key element of the plan, supported by most of the donors, is the establishment of a high-level multisectoral body to provide leadership across all ministries. This has not been put into place or even planned for. Further, according to the CCA report, government commitment through the Ministry of Health has been minimal amounting to \$2.8 million in 2001 and \$430,000 in 2002.
- Need for proactive military engagement in AIDS prevention. UNAIDS notes that in the late 90s, figures from Zimbabwe and Cameroon showed military HIV infection rates 3 to 4 times higher than in the civilian population. In general, because of transience, and separation from families, military personnel the world over are considered to be at high risk of contracting HIV. Angola, which has had large numbers of men and women in the military for the past 27 years, would be no exception. The June 2001 report of the CDC team quoted a 1998 study of HIV prevalence in the army at 15%. A CDC epidemiologist, in an August 2002 meeting quoted studies showing 8% and 30%. Army sources in August 2002 stated prevalence rates in a 2002 study of units around the country were 4.3% in Luanda; 4.7% in Cabinda and 5.0% in Saurimo. The actual prevalence is probably somewhere between 4.3% and 30%. The Army procured 2 million condoms in mid 2002.
- Need to assure uninterrupted supplies of free condoms for the public sector. Once outside of Luanda, condoms are rarely available, particularly in the public sector facilities and areas, including the quartering and family areas, the IDP camps and clinics and hospitals. In some countries there is a worry that public sector (thus free) condoms may displace sales of socially marketed condoms. In Angola, where PSI condoms are available mostly in Luanda with limited NGO sales in several provinces and where extreme poverty is widespread, the public health imperative is to assure stocks of unbranded, public sector condoms are available in health posts, hospitals and quartering areas as quickly as possible.

- Need for care and support programs for persons living with AIDS and their families, including vulnerable children. In a report done in October 2001, a Save/UK consultant quoted the Executive Secretary of the Angolan Network of NGOs involved in HIV/AIDS, who estimated that there were 29 organizations working in the AIDS field, but that only about 20% in care and support. Some of these organizations, however, appear to exist in name only. LPV (Fight for Life) appears to be the only organization for people living with HIV. In an ad hoc focus group discussion of Luanda-based NGOs held during this assessment in August 2002, the “need” most often cited by NGO representatives was for care and support programs, particularly for children. There does not appear to be good information on the numbers of orphans and other vulnerable children.
- Need to prevent mother-to-child transmission. PMTCT is a priority for the Ministry of Health which has purchased \$400,000 worth of nevirapine to support a pilot study in two hospitals jointly funded by UNICEF and the Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation. The U.S. Presidential International Mother and Child HIV Prevention Initiative announced in June 2002 that \$500 million will be available to PMTCT in selected Africa and Caribbean countries.
- Need for voluntary testing and counseling. VCT is a priority for the Ministry of Health but is extremely limited to date and implemented in only a few NGO settings. No standardized testing protocol exists. A variety of rapid tests are available, but the government does not systematically procure them for use in government facilities. WHO will support six VCT sites in Luanda, Cabinda, Bengo, Malanje, Lunda Sul, Huila. CDC will work on developing VCT protocols and standards for countrywide use. Under an Interagency Agreement (IAA) with USAID, CDC has funded PSI to run a demonstration project with GOAL, an Irish NGO, and the Portuguese Institute for Preventive Medicine (IPMP) to initiate VCT services in two public sector sites in Luanda. Drew University which works with the Angolan Army is developing VCT protocols and hoping to receive funding in 2003 to set up VCT sites within military settings. Given CDC expertise in VCT and the fact that it is working closely with a USAID partner, no direct USAID inputs to VCT in Angola is proposed in the coming year.

4.4 Potential for Partnerships and Alliances to Maximize Results

The health/HIV/AIDS sector has a number of exciting possibilities to develop alliances with other donors and other USG agencies to maximize results. It also has potential for increased cross-SO synergies within USAID/Angola.

4.4.1 Other Donors.

Following are some partnerships and alliances with other donors that USAID might pursue strengthening.

- **UNICEF.** UNICEF and USAID currently collaborate very closely on HIV/AIDS. There are other possible joint activities which should be explored including nutrition, bed nets, maternal and child health. Most of UNICEF HIV/AIDS activities target youth in 10 provinces with about 35 “youth-driven” national NGOs which, in turn, are doing capacity building of 7 CBOs. UNICEF funded PSI (\$1 million) to work in 5 provinces: Cabinda, Huambo, Benguela, Huila, and Luanda. PSI will undertake capacity building of the NGOs, plus give grants to two to three NGOs in each province (about \$50,000 each. With Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation, UNICEF funds a pilot study of nevirapine and follow-up in two Luanda hospitals. UNICEF has expressed willingness to undertake joint assessments with USAID for both vulnerable children and care and support of persons living with AIDS.

- **World Health Organization.** WHO and USAID jointly work on many activities including malaria and polio. WHO, with support from the Italian Cooperation and CDC, will conduct additional surveillance studies in late 2002. WHO will also support a total of six VCT sites in Angola. WHO will have a TB advisor on the ground by September 2002 and has said it would welcome short-term technical assistance from both USAID (GH/HIV-AIDS) and CDC to work with the new WHO TB staff to clarify issues and put together a plan of action to address Angola's looming tuberculosis problems.
- **British Government.** DfID has had a humanitarian program of about \$10 million over three years with a planned renewal of an additional \$10 million beginning in January 2003. It works in a periurban area with local partners. DfID does not have explicit health or AIDS components but has asked its partners to "mainstream" HIV/AIDS awareness into their beneficiary group interventions as appropriate. In terms of potential partnerships with USAID, DfID proposed raising HIV/AIDS awareness among the project staff and their partners; and suggested USAID work in parallel with DfID's periurban program to deliver effectively HIV/AIDS messages.
- **European Union.** The EU has begun a five-year project to support health infrastructure. It will support the MOH in policy development and strategic planning as well as rehabilitate some community level health centers and posts. A separate EU/UN agreement totals \$20 million over five years to address malaria, HIV/AIDS and TB among other interventions. In HIV/AIDS, the priority is to support the National Blood Center in training, provide supplies for reagents and support short-term technical assistance. CDC has proposed to work closely with EU once the CDC team is on the ground.

4.4.2 **USG Agencies**

USAID is also collaborating with other USG agencies, and seeks to continue to strengthen the collaboration.

- **U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.** The CDC established a program in Angola in 2002 and will place two long-term advisors in the MOH. Initially, the program will focus on improving disease surveillance, particularly for HIV and STD. It will work to improve national testing protocols, laboratory facilities; increase rapid HIV diagnostics, including setting standards for surveillance and VCT; and provide quality control for testing. CDC will also provide management and laboratory training. Although CDC considers TB a priority, CDC will not work in TB during its first year.
- **Department of Defense.** In spite of a presumably high risk of HIV in the Angolan Army, USG support for anti-AIDS programs of the Angolan military has been modest. The DOD has provided some equipment and training with LIFE funds, and generally oversees a grant with the American medical school, Drew University. The Drew program, which does not have a full-time staff person in Angola, consists of U.S.-based training, training-of-trainers as well as limited materials development. Future plans by Drew include development of behavioral surveillance and VCT protocols. The program has not yet begun training of soldiers in behavior change interventions or condom use. The FAA has asked USAID and its contractor PSI for additional help in protecting its troops from HIV. In the absence of additive USAID funding, the team would encourage DOD to provide support to PSI or other locally based groups skilled in behavior change interventions to fill gaps in the FAA curriculum and programs which Drew may not be able to fill.

4.4.3 Private Sector

In addition to the numerous NGOs engaged in humanitarian health assistance, the team has identified some additional opportunities for partnerships and alliances in the private sector.

- **Religious organizations.** USAID should seek joint areas of interest with the Angolan Catholic Church. The church has a widely listened to radio program and could be instrumental in helping to spread good health messages such as with exclusive breastfeeding or good weaning habits. There are also community religious organizations that could be mobilized by the church to help in changing health behaviors.
- **Oil Companies.** Given the huge investments and potential profits of the oil companies based in Angola, their support for public sector health or AIDS projects has been relatively small. PSI has received about US\$1 million over the past two years from a consortium of oil companies including BP, Exxon, ChevronTexaco, and Elf to help supplement funding received from USAID. Work to date has been mostly in Luanda. The companies appear willing to continue to help in the HIV/AIDS prevention effort, although their interest is turning increasingly to the areas where they are working including Cabinda and Zaire Provinces, not currently USAID focus areas. PSI has also received in-kind contributions from Nike and is exploring opportunities for funding with Coke representatives especially to help support youth initiatives. The U.S. Angola Chamber of Commerce is a supportive force in encouraging private sector investment and joint action.

4.4.4 Cross-SO Synergies

Finally, USAID/Angola has the potential to increase results under SO7 by strengthening synergies among SO teams.

- **SO6, Democracy and Governance.** Respect for human rights is only one of the common themes between the HIV/AIDS program and the DG program. With DG funding, World Learning currently undertakes advocacy for persons living with HIV and AIDS including working on issues related to workers rights, confidentiality, and attempting to have the GRA's HIV/AIDS budget increased. Increased demands on DG funds make refunding of this element uncertain. PSI has held discussions with WL and feels there is potential to include information on DG in their capacity building activities with local NGOs. In order to maintain this important program USAID could use additional HIV/AIDS funds to continue to support this human rights program – one of the few HIV/AIDS activities focused directly on policy change and advocacy. It will be necessary to assure that current grant agreement has sufficient scope for CSH money and to clarify both the grant language and the mechanism to transfer HIV funds to the World Learning grant.
- **SO5, Food Security and Agriculture.** For interventions that could complement health and HIV/AIDS activities, USAID should identify those that can incorporate HIV messages. This might include adding HIV/AIDS modules to health promotion activities or putting HIV/AIDS prevention messages on selected commodities. For example in Zambia, fertilizer bags carry the message: "To grow properly, your crops need fertilizer. To grow properly, your children need you. Use a condom every time. Protect yourself against HIV/AIDS."

As discussed in more detail in section 4.3 below, all proposed follow-on P.L. 480 Title II Development Assistance Programs (DAPs) prepared by USAID's cooperating sponsors should be encouraged to have a health component. This is a planned linkage between SO5 and SO7 which should strengthen synergies, particularly among women's and farmer's groups mobilized under the

FFP program. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways. Within USAID, a point person within each SO should be identified and tasked with working together with the international NGOs to standardize nutrition education messages across all programs. Messages should focus on the nutritional needs of women with a special emphasis being given to pregnant and lactating women. The focus on children should include breastfeeding and appropriate weaning foods. One or two standard indicators should be jointly chosen and tracked by all grantees to monitor impact of their food aid programs.

- **OFDA** is currently funding six field-based health activities. Many of the health activities focus on delivering primary health care services or health education messages. There is a great potential to strengthen the linkage between the emergency health activities and SO7.

4.5 Management

There are currently three technical staff handling the SO7 portfolio. Two staff members are on board, the HIV/AIDS Advisor and the Program Assistant. A person has been recruited to fill the vacant Health Advisor position but will not start until September 2002. The person identified to fill the vacant Health Advisor position has strong experience working in maternal and child health in emergency situations. This person may be quite appropriate to facilitate USAID's work with the OFDA and FFP health activities. The HIV/AIDS Advisor will most likely be leaving in December of 2002. SO7 will need to recruit a candidate to fill this position before the incumbent leaves, and then fill it as soon as it is vacant.

Expansion into additional provinces will require all international NGOs to expand their staff. However, this needed staff increase could require bringing on additional qualified Angolan staff rather than expatriates.

4.6 Recommendations

Following are the assessment team's recommendations for MCH and HIV/AIDS in the short- and medium-term. Annex G includes a more graphic representation of activities.

Maternal and Child Health Recommendations - Short term FY 2002 – FY 2003

- Implement the MSH maternal and child health project to Huambo, Bie and Benguela provinces.
- Work with OFDA and FFP to standardize all health activities including but not limited to; health care protocols, messages and indicators for tracking impact. Explore possible opportunities in working with women's and farmer's groups.
- Expand the CORE grant activities to strengthen routine immunization e.g. data analysis for polio and routine; tracking zero-dose children under five; house-to-house NIDS that also record/note coverage for routine immunization; incorporating messages about routine immunization into social mobilization and integrated disease surveillance.
- Maintain on-going work with WHO in malaria in Huambo and Malanje provinces.
- GH and/or AFR should provide central funds to cover the cost of one team member of the evaluation of an External Evaluation of the Routine Immunization Program in Angola.
- GH and/or AFR should provide central funds to cover the cost of an assessment of provision of reproductive health services in Angola.
- GH and/or AFR should provide central funds to review of the contraceptive logistics system.
- AFR should fund a team to conduct an assessment of the current activities being conducted by the GRA and its partners (donors, missions, NGOs) in the education sector. Given the very low literacy rates of Angolan women, and given the fact that the health status of children is directly correlated to

the education level of the care-giver, programs to improve women's literacy rates – supported by USAID and/or other donors -- may be indicated.

Maternal and Child Health Recommendations - Medium/Long Term FY 2004 and beyond

- Child Survival: If additional resources are available, intensify child survival activities (estimate needs as up to US\$2 million additional/year):
 - a. to expand the MSH grant to all targeted USAID provinces,
 - b. to expand the CORE agreement to allow the PVOs to support the routine immunization system, and
 - c. to conduct a DHS or follow-up on MICS analysis in 2004.
- Reproductive Health: If additional resources are available, mount a family planning program in Angola (estimated at approximately \$0.5 million for the first year increasing to \$2.25 million a year by FY 05 under "high" financial planning scenarios).

With the exception of the IMC project, provincial level hospitals and in the capital, Luanda, family planning services were not available in Angola. In a recent survey conducted by IMC an enormous unmet need for family planning was identified. The lack of information about family planning and where to obtain services was frequently cited as the reasons for not using family planning. When used, most services are obtained in the hospital. Thus, community education about family planning for both women and men, as well as where to obtain the services is needed. A demand for the provision of quality family planning services that were more accessible, such as in health centers and health posts as opposed to hospitals.

- Infectious Disease: If additional resources are available, expand the work on malaria to include complementary malaria activities by the NGOs at the community level, and expand the work with CDC and WHO to include TB (estimated at approximately US\$1 million/year).

HIV/AIDS Recommendations - Short term – FY2003

- More funding now. Recommend immediate addition of FY2002 HIV/AIDS resources.
- Additional resources. Recommend that Angola become an “expanded response” country in FY2003 with the opportunity for additional HIV/AIDS resources.
- PSI program: Implement FY2003 workplan which targets Luanda, three additional USAID focus provinces and cross-border transport routes.
- GH or Regionally-funded technical assistance or assessments. Assure short-term TA in the following areas: condom logistics and analysis; tuberculosis; care and support; and policy. Undertake with UNICEF a joint assessment for both vulnerable children and care and support of persons living with AIDS.
- Non-branded condoms. Secure immediately 4 million non-branded condoms from USAID/W.
- No-cost interventions:
 - USG advocacy. Senior USG officials from all agencies should use every opportunity, both formal and informal, to undertake systematic advocacy to encourage GRA to adopt appropriate policy measures related to HIV issues.
 - Cross-sectoral messages. Assure that all USAID-funded programs run by NGOs or contractors (micro-credit, agriculture, health, etc.) include appropriate anti-AIDS messages within their staff training and messages.

HIV/AIDS Recommendations - Medium Term – FY2004-2005

- GH or regionally-funded technical assistance or assessments. Provide short-term AID/W core-supported technical assistance or assessments in the following areas: capacity building for local NGOs and follow-up assessments on vulnerable children and care and support, if these have not been undertaken in FY 03.
- Support to the Angolan military. If additional funding is available, support PSI to work with the military to complement the Drew University activities.
- VCT. If additional funding is available, expand CDC/PSI or PSI/UNICEF VCT Centers.
- PMTCT. Explore increased USAID funding for additional PMTCT sites.

5. DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Current Sectoral Setting

The end of hostilities in the Angolan civil war presents a unique yet challenging environment for DG programming. The ceasefire signed on April 4, 2002 was attained through the decisive military victory of the GRA over UNITA rather than via a new negotiated settlement. This fact, combined with the death of Jonas Savimbi and the rapid quartering and demobilization of UNITA soldiers (officially completed on August 2, 2002), has led most observers to believe that a permanent military peace has finally been achieved after 27 years of brutal conflict. However, given the combined weakness of UNITA, the political opposition, and civil society vis-à-vis the MPLA and the government, a political peace that addresses the underlying causes of the civil war and ushers in a period of genuine democratic development is likely to be much harder to realize. Turning the end of war into an opportunity for a transition to a just peace and democratic political system will require the united and coordinated efforts of non-governmental organizations, opposition political parties, and the independent media—in addition to sustained international diplomatic pressure.

While the GRA is making efforts to abide formally by the political terms of the Lusaka Protocol, there is a lack of political will to address the fundamental issues of governance, e.g. participation, representation, transparency, accountability, and citizen welfare. The GRA does not seem to recognize the current period as one of political transition and asserts that an elected government of national unity (GURN) already exists (notwithstanding its electoral mandate being over ten years old). The implication is that the basic political issues addressed during the Bicesse peace process of 1991-1992 and of the Lusaka peace process of 1994 do not need to be revisited, despite the fact that many of those earlier democratic reforms have never been fully implemented. Recently, the GRA also has shown some troubling signs of restricting political space by such actions as holding up the registration of some NGOs (CEPPS report) and passing a restrictive security law which could negatively impact freedom of speech and access to government and some public information.

Despite the demonstrated lack of political will on the part of the GRA to address issues of good governance and democracy, a real window of opportunity does exist to put these issues on the national agenda and launch a meaningful transition. For the first time in the history of Angolan independence, the government no longer has a war-time or national security justification for its repressive policies and poor governance record. The international community and Angolans themselves (many of them members of the MPLA, the government bureaucracy, opposition political parties and the military who are opposed to the parallel political and economic structures set up by the President) will now be watching closely and expecting different governance methods and outcomes. Donor countries are also reported to be unhappy with the GRA's continued requests for humanitarian assistance when huge amounts of public funds are unaccounted for in the public budget (more than \$1 billion in public revenues was reported to off-budget

last year alone). Consequently, both internal and external pressure for change is likely to increase over the next 12-24 months. In addition, international legitimacy and the role of regional leadership seem to be important to the current government. Since Angola will shortly be taking over the presidency of SADC, the GRA may feel some additional pressure to comply with the emerging regional norms and standards for governance. Most importantly, there has been an opening of political space over the last ten years that provides a platform for increasing the public demand for change.

Some of the positive changes in the political environment include: a more active role taken on by civil society organizations, a more active and vibrant press, and more numerous public debates on key political issues. There also seems to be a greater willingness for government to include civil society in policy dialogue. The recent public debate on the draft land law and civil society representation on the draft media law committee are two recent examples of this positive dynamic.

In sum, the current ceasefire presents a new and important opportunity to commence a peace and reconciliation process that will reinvigorate Angola's stalled democratic transition of the early 1990's. Targeted U.S. investment in civil society, media, reconciliation, and political party development over the next 12-24 months could help make the difference between a transition toward participatory democracy resulting in a stable and equitable peace or continued single-party dominance, poor governance, and continued poverty. On the other hand, without investment at this critical time, the window for change is likely to close for the foreseeable future. Without outside financial support and diplomatic pressure for a participatory reform process between now and the elections, the ruling clique will certainly succeed in entrenching themselves in power and perpetuating a governance philosophy based upon control and not service and participation. The USG is positioned to play an important role during this critical time, since the other donor organizations are not likely to support DG programs in any significant way as they are concentrating more narrowly on humanitarian assistance.

5.2 General Recommendations for the USG-supported DG activities

USAID's current DG strategy is well-designed and matches the current context. Its demand-side approach focusing on: strengthening civil society, building its advocacy capacity and promoting coalitions around various social and political issues, fostering public debate, and supporting a free and independent media as an alternative voice and source of information is appropriate. This approach allows the Mission the flexibility to engage on strategic governance issue areas as they arise (land tenure, for example). The annual budget for DG programs is modest (\$1 million in FY 2003 and will decline to \$750,000 in FY 2004), though the Mission has been quite successful in obtaining an additional \$2-4 million in ESF funding annually for DG programs.

While both the existing SO and activity portfolio provide an important foundation for taking advantage of the present window of opportunity, it is only by expanding on both that USAID can take full advantage of the current situation. The existing programs were designed at a time when political space was more constrained and there was less urgency to the DG agenda. As a result they have not tackled some of the more highly charged political issues, such as transparency and accountability, civic registration, and other participatory democratic processes.

The assessment team has three recommendations with regard to the current activities of the DG Strategic Objective over the next 18-24 months:

1. *Focus and limit issue areas supported under the civic advocacy program.*

The DG SO team has done a very good job of integrating cross-sectoral issues into its portfolio. For instance, they have been supporting information and advocacy campaigns on HIV/AIDS, land tenure, and

women's rights. However, given the severe constraints on DG resource, the limited capacity of civil society, and the small window of opportunity that currently exists to engage the GRA on fundamental governance issues, the DG SO should focus on issue areas that are most relevant to a political transition in Angola, e.g. citizenship, transparent and accountable governance, including land tenure issues, and human rights (rights and responsibilities of citizens vis-à-vis a government). The DG partners, through their small grant mechanism, should also help civil society to refocus its priorities and agree on a post-conflict advocacy agenda. Regional exchanges with regional civil society groups -- such as the Oasis Forum in Zambia or other Lusophone organizations with relevant experiences from Mozambique or even East Timor -- could also help civil society groups to understand the importance of coalition-building and successful mobilization techniques as they push for a democratic transition.

2. *Start-up an OTI program.*

The end of hostilities and the current state of peace provide a window of opportunity to open political space, increase advocacy for more accountable, transparent, and participatory governance and lay the foundation for free and fair elections. However the window may only be open until national elections anticipated in 2004. After that another decisive victory by the ruling party combined with expanded oil production that could double government revenues would further insulate the government from international or domestic pressure for meaningful macroeconomic or political reform. The next two years then serve as the best chance in over 40 years for Angola to move in more democratic directions. Further focusing the Mission's DG program on key transition issues will help take better advantage of the post-conflict opening. However, the resumption of an Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI) program, with its rapid deployment and flexible funding would provide important additional opportunities to expand work with civil society, opposition political parties, and the independent media to act as a count weight to the national government. An OTI program would also allow USAID's DG program to redirect its resources in ways that would support community-based reconstruction and reconciliation activities.¹³

There is broad consensus within USAID/Angola and the Africa Bureau that existing funding for DG programs is neither sufficiently large nor sufficiently reliable to adequately respond to the opportunities presented by the current state of peace. We concur and note that the start-up of an OTI program would address those concerns. However, we also note that even more important than the resources themselves would be the speed and flexibility with which they could be disbursed. An OTI program, including a small-grants mechanism and program management staff, can be operational within a matter of weeks. Used adroitly and proactively, a small-grants program not only provides a means for supporting a wide range of activities, but also can greatly amplify local pressure for democratic governance by nurturing leadership, stimulating initiative, and forging collaborations. An OTI program would also permit a quick expansion of activities outside Luanda to support critical transition activities in the provinces. The combination of program flexibility and risk-taking and quick disbursement has proven an enormously powerful tool in promoting democratic governance in chaotic conditions elsewhere. We expect an OTI small-grants program would be equally powerful in advancing participatory democracy and good governance in the uncertainty of Angola's peacetime trajectory.

3. *Expand DG activities into USAID target provinces.*

Currently, DG activities are heavily focused in Luanda. However, the resettlement of large numbers of people, the re-establishment of local administration in many areas, and the lack of access to information and resources in the provinces make support to civil society and media in the provinces a critical need.

¹³ A fuller discussion of the rationale for an OTI program and its programmatic objectives is found in *Democratizing the Peace: The Case for an OTI Program in Angola* available from DCHA/OTI/Washington. Options for the USAID/Angola DG program in "with OTI" and "without OTI" scenarios are presented at Annex F.

Current levels of DG resources make geographical expansion difficult. However, if additional resources are added to the program through ESF or an OTI program, increased activities in the provinces is a high priority action. Should an expansion of DG efforts be possible, USAID/Washington has expressed its willingness to provide USAID/Angola with any technical assistance that might be needed to design appropriate interventions that complement the current portfolio.

With regards to the larger USG presence in Angola, the team suggests that USAID and the U.S. Embassy should strive for increased coordination and synergy within and between programs. For example, participatory methods, advocacy training, and CSO capacity-building should continue to be built into the health and food security programs. Most of the registered civil society groups are service delivery organizations and more likely to be partnered with the other SO teams. Therefore, civil society strengthening could have an important impact in these areas and help to further the goal of a stable peace process. All activities, including those in health, food security, etc., should also include an element of building communities and promoting reconciliation through encouraging citizen participation and strengthening local government/community relations. Given the high number of female-headed households and the relative marginalization of this group, we recommend that women be given a special consideration in the design and implementation of activities at the local level. Conflict funds could be considered for these types of activity.

Greater coordination of USG resources (ESF and DA) is critical during the next 18-24 months. If the USG is to have any positive impact with its limited funds on the political process in Angola, resources will have to be strategically used and targeted at priority areas.

Finally, donor coordination should be encouraged through the establishment of a DG donors' working group. USAID has been a leader in both humanitarian assistance and civil society development in Angola. Increased donor dialogue and information-sharing could help to leverage the limited DG donor funds and perhaps to amplify the donor agencies' political pressure on critical governance issues.

5.3 Opportunities and Challenges

5.3.1 Civil Society

5.3.1.1 Civil Society Analysis. The emergence of civil society organizations in Angola is a relatively recent development. Before the arrival of multi-partyism in the early 1990's, civic associations existed as instruments of political organization and control for the one party state. Not until the Association Law was passed in 1991 was it possible for civic associations to register independently of the ruling party. The political and economic liberalization of the 1990's, as well as the increasing demand for NGOs to provide social services in the face of a worsening humanitarian crisis, gradually opened the door for civil society organizations to grow in number and strength. Currently, there are over 300 registered NGOs in Angola; most of them service delivery organizations. Compared to the heavy-handed repression of citizen activism in the recent past, since 1999 civil society has enjoyed a relatively favorable political environment to publicly assert alternative opinions and to advocate for policy reforms. Key informant interviews revealed that there is much less fear of speaking out on sensitive issues than ever before. The recent public debates on the draft land law and the media law suggest willingness on the part of the government to consult (albeit reluctantly) with civil society, or at least to delay passing laws in the face of an organized, vocal opposition. Whether the government is willing to negotiate or compromise with civil society on key issues remains to be seen. However, civil society over the last decade has proven itself capable of taking advantage of the gradual political openings and is likely to capitalize on these current opportunities to engage government policymakers quite actively.

While civil society has made some impressive gains in the last 10 years, it is still relatively weak and fractured. As in most other African countries, civil society is dependent on donor funding, concentrated in the capital, and dominated by the educated elite. The lack of a diversified private sector, low salaries, overall low levels of literacy and education and the inaccessibility of the provinces by road or communications infrastructure make these characteristics perhaps even more pronounced in Angola than in neighboring countries. Recently, the death of Savimbi and the ensuing ceasefire has left civil society without its most unifying theme: ending the war. As of yet, there is a lack of consensus within civil society on the political, economic, or social priorities in a peace context. The churches appear to be focused on reconciliation and rebuilding local communities. Other issue/advocacy organizations are dividing their energies between the monitoring the Constitutional revision process, commenting and advocating on the draft land and media laws, promoting transparency in public finances, and taking up general sustainable development and poverty alleviation issues. A common vision and agenda on what is needed in the immediate future would strengthen civil society's role in advocating for responsible governance. Open Society Institute is scheduled to fund a civil society forum in September that hopes to prioritize issues and produce a set of common goals for civil society organizations to work on collectively. COEIPA is another of many local organizations that stressed the importance of a national conference/dialogue on national priorities and could be a potential partner on this sort of activity.

5.3.1.2 Civil Society Recommendations: The consensus of this assessment team is that civil society is the most critical area of development investment for USAID in this immediate post-conflict period. It is only through a sustained program of advocacy and public dialogue that the current government may be pressured to pursue meaningful governance reforms. The current USAID program is rightly focused on strengthening civil society, increasing access to information, and improving government/constituency relations. However, to have a greater impact on the current political issues, more resources are needed for grants, training, and capacity-building (currently the USAID/Angola program can fund less than \$500,000 per year in small grants). If more resources become available, increasing investment in the civil society program is the priority. As much as possible, issue areas should be focused on governance and accountability issues (e.g., citizenship, land tenure issues, and human rights and the responsibilities of citizens vis-à-vis a government). Increasing civil society activity in USAID/Angola target provinces should also be the goal of increased funding levels.

5.3.2 Media

5.3.2.1 Media Analysis. Throughout the 1990s, the political space for media has increased, and, since 1999, there have been no reports of the repression, harassment, or detention of journalists. Even the state-owned media has shown an increasing willingness to allow some public debate – such as radio call-in shows – to cover more public interest issues and a greater diversity of views. The newspapers as well have begun covering more controversial issues. Nonetheless, the government does apply subtle methods to limit the activities of independent media. The Ministry of Information has delayed granting licenses for nation-wide broadcast to private radio stations, employs 80% of the country's journalists (luring away the best journalists from the private media with higher salaries as a tactic of co-optation), and owns the only printing press currently operating in Angola. In addition, the recently passed Security Law seems designed to restrict access to information by creating broad categories of potentially classified information and devolving classification authorities to low levels within the government bureaucracy. Under the new law, even publications from foreign sources, such as Global Witness reports, can be classified and their reproduction and dissemination limited or penalized.

There are very few independent media outlets in Angola. The high cost of inputs such as newsprint and paper, the higher salaries paid by the state-owned media, and the limited readership make it difficult for private newspapers to survive. There are a few privately owned provincial radio stations but their

majority shareholders are MPLA party functionaries and their credibility as independent media sources are reported to be questionable. Radio Ecclesia, owned and operated by the Catholic Church, is the only private Angolan radio station with national broadcasting coverage, which is limited to only one hour/day by short-wave (SW). However, its 24 hour/day broadcasts on FM reach the greater Luanda area and will soon be extended to five additional provinces with the installation of repeaters. VOA's SW program is the only other independent radio broadcast to reach all of Angola. The few independent Angolan newspapers are distributed only in Luanda, but with high illiteracy rates across the country and especially in the provinces, support for radio is the most strategic investment at this time.

5.3.2.2 Media Recommendations. Radio Ecclesia and VOA programming will be valuable tools for providing alternative and objective sources of news, publicizing public service messages, and supporting civic education campaigns. While the state-owned media is not uniquely supportive of the government, or of the ruling party, this situation could change in an electoral environment. Possible activities include training for journalists in investigative journalism and relevant issue areas (economics / debt, poverty reduction, elections and political processes, etc.), producing radio spots / programs on important public issue areas, and increasing the distribution of human rights and civic education material to the provinces. Getting information to and from the provinces is especially critical at this time. Additional resources should be used to produce spots for provincial radio stations and perhaps to support Radio Ecclesia's news reporting from the provinces and/or translate some programs into local languages (currently only the Radio Angola broadcasts in local languages as well as Portuguese).

5.3.3 Political Processes-Elections

5.3.3.1 Political Processes-Election Analysis. The question of the new Constitution is but one of many that will have to be settled before new elections can be held in Angola. The 1994 Lusaka Protocol and the National Assembly Law 18/96 called for the approval of a new Constitution before elections are held. Yet, many people now feel that the current National Assembly does not have the legitimacy to engage in broad Constitutional revision, as their mandate is now ten years old. Despite the terms of the Lusaka Protocol, according to an interview with General Gato (the current political head of UNITA), UNITA would prefer to hold elections under the existing 1992 Constitution and allow a newly elected representative body take up the broad Constitutional issues now on the table. Most other members of civil society and political parties with whom the team spoke agreed with this approach. However, if the GRA insists that the constitutional revision process should resume, it will be important to support civil society's active participation in the process.

In addition to agreement on the Constitutional framework for elections, the March 2002 CEPPS Pre-Election Assessment Report identified numerous other serious issues that must be addressed to create a climate for free and fair elections, such as the restoration of basic freedoms, especially in the provinces; enactment of electoral law reform; completion of a national identity system and voter registration process; and resettlement and reconciliation. The complexity and costliness of many of these pre-conditions for a credible electoral process is bound to have implications for the timing of the elections that are tentatively planned for 2004. Even if the GRA did manage to address these pre-electoral issues in a timely and satisfactory manner, there also seems to be considerable disagreement among Angolans about elections as a means of effecting political change. Immediate international assistance to help lay the groundwork for free and fair elections would help to increase the confidence of Angolans in the importance of elections as a means to deepen democracy and contribute to a sustainable peace.

The perception of an equitable playing field will be especially important in these first post-conflict elections which are likely to occur in an atmosphere of heightened suspicion given the MPLA's dominant position, access to state resources to finance its campaign, access to state-owned media outlets, and far superior organizational structures. Opposition political parties are currently weak, fragmented and

factionalized, and dependent on state financing. UNITA, while certainly better financed than other opposition parties will have the additional challenge of unifying its various factions (this process is already underway with the recent dissolution of UNITA-Renovada) and transforming itself from a rebel movement into a functioning political party. UNITA recently selected General Gato as its Secretary General and UNITA plans to hold its party Congress in 2003. Capacity-building and training for political parties will be critically important activities for instilling confidence in the electoral process. Support for fair and equitable media access as well as the support of impartial and effective institutions of electoral administration will also be important.

5.3.3.2 Political Process-Elections Recommendations. The team strongly supports the pre-election activities outlined in the CEPPS partners' proposal (June, 2002). Post is congratulated on moving so quickly to secure ESF funds for these pre-election activities. The sooner capacity-building and training begins for political parties and civil society organizations involved in the electoral process, the better chance there is to have a positive impact on the electoral framework. The early engagement of IFES in electoral administration issues, as well as their early and sustained promotion of SADC Electoral Norms and Standards, the more likely it is that the GRA will be convinced to make policy and funding decisions that may improve the administration, and consequently, the credibility of this crucial electoral process.

Given the prohibitively high costs of establishing an organizational presence and operating a program in Angola, the CEPPS partners should be strongly encouraged by USAID and the U.S. Embassy to share administrative costs, where possible. Cost savings could be realized, for example, by co-locating the CEPPS partners. Program synergies might also be increased by encouraging close cooperation and co-location.

If additional funds become available, the team believes that there would be considerable value-added in including a small legislative strengthening component to the CEPPS program. Since the legislative framework for elections will be decided on by the sitting Parliament, it would be wise to engage parliamentarians on relevant electoral issues and help to give them the tools to participate actively in the legislative process. For instance, the political party resource center envisioned by IRI could provide information and support services to parliamentarians. Some targeted training in legislative process and relevant issue areas, such as electoral administration, voter registration, and constituency relations, could be offered.

5.3.4 Governance

5.3.4.1 Governance Analysis. While the Bicesse process of 1991-1992 ushered in a multi-party system, replacing the post-independence one-party state, the dominance of the MPLA has continued. In the current government, there is a continued emphasis on control and executive dominance, an absence of transparency and accountability, and limited citizen participation in government decision-making systems. While significant progress has been made over the last decade with respect to civic rights and freedoms in Angola, the concessions towards political liberalization begun in the early 1990s have been incomplete and were stalled due to the resumption of fighting in late 1992. Many of the reforms called for in the 1992 Constitution have never been implemented or funded, such as the Constitutional Court.

A new Constitutional revision process was begun four years ago that has dragged on slowly with few concessions by the MPLA on reforms that would make the Angolan political system more representative, participatory, and competitive. For instance, the ruling party has insisted on retaining the provision for appointing, rather than electing, provincial governors. The current impasse on the Constitutional Review Commission revolves around the issue of executive power with the MPLA pushing for a strong presidential system and the opposition advocating a semi-presidential system. The distribution of power

between levels of government has also long been an issue between the MPLA and UNITA with the latter advocating for a more decentralized state and empowered and elected local level government while the former has insisted on centralized control with local levels officials being appointed.

Ironically, for a state so intent on centralized control, provincial governors have surprising autonomy from the central government authorities and the capacity for local administration is weak. The liberal reforms that were begun in 1992 did not extend much beyond Luanda. Some provinces have essentially operated as a state within a state. Generally, citizens living in the provinces experience restricted civil liberties and have no access to functioning courts. Throughout rural Angola, civil society organizations, political parties, and journalists find a much less favorable enabling environment than Luanda. In addition, the central government has not been very effective in establishing an administrative presence at the municipal and communal levels. Many areas, especially at the commune level, have no functioning civil administrations. Local administrations will need to be formed or strengthened. As the resettlement process unfolds, there is a unique opportunity to advocate for more capable, efficient, and participatory local governance structures by influencing citizen-government relations at the grassroots level.

5.3.4.2 Governance Recommendations. The team found that there is very little opportunity to work on governance issues directly, especially at the national level. There is no political will to address the serious problems in transparency, accountability, and responsive governance. The GRA's relationship with the IMF indicates that the government is not interested in tackling economic governance issues such as budgetary reform. In addition, the development priorities outlined in the interim PRSP indicate that the government may not be dedicated to poverty reduction goals either. These governance concerns can only be successfully addressed through a demand-side strategy, i.e. support to civil society and the media.

On the other hand, there may be important opportunities to improve local-level government by supporting capacity-building programs and citizen-government relations. Improved local governance and citizen engagement at the local level could enhance the environment for reconciliation and community-building. If additional resources are received through ESF or an OTI program, the Mission's DA funds could be directed to these types of interventions.

5.3.4 Conflict Prevention/Reconciliation/Peace Building

5.3.4.1 Conflict Prevention/Reconciliation/Peace Building Analysis. While there seems to be a unanimous opinion that the death of Jonas Savimbi has removed one of the greatest single obstacles to peace in Angola, the scars of the long-term civil war and social fragmentation are deep. The overwhelming superiority of the Government forces and the impact of the past sanctions on UNITA make peace much more likely to endure than after earlier attempts at peace. However, long-term peace and stability is not assured and a serious humanitarian situation will remain at least until the harvest of 2003. Many of the consequences of war, such as the high level of urbanization, may never be reversed. The consolidation of peace will require a number of specific peace-building measures, aimed at promoting demilitarization, peace and reconciliation and recovery. National reconciliation will require the implementation of policies that promote inclusion, so that all Angolans, irrespective of their ethnic, geographic or political party affiliations, see that they have a stake in the new post-war Angola. In addition, there are many high expectations for a peace dividend from UNITA and their supporters as well as the millions displaced or those seriously affected by the war.

The GRA faces both high expectations and profound skepticism of its capacity to shift from war to peace. Yet the chances for real peace and stability are unlikely to advance far unless the GRA makes a number of more fundamental changes, including a turn towards greater openness and, above all, investment of the country's oil wealth in meeting the humanitarian, social, and economic crises. Without such changes, moreover, future elections are as likely to stir up conflict rather than assuage it.

Role of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs): Over the last few years, a more politically active civil society and media have emerged and they have demonstrated that they can play a critical role in the peace and reconciliation and the political reform process. The GRA has at times acted upon pressure brought about by civil society and the end of war should provide a timely opportunity for civil society to become more engaged in supporting a more participatory process and advocate for more democratic reforms. However, they are weak and fragmented and will require increased levels of support, including technical assistance and capacity building.

Role of Churches: As most of the civil society organizations and NGOs only operate in Luanda, the churches are probably the most legitimate and organized country-wide network for advocating for peace and democratic reform in Angola. Churches have been advocating for an end to the conflict, human rights abuses and poverty and they have become much bolder since the conflict renewed in 1998.

Role of Peace Networks/Coalitions (like COIEPA): In 2000, ten years of tentative joint Catholic-Protestant initiatives matured into the Inter-Ecclesiastical Committee for Peace in Angola (COIEPA). COIEPA has called for civil society to take the lead in a national debate about how to bring about durable peace in Angola and to change the culture of violence, respecting human rights, establishing truly democratic governance and ensuring a more equitable sharing of the wealth in Angola.

Role of the Sobas – At the local level, very few state administrations function and the traditional councils, or Sobas, are perhaps the only authority at the local community level that can play a positive role in mediating local level conflicts, such as land disputes. It will be important to try to re-establish the Sobas by transparent means in communities where the reintegration of various vulnerable groups will take place where such Sobas don't presently exist.

5.3.4.2 Peace and Reconciliation/Conflict Resolution Recommendations. USAID should consider the following types of activities to support peace and reconciliation/conflict resolution:

- Capacity building/TA for NGOs/CSOs.
- Training (journalists, mediators, local leaders).
- Expand role of media (especially radio).
- Promote community dialogues, national debates.
- Promote human rights advocacy/training.
- Increase access to factual/relevant information.
- Promote/strengthen justice initiatives.
- Advocate for greater accountability and transparency.
- Utilize community-based approaches towards re-integration of vulnerable groups to foster interaction between civil society/beneficiaries and local authorities to reach consensus on priorities and role of each group.
- Support Angolan peace movements (COIEPA, Angola Peace Building Program).
- Support NGO resource center, provide training.
- Support expansion of justice systems (courts) to more municipalities.
- Support civic education initiatives.
- Advocate for greater UN role in protection/monitoring of human rights during re-integration of vulnerable groups and appoint field protection officers.

6. FOOD SECURITY FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Overview

Many have argued that displacement, much of it forced, has been one of the predominant tactics in Angola's civil war. The majority of those affected have been rural populations who have been displaced from their lands and means of subsistence. Many families have become separated and the proportion of female-headed households has increased substantially. Some of the internally displaced have made their way to regional centers where international agencies have been able to provide assistance. For the remainder, they have often been forced to live and hide in the hills and forests, with little or nothing to sustain them other than what they have been able to forage. The insecurity and the large number of land mines and unexploded ordinance have restricted access to cultivable land and seriously affected food availability. Furthermore, the collapse of livelihoods and the economy have resulted in widespread poverty. As a result, many have been left unemployed, or underemployed, and alternative income opportunities have been poor. The situation has been further exacerbated by poor infrastructure, including access to basic education, health care, clean water and sanitation. The result has been a deteriorating humanitarian situation characterized by rates of malnutrition, morbidity and mortality that have exceeded emergency thresholds.

The ending of hostilities in April revealed the extent of food insecurity among those trapped in rural areas by the fighting. Large numbers of people, many of them ill and malnourished, have since made their way to the provincial and municipal capitals and UNITA family reception areas. The nutritional situation in some of the newly accessible areas has reportedly also been critical.

Many displaced families living in the provincial and municipal capitals, as well as some refugees, have already started to return home to prepare their land for the next planting season (September/October 2002). With evident shortages of food and seed, food assistance and agricultural inputs will be required for at least two agricultural seasons to enable families to restore their livelihood systems and achieve food security.

6.2 Current Sectoral Setting

6.2.1 Food Availability

Angola – once a net food exporter – currently produces only 50% of its food needs, and relies on food imports to meet its requirements. Subsistence agriculture had been the primary livelihood activity for nearly 85 percent of Angolans. However, constant population movements, insecurity, and the threat of landmines have prevented many farmers from cultivating their land. Moreover, insecurity and poor infrastructure have hampered trade between regions. Consequently, in addition to commercial imports, the country will require 220,000 metric tons (MT) of emergency food aid in 2002/2003.¹⁴

6.2.1.1 Production Maize is the main staple food in the central highlands, while millet and sorghum are the most important cereals in the dry southern regions, and cassava predominates in the north. Other major crops include beans, groundnuts and sweet potatoes, and vegetable production is important particularly in low-lying wet land areas. In most of the conflict areas, agriculture has fallen to or below subsistence levels, with little or no marketable surplus and very limited trade activity. Self-sufficiency has seldom been attained among displaced populations, primarily due to the limited access to land and insufficient seed.

¹⁴ FAO/WFP, "Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to Angola", July 2002.

Due to the conflict, formerly viable small-holder farming and marketing systems have been devastated. Property damage was widespread; households lost or liquidated productive assets, including seeds, tools and farm animals; and conscription, war deaths, and migration have left thousands of households headed by women, without the labor needed for extensive cultivation. The loss of draft animals and family members has affected many households' ability to cultivate large areas. Further, insecurity contributed to loss of land access. As a result, traditional methods of soil conservation, such as rotation and fallow practices could only be infrequently practiced, which has led, in part, to low productivity and the inability of small farmers to meet basic food requirements.

It is estimated that over four million people have been displaced since 1998 and excluded from the normal agricultural production cycle. Some two million IDPs have been allocated land, and those beyond their second agricultural season are assumed, perhaps incorrectly, to be self-sufficient and no longer in need of food assistance. The GRA and NGOs have made great effort to provide sufficient land and inputs, though the size of parcels has generally been insufficient (< 0.5 hectares) and of poor quality in some areas. Seeds and tools have been distributed through the NGOs, though availability has often been below requirements. Further, there have been difficulties in providing the appropriate varieties for each agro-ecological zone, and crop failures have often been blamed on the variety.

According to the FAO/WFP, cereal production for 2001-2002 was slightly higher than previous years due to an increase in area under cultivation. Crop yields, on the other hand, were below their maximum potential due to delayed rains, late planting, and crop destruction by the military. Another factor adversely affecting yields, especially among IDPs, was reduced soil fertility in the areas surrounding the main towns where cultivation has taken place due to insecurity. Additional constraints to production include shortage of tools and labor, late and inadequate seed deliveries, and poor seed quality.

At the time of this assessment, food stocks in the country were quite low. In secure areas, WFP/VAM estimated that food reserves from the 2001-2002 agricultural season would last through July 2002 for most resident farmers and established IDPs, whereas IDPs in their first season were expected to have few to no reserves.¹⁵ The assessment team confirmed these estimates, finding that families were already adopting coping strategies such as reduction in meal frequency (to one meal per day) and depending on the availability of sweet potatoes and cassava (tubers and leaves) for their staple foods. In newly accessible areas, the economic and military situation in the country did not allow for food stocks, so they are considered to be nominal.

The availability of agricultural inputs for the 2002-2003 agricultural season remains a major concern, and preliminary assessments estimate that approximately 370,000 families can be supported through current agricultural assistance programs. However, the amount of assistance required is expected to increase in the coming months as a result of expanded access, return movements and demobilization. Approximately 200,000 additional families are expected to require seeds and tools among populations residing in newly accessible areas, resettled IDPs and returnees, and demobilized soldiers and their families. While the situation with respect to retained seed both among affected and resident populations is unknown, it does not appear that current programs can sufficiently meet these increased needs.

With the current movement of IDPs to their areas of origin to prepare for the forthcoming agricultural season, many returning without adequate stocks to survive until the next harvest, food assistance will be required. Many are returning to areas heavily affected by the conflict, and the few who remained may have little to share with returnees. These groups will become more vulnerable from September onwards

¹⁵ Vulnerability Analysis and Food Aid Working Group, "Angola: Vulnerability Analysis November 2001 – April 2002," June 2002.

with the start of the “hungry season”. It will therefore be imperative to provide food aid to ensure that seeds (both saved and distributed) are not eaten in order to increase the likelihood of a successful harvest.

6.2.1.2 Food Assistance: As a result of the newly signed peace accord, the overall security situation is has greatly improved. One of the foremost features of the past few months has been an incredible influx of people to municipal towns in hope of accessing relief assistance, many in a precarious state of health. A series of joint rapid assessments of critical needs have been carried out by OCHA to investigate the living conditions of populations, which, for many months, had limited or no access to basic foodstuffs. Several pockets of severe malnutrition with urgent needs for food assistance were identified and it is highly probable that as more areas become accessible, other populations vulnerable to food and nutritional insecurity will be identified. Furthermore, the families of the ex-combatants who are living in quartering areas are also cut off from their normal sources of food and income, and require urgent food assistance.

For 2002-2003, the number of people in urgent need of food assistance is currently estimated at 1.9 million, approximately 400,000 higher than estimates made in June 2002. At that time, WFP reported that it had the capacity to support 87% of the beneficiary caseload, with the remainder expected to receive food aid through other food pipelines. Given this expected increase in beneficiaries, WFP has recently revised its planning figures to include the entire caseload, and is requesting donors to bring forward additional contributions to meet increased requirements.

While improved security has increased access to affected populations, the condition of Angola’s infrastructure will have important implications for the ability of the humanitarian community to meet food aid requirements. WFP has announced that since the ceasefire it has been able to shift the emphasis away from air transport to the road network. However, the presence of mines and very poor condition of the roads will continue to hamper access and road transportation in many areas. Hundreds of bridges were destroyed during the war, and many secondary roads will not be passable during the upcoming rainy season. In view of this, WFP is pre-positioning stocks in areas that are likely to be inaccessible.

In general, the food security of the population is extremely poor and, as new areas open up and the numbers of displaced continue to grow, it is likely that the overall situation will worsen as the highest needs are clearly among the newest displaced and in the newly accessible areas. With the availability of adequate and timely food assistance, food security may stabilize over the coming months; however, there are unlikely to be major improvements until the displaced have been resettled and two full agricultural seasons have successfully passed. The upcoming harvest should provide some improvement to the food security situation, although shortages of agricultural inputs (seeds and tools), productive land, and labor will limit the number of food insecure populations that benefit. Thus, food security will continue to remain precarious, and a very substantial humanitarian intervention will be required to meet the needs of at-risk populations during the resettlement phase, which is currently estimated to be a minimum of three years.

6.2.2 Food Access

Angola’s civil war has resulted in massive population displacements that have affected people’s capacity to produce and access the necessary food. Overall, the conflict widely disrupted marketing activities and the price system, devaluated currency and increased inflation, and made food availability irregular and out of the price reach of most households.

Migration from rural to urban areas, especially into Luanda, has not been matched by income generation activities. While an informal economy is readily observable, it is evidence of the high unemployment

(and underemployment) rates. Currently, more than 60% of the urban population lives below the poverty line, and the poorest households devote a high proportion of their expenditure to food, indicating a high level of vulnerability with respect to food security.¹⁶

It was found that the income levels among IDPs were extremely poor as opportunities to generate income to supplement the diet have been relatively limited. The markets are currently saturated with goods typically used for income generation, such as charcoal and firewood. New IDPs tend to rely on residents or more established IDPs for assistance, often in the form of sharing of food resources, or labor in exchange for food. Thus, the overall situation of the resident population and its capacity to support increased demands tends to influence the vulnerability of new arrivals.

In general, income activities are related to the provision of casual labor for seasonal production, collection and sale of firewood and charcoal, brick-making, etc. It is expected that these activities will increase but become more dispersed as security improves. With wider population circulation there should be a reduction in the pressure on natural resources, an increased demand for construction materials, and improved opportunities for families to return to a range of livelihood activities in addition to agriculture, e.g., fishing, animal husbandry, collection/sale of forest products.

Commercial activity and opportunities for related casual labor in municipal and provincial capitals might also increase with increased movement of commercial traffic. The assessment team noted that many road transport routes were re-opened and there was a significant increase in commercial activity and the availability and diversity of products in markets. This provides opportunities to support micro-enterprise activities in peri-urban and urban environments, and agribusiness in rural areas.

6.2.3 Food Utilization

The MICS data cited in section 2 above are striking and reveal a catastrophic situation among Angolan children and women. The under-five mortality rate is 250 per 1,000 live births, with wide geographical disparities from 192 to 315, meaning that every year over 155,000 children under five years of age die. The MICS found that 45% of children suffer from stunting (chronic malnutrition), illustrating the long-term negative effect of the conflict on the healthy growth of children. While poor nutritional status is reflective of a mix of environmental, cultural and health-related problems, underlying factors include poverty and household food insecurity.

Small-scale nutritional surveys conducted by NGOs earlier this year, as well as recent rapid assessments conducted by OCHA, have identified several areas with elevated levels of wasting (acute malnutrition) throughout the country, and noted that additional pockets may exist in currently inaccessible areas. As access of the humanitarian agencies continues to improve, the nutritional situation is quickly stabilizing. It is striking to note, however, that while the prevalences of acute malnutrition have been readily reduced, the mortality rates remain alarmingly high, suggesting that the main problem for the population is a poor health environment, e.g., lack of access to health services, clean water and sanitation.

Presently, many IDPs, as well as ex-combatants and their families, are almost totally dependent on food assistance to meet their nutritional needs and have little opportunity to find income or alternative sources of food. In fact, it is currently estimated that one-tenth of the all Angolans rely on food assistance to meet basic food requirements.¹⁷ Reported cases of pellagra (niacin deficiency) are strongly indicative of the consumption of very poor quality diets and are most likely the result of a lack of access to foods other than food aid. In addition, anecdotal evidence of night-blindness (vitamin A deficiency) further supports the conclusion that the population has had limited access to food.

¹⁶ United Nations Common Country Assessment, 2002.

¹⁷ OCHA Humanitarian Situation Fact Sheet, 2002.

Furthermore, interviews with beneficiaries revealed a poor knowledge of appropriate health/nutrition practices. For example, although breastfeeding rates are quite high, the exclusive breastfeeding rate is only 14% as women frequently reject the colostrum and supplement breastfeeding with sugar water. Health seeking behavior is also quite low, perhaps due to the general lack of health services, and many families have reverted to the use of traditional medicines to treat illnesses.

In summary, the high prevalence of malnutrition is caused by multiple factors: poor food intake, poor environment, and poor caring capacity. The high level of morbidity is, in some cases, as important a contributory factor to malnutrition as food availability and access. This suggests that food provided without complementary services may have very little impact on household nutrition, and the provision of basic health services, water and sanitation should be considered important priorities for improving overall household food security.

6.2.4 Land Tenure

The issues of land, land rights, and tenure security are currently being discussed in Angola because a new draft land law has been released for public review by the Presidential commission on land tenure. Intended to replace the existing 1992 Land Law, the new draft law appears to be inadequate, failing to address many longstanding inconsistencies and shortcomings, including the lack of a solid legal standing for traditional communities land rights. Although the draft is flawed, it is important to note that this is only the second example of the government soliciting any public contribution to the law-making process. While the initial public consultation period was projected for 90 days, it appears that a more lengthy public dialogue and commentary period will be permitted. The donor community is supportive of a longer consultation period.

Land is also being discussed in Angola because the resettlement and reintegration of IDPs and ex-combatants will involve the allocation of millions of hectares. While some of the displaced will return to their homes of origin, others will not. In both instances, land conflicts may arise when those occupying or re-occupying the land encounter others asserting claims to the same parcels. Although the national land registration system is disorganized and dysfunctional, various government bodies including the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development as well as the Provincial Governments, have been granting their respective land titles, often without informing each other. The result is a land tenure system that offers very little security to anyone other than private agri-businesses and influential elites. To date, the government has not recognized land as a national resource that should be considered as an essential element in poverty reduction plans, such as the PRSP. Communities must be able to gain communal security to resources, including land, in order to solidify a meaningful and prosperous peace for the majority of Angolans.

Access to land will also become an increasingly important issue as reconstruction progresses and as the opportunities for agri-businesses expand with the new post-war context. Access to communal land in some provinces such as Huila is threatened by the privatization of large parcels for commercial purposes, often granted by provincial officials through extra-legal procedures to generals, ministers, and other high-ranking government officials. These land grabs include parcels of the cash-cropping land that constituted the former Portuguese *Fazendas*, as well as parcels of land near critical infrastructure such as irrigation and transportation corridors. Farming communities are being displaced, while agro-pastoral communities are losing access to their traditional grazing lands. It seems likely that most existing claims to land by commercial farmers, whether or not they have been obtained through “official” channels, will be honored under the new draft land law. This means that communities that have already been evicted from their lands are unlikely to regain their holdings.

Among the many land conflicts on the horizon, disputes have already been noted between: 1) returning/resettled IDPs and local communities; 2) returning/resettled IDPs and agri-businesses that have encroached on traditional communal lands; 3) local communities and private agri-businesses that have been granted access to their communal lands, often on former plantations; and 4) agro-pastoral communities and agri-businesses that restrict access to pasturage. Often, there is no recourse for these communities since they hold no land titles, registration documents, or other “official” forms of tenure security. When confronted with competing claims, there is no legal framework to which they can appeal.

There are very few functioning institutions available to settle land disputes. Of the 140 municipalities, only 12 have functioning courts. Most local disputes are settled by *sobas*, the traditional leaders. Although they receive stipends from the State, they are reported to be predominately effective dispute resolution bodies that defend the communities’ interests at the local level. In cases where land disputes are contests between two local entities (e.g., individuals, families, or communities), the decisions of the *sobas* are likely to be respected by both parties. In those instances, however, when a local party is contesting the claim of an outsider – most likely a wealthy, elite, and influential outsider – the decisions of the *sobas* may be overridden by representatives of the government.

A means for the peaceful resolution of land disputes, a policy environment that legally-recognizes traditional tenure systems, as well as a system for registering communal holdings, will be critical for Angolan stability and reconstruction. In the longer term, agricultural recovery and development must be supported by a land tenure framework – including legal, institutional, and judicial processes – that provides the security against which farmers can access credit to obtain agricultural inputs, and that strengthens communities’ property rights, enabling them to negotiate with potential investors, agri-businesses, and the state.

6.3 Opportunities and Challenges

In the short-term, emergency food assistance will be necessary to meet the immediate needs of at-risk populations, and USAID should ensure that USG contributions to WFP are maximized for FY 2003-05 to support the resettlement process. While WFP expects to support a total of 1.9 million people by December 2002, it is unclear if WFP has the capacity to meet increased requirements so quickly. The assessment team therefore recommends that additional food pipelines be considered.

In support of food security programming, there is currently limited analysis in Angola. WFP’s Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) Unit looks retrospectively at factors affecting household food security, such as agricultural performance, income sources, price trends, and levels of malnutrition, as well as geographic and socio-economic characteristics, and makes predictions as to the ability of different types of households to achieve food security. Regrettably, this analysis does not track climatic, socioeconomic and demographic changes that can adversely affect food availability and/or access in the short-run and may pose serious acute food security threats; nor does it assess underlying causes of food security and identify long term development needs. Strengthening such analysis in Angola is extremely important during this resettlement phase, particularly with general food security in such as precarious state. Information systems such as the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) NET should be considered to address these information gaps, in order to provide timely information to pinpoint and assess emerging or evolving food security problems, and to allow decision-makers to take preventive action.

FEWS NET has been working in southern Africa since 1992. It initially was used in the region to assist in targeting and responding to the 1991/92 drought. FEWS NET currently has a regional presence within the SADC Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources Sector (FANR/REWU) and country offices in Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Tanzania. FEWS NET already has some contact with the National Early Warning Unit in Angola (through its regional activities with the SADC Regional Early

Warning Unit and the Regional Remote Sensing Unit—representatives from Angola participate in SADC training and planning workshops).

FEWS NET information and services can assist with emergency response in Angola. FEWS NET develops food economy and livelihood baselines, and monitors changes in household food security. This understanding of the local food economy allows for; 1) an early identification of the nature and magnitude of a food security problem, 2) a more appropriate and better targeted emergency response to assist recovery and growth rather than hinder it, and 3) improved crop production estimates especially in areas where there is limited access—due to physical or security considerations. This information enables the preserving and enlarging of livelihoods and not just the saving of lives. This usually results in improved targeting of emergency operations (focusing on where the food insecure populations are and what their needs are). This is very important if the real objective is to facilitate local market solutions to food insecurity in the context of an Angolan agricultural recovery.

Experience in the Sahel has shown that improved targeting of emergency assistance has disciplined both the demand side and the supply side of food aid. Better information has resulted in better decision-making in all aspects of the food aid process, from identifying needs to more efficient implementation of an emergency program. As a result, the level of food aid needed in the Sahel has declined significantly and consistently over the last 12 years.

Better early warning and food security information—such as interpreted satellite imagery, market and price analyses, food economy baselines etc. can assist decision makers in determining more accurately where and when to phase down emergency operations in Angola (which is to be expected, given the rich natural resources—soil quality, rainfall—in the country). This information can be essential for building an “exit strategy” from emergency operations while helping to promote poverty reduction through improved food security and rising agricultural productivity.

In addition, FEWS NET information can support the re-starting of agriculture in Angola. ***Understanding the livelihoods of households in Angola will lead to better agriculture investments by USAID and other donors:*** FEWS NET uses the food economy method to develop baselines according to food economy zones for hazard monitoring, one of its core technical functions. These same baselines provide critical insights into the socio-economics of an area, which can be used to better design the type and scale of agricultural investments by the government into the most chronically vulnerable regions. Mozambique is using the baselines for this purpose.

FEWS NET disseminates information to target many audiences from policy makers to farmers: FEWS NET disseminates information in many ways, including regular monthly food security reports, oral briefings, annual assessments (for example harvest reports and vulnerability assessments). In the Sahel, FEWS NET has worked with rural radio to transmit information—such as weather, the progression of the agricultural season (for example the start-of-season), input availability and prices and market information. Angola would seem ideal for the design of information that can be widely disseminated by private FM radio to rural farmers at critical stages of the production and marketing cycle.

For longer-term food security, one must realize the enormous agricultural potential of Angola which boasts nearly 5-8 million hectares of cultivatable land in five major agro-ecosystems. This makes it possible for the country to produce a variety of tropical and temperate zone crops for domestic consumption as well as export. However, the productive capacity and assets of most of the nation’s small farmers has been destroyed, and their future tenure security is not guaranteed. During the resettlement process, farmers will not only require access to land and agricultural inputs in order to reestablish their livelihoods, but will also require agricultural extension services in order to maximize their productivity and improve market linkages. Furthermore, the general lack of seeds in Angola has been a major

constraint to the agricultural sector, and investment in seed multiplication activities and seed banks should be expanded. In the future, to protect the interests of communities and small farmers, a functioning land registration system must be established in the provinces, as well as local means for reconciling disputes over natural resource use and management rights.

The country's agricultural research and extension system is not currently functioning. Much of the physical infrastructure was destroyed during the war. Further, the remaining staff has no resources, such as vehicles, office equipment or budget resources. Although it is shocking to see a country's agricultural research and extension system destroyed, this also presents an opportunity to initiate new and innovative approaches for increasing household food security. For example, the previous system was a top-down, paternalistic system that was not integrated and had a heavy emphasis on large scale farming systems. Therefore, rather than rebuilding the old system, innovative private sector approaches may be considered, such as privatization of seed variety research, multiplication and marketing. Further, agricultural extension may also be privatized so that struggling farmers may learn from the best practices of the more successful small farmers or agribusinesses. Also, extension should be an integrated approach that includes health and nutrition messages, as poor health translates into lower agricultural productivity.

The four US NGOs currently receiving Title II development support have had some successes with agricultural productivity through such activities as agricultural extension, tool/seed distribution, and income generation. Therefore, all have relevant experiences on which to expand recovery and developmental relief activities during FY 2003. Beginning with their new DAPs in FY 2004, the cooperating sponsors are encouraged to more closely integrate agricultural activities with interventions in health, nutrition, water and sanitation, in order to improve household nutrition and increase overall agricultural productivity.

6.3.1 Opportunities for Current Programs

1. **Seed Multiplication Programs:** To support the resettlement process, access to seeds of sufficient quantity and quality is required. Most seeds currently used by farmers are imported each year. It is, therefore, recommended that seed multiplication be expanded through the partnerships built by FAO and the NGO community. The recently proposed seed multiplication effort of WVI should be given consideration for funding so seed requirements can effectively be produced in country. Further, it would be desirable to expand the range of partnerships to include relevant CGIAR (Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research) centers that have substantial knowledge of, and capacity in, identifying and reproducing appropriate genetic material. Seed multiplication activities should focus on the following primary crops: maize, beans, groundnuts, cassava, sweet potatoes and vegetables.
2. **P.L. 480 Title II Development Assistance Programs (DAPs):** Four US NGOs (CARE, CRS, WVI and SCF) are currently implementing P.L. 480 Title II-supported interventions. These include provision of seeds and tools, agricultural extension, and food-for-work for the rehabilitation of roads, bridges, irrigation canals and other physical infrastructure. Given the increased security within the country, these NGOs should be encouraged to expand their coverage to the original activity scope in the DAPs to assist with the resettlement process.
3. **Rural Group Enterprises and Agricultural Marketing Activities:** This initiative aims to identify market opportunities and develop approaches to help farmers establish farming enterprise on a cost-effective basis. The Cooperative League of the USA (CLUSA) is currently established in Huila and the Luanda greenbelt. It would be ideal to foster close collaboration between CLUSA and DAP activities in order to increase agricultural production and improve market linkages. Further, micro-financing

and micro-enterprise development activities should be considered in the new DAPs to improve impacts on food security and poverty alleviation.

6.3.2 Opportunities for New Programs

1. P.L. 480 Title II Development Assistance Programs for FY 2004-2008: These programs are currently being designed. They will focus on transition needs and target resettled IDPs and ex-FMUs and their families in the six provinces with highest concentrations, i.e., Bie, Huambo, Huila, Kuwanza Sul, Malanje and Benguela. Activities will address broader constraints to food security, and may include general relief, developmental relief, and more development-oriented activities, such as agriculture, MCH, HIV/AIDS, and micro-credit/micro-enterprise and institutional feeding. Gender issues should be carefully considered during program planning and implementation.

Further efficiency gains and incentives could be created if NGO partners were to link with CLUSA's agricultural production and marketing activities. Through contracts with CLUSA and its small-holder producer associations, partners could acquire vegetable and fruit commodities for use in their Title II activities, thus improving diet diversity and strengthening markets.

2. Famine Early Warning System (FEWS): USAID's Regional Center for Southern Africa (RCSA) has offered funding to establish a FEWS office in Angola, and the assessment team endorses this offer. It has been estimated that a FEWS office could be operational in less than four months. At present, the World Food Program's Vulnerability Assessment Monitoring (VAM) unit is monitoring food availability to targeted populations. The proposed FEWS office would add significant depth to the work of the VAM by analyzing a wider spectrum of information, such as remote sensing-derived crop production and yield indices that indicate changes in food availability and household level food security. Such information would improve the development of policies, programs, strategies and plans (including contingency and response) that reduce food insecurity.
3. Regional Support for Angola's Agricultural Recovery: USAID's Regional Center for Southern Africa (RCSA) foresees opportunity to support the USAID/Angola Strategy through its Sorghum-Millet Improvement Program and the Southern Africa Regional Research Network (SARRNET) for cassava and sweet potato activities. Both activities are already well established and quick response is believed possible. In addition, there would also appear scope for RCSA to provide support through the newly established Trade Hub. One of the objectives of the Trade Hub is to facilitate harmonization of customs and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations in the SADC region. Both of these issues have been mentioned to the Team as barriers to the importation of seed into Angola and to private sector investment in a commercial seed industry. Trade Hub staff might also assist with the analysis of intra-regional trade opportunities for Angola agricultural produce.

Though of a longer-term nature, the RCSA, through its support to the SADC Food, Agriculture and Natural Resource unit, may also be able to contribute to policy analyses on re-vitalizing the agricultural economy of Angola, the regional dimensions of a national food security strategy, and intra-regional trade opportunities.

4. Land Tenure: The assessment teams strongly urges USAID to maintain a focus on land issues, particularly through the civil society and media promotion activities of SO6. USAID could provide support to civil society groups that assist communities in articulating their tenure claims and that advocate for broader public consultation of the draft land law, including commentary from the local level throughout the provinces. While media programs are expanded to increase radio coverage in the provinces, USAID could facilitate the flow of information regarding both the content of the current draft law and citizens' reactions to it. This process is especially significant since the draft land law is

only the second law in Angola for which the government has encouraged public dialogue and input. Civil society must take full advantage of this opportunity to participate in the legislative decision-making process.

At a minimum, the USG should continue to apply political pressure to extend the public discussion period of the draft law. The Mission should also directly support the public policy debate process. At least one year should be budgeted to permit more technical input, greater civil society consultation, a nation-wide discussion/debate that includes substantial input from the local level throughout the provinces, and the establishment of an iterative process for revision of the draft law. With collaboration between the SO6 and SO7 implementing partners, USAID should support a legal review of the draft land law, followed by the provision of technical input at critical junctures in the revision process to strengthen the policy dialogue. Although few other donors are directly engaging the land issue at this time, DfiD has designed an action research program for land registration in peri-urban Luanda. To the extent possible, USAID should share information and potentially collaborate with DfiD.

Additional activities could include efforts to strengthen local mechanisms for resolving land disputes, increase the capacity of local communities to advocate for tenure security with their local administrations, promote the establishment of a decentralized land registration system, and initiate a pilot registration program for communal lands in target province(s). The timing of such interventions should be determined after a land tenure expert is able to evaluate the implications of the draft law as revealed by the legal review exercise, the scale and province-specific dimensions of the much-discussed land encroachments by agribusinesses, the emerging resettlement plans (PEPARRS) of the provincial administrations, the relationship and relative authorities between local administrations and the *sobas* in resolving disputes, and the importance of a national civil registry to the functioning of a land registration system.

As the public consultation process of the draft land law progresses, additional research will be required to determine the most appropriate intervention points for the USAID programs. Remaining questions include the following:

- Does the draft law adequately distinguish between ownership, management, and access rights?
- Does the draft land law sufficiently address other resource rights, especially water rights? If not, do other laws/regulations detail resource rights?
- Does the draft law provide for a legal means of securing communal property rights?
- Has land been designated by use categories and surveyed? Is this information publicly available?
- Will the national cadastre be updated? When? By whom?
- How will land be “registered” throughout the country? Which ministry, at what level of government, will be responsible?
- What type of pilot program(s) should USAID support? Is it more important to promote tenure security through titling to establish the foundations for increased agricultural investment and agribusiness expansion, or, is it more appropriate first to help establish local dispute resolution mechanisms for land issues, or to strengthen the capacity of local communities to dialogue with local administrations regarding tenure rights and security?

6.4 Potential for Cross-SO Synergies

Activities carried out under SO5 can strongly support and provide synergies to SO7 (Maternal Child Health and Infectious Diseases). In particular, food security activities can support the following IRs:

IR7.1 Increased access to MCH services

IR7.2 Increased demand for MCH services

Programs funded by Title II resources have two sectoral priorities – improved household nutrition and improved agricultural productivity. Although the programs being implemented by NGOs under the current DAPs are primarily in the agriculture sector, these NGOs have considerable technical capacity in MCH programs (e.g., immunization, MCH), and this capacity should be utilized under the forthcoming DAPs.

Meanwhile, it should be noted that many of the agricultural interventions under the current DAPs work with farmer associations. During regular meetings, simple (standardized) messages regarding health, nutrition, and HIV/AIDS could also be incorporated.

SO5 activities could also be coordinated with SO6 (Democracy and Governance) efforts to support the legal review of the draft land law, particularly by supporting the provision of technical input at critical junctures in the revision process to strengthen the policy dialogue.

6.5 Recommendations

1. DCHA/FFP consider providing TDY support to USAID/Angola to provide technical support to the PVOs' preparation of joint emergency/development proposals.
2. The Africa Bureau and DCHA/FFP consider assigning a USDH Food for Peace Officer in Luanda to monitor food aid programs. Further, following this assignment, USAID/Angola and DCHA/FFP consider executing an agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) with USAID/Angola giving it "delegated mission" status for the review and approval of annual PVO operational plans.
3. DCHA/FFP endorse the DCHA/Humanitarian Assessment recommendation for an additional food pipeline to be operated by an NGO consortium (to commence o/a January 2003). This pipeline will be funded by both DP/EP funds in order to facilitate a developmental-relief approach to food security. Based on needs assessments, activities may include general distribution, food-for-work, MCH, HIV/AIDS, institutional feeding, micro-credit/micro-enterprise, and agricultural development (particularly seed multiplication, extension services, and market linkages).
4. DCHA/FFP maintain strong financial support to WFP under the revised 2002 Consolidated Appeal and the forthcoming 18-month special Consolidated Appeal (2003-2004).
5. DCHA/FFP and USAID/Angola encourage PL480 Title II cooperating partners to expand current DAPs to the extent that activities are consistent with originally approved parameters. More specifically, cooperating sponsors should expand into areas of need during the resettlement process, with particular attention to USAID focus provinces.
6. RCSA establish a FEWS office in Angola. RCSA has committed \$200,000 to establish the unit, but additional funding will be required to maintain the FEWS program beyond year one.
7. DCHA/FFP consider increased resource levels for, and expedited approval of, PL 480 Title II funded activities in Angola.
8. DCHA/FFP and DCHA/OFDA consider increased funding to support seed multiplication activities through FAO, PL480 Title II cooperating sponsors, and other NGOs.

9. USAID/Angola foster coordination/synergies between DAP partners and CLUSA in order to increase agricultural production and improve market linkages.
10. RCSA consider support for Angola's agricultural recovery, including funding to the Sorghum-Millet Improvement Program (SMIP) and the Southern Africa Regional Research Network (SARRNET) activities and general support through the Trade Hub.
11. USAID consider Angola a "priority country" under the U.S. Agriculture Initiative, with possible funding in FY 2004.
12. Increase focus on land tenure. The assessment team strongly urges USAID to maintain a focus on land issues, particularly through the civil society and media promotion activities of the DG SO6. Critical questions remain unanswered concerning the relationship between communities and local administrations regarding tenure security and the means by which land disputes will be arbitrated. Any resettlement and reintegration activities should consider land issues as essential elements of community building.
13. Foster broad-based debate on new land law. At a minimum, the USG continue to apply political pressure to extend the public discussion period of the draft law. USAID should also directly support the public policy debate process. At least one year should be budgeted to permit more technical input, greater civil society consultation, a nation-wide discussion/debate, and the establishment of an iterative process for revision of the law.

7. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The assessment team agrees with USAID/Angola that the current Country Strategic Plan for FY 2001-2005 provides an excellent framework for the transition from emergency to development. The team recommends a slight narrowing of geographic focus for transition and development activities, to the six provinces with the most IDPs and ex-FMU, plus Luanda. The six provinces are Bie, Huambo, Huila, Kuwanza Sul, Malanje, and Benguela. The team strongly recommends that USAID/Angola work to increase its intra-SO and inter-SO synergy, including synergy among DA, ESF, OFDA, FFP and OTI (if it re-enters Angola) funded partners. Finally, the team recommends addition of one USDH Food For Peace Officer to manage the massive P.L. 480 emergency and development resources, and a Famine Early Warning Systems (FEWS) Coordinator to be fielded through USAID's FEWSNET program to direct the proposed Angola FEWS unit. If OTI decides to re-enter Angola, it would place – and fund – an additional Personal Services Contractor (PSC).

7.1 HIV/AIDS and Health

Angolan health statistics for women and children are among the worst in the world. They include high maternal and infant mortality; high burdens of disease, especially malaria and diarrhea; high rates of vaccine preventable diseases, especially measles; low contraceptive prevalence and high fertility. Chronic shortages of drugs, contraceptives and equipment lessen the effectiveness of existing health programs, particularly in the public sector. The country-wide prevalence of HIV/AIDS is estimated by the GRA at 8.6%, with antenatal mothers in Luanda testing at 8.6% in 2001 and commercial sex workers at 33.8% in 2001. Recommendations for expanding USAID's health and HIV/AIDS program are linked to expansion into selected provinces and targeting of populations at high risk of HIV/AIDS in the post-war Angola.

7.1.1 HIV/AIDS

1. ***Request immediate addition of FY 2002 HIV/AIDS funding.*** There is urgent need to expand access to condoms and high-risk behavior messages for the highly mobile population during the return and resettlement period.
2. ***Increase FY 2003 resources.*** The team recommends that Angola become an “expanded response country” with the opportunity for additional HIV/AIDS resources.
3. ***Expand the PSI program in FY 2003 within existing resource levels:*** The team endorses the Population Services International (PSI) plan to intensify the program in Luanda, expand into the three USAID focus provinces of Benguela, Huila and Huambo, and cross-border transport routes in FY 2003.
4. ***Use available Central or Regional funding for key technical assistance (TA) and assessments in FY 2003-2005:*** For FY 2003, the team identified needs for short term TA to undertake assessments related to condom logistics, tuberculosis, vulnerable children and national HIV/AIDS policy. For 2004-2005, there is a need for TA in capacity building for local NGOs and HIV/AIDS care and support.
5. ***Increase USG advocacy:*** At no additional cost to the program, senior USG officials from all agencies should use every opportunity, both formal and informal, to undertake systematic advocacy to encourage the GRA to adopt appropriate policy measures related to HIV issues. USAID should assure that all USAID-funded humanitarian and transition/development programs run by NGOs or contractors (agriculture, micro-credit, health, etc.) include appropriate anti-AIDS messages within their staff training programs.
6. ***Support HIV activities with the Angolan military:*** In FY 2004-2005, if additional funding is available, the team recommends support to PSI to work with the military to complement on-going Drew University activities.
7. ***Expand Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT):*** If more funding is available in FY 2004-2005, in close collaboration with CDC, the team recommends expanding the PSI and UNICEF VCT centers.
8. ***Explore expanded interventions to increase Prevention of Mother To Child Transmission (PMTCT),*** if additional funding can be found for FY 2004-2005.

7.1.2 Maternal and Child Health

1. ***Expand the Management Sciences for Health MCH Project in FY 2003*** to Huambo, Bie, and Benguela provinces, as existing funds allow.
2. ***Standardize all health activities*** undertaken by NGOs with support of OFDA and FFP to include but not be limited to; health care protocols, messages and indicators for tracking impact. Explore possible opportunities in working with women’s and farmer’s groups, all years.
3. ***Strengthen Routine Immunization:*** Beginning in FY 2003, expand the CORE grant activities with NGOs for such activities as data analysis for polio and routine; tracking zero-dose children under five; house-to-house immunization campaigns that also record/note coverage for routine immunization; incorporating messages about routine immunization into social mobilization and integrated disease surveillance.
4. ***Maintain on-going work with WHO*** in malaria in Huambo and Malanje provinces, all years.
5. ***Use Global Health (central) funding for needed TA and assessments.*** Needs for FY 2003 include funding one member of an External Evaluation of the Routine Immunization Program in Angola; a full assessment of the reproductive health services in Angola; and a review of the contraceptive logistics system.
6. ***Request additional FY 2004-2005 Child Survival resources*** to expand the MCH project to all USAID focus provinces; expand the CORE agreement to enable the PVOs to support the routine immunization system; conduct a Demographic Health Survey or follow-up the Angolan Multi-

Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS); begin a family planning program; undertake complementary malaria activities by NGOs at the community level; expand malaria activities with WHO; and expand the work with CDC and WHO to include attention to TB.

7.2 Democracy and Governance

The current ceasefire presents an important opportunity to commence a meaningful peace that will address Angola's stalled democratic transition of the early 1990's. The window of opportunity, however, is short, expected to last through the pre-electoral period of 2003 and 2004. After that, new oil contracts and increases in production will likely double oil revenue, thus reducing potential for donor leverage for macroeconomic and political reform.

Targeted U.S. investment in civil society, media, reconciliation, and political party development over the next 12-24 months could help make the difference between a transition towards democracy resulting in a stable and equitable peace or continued single-party dominance, poor governance, and poverty. On the other hand, without investment at this critical time, the window for change is likely to close for the foreseeable future. Without outside financial support and diplomatic pressure for consolidating the peace and promoting a participatory reform process between now and the elections, the ruling clique will certainly succeed in entrenching themselves in power and perpetuating a governance philosophy based upon control and not service and participation.

The assessment team recommends increased support for those elements of Angolan society that can act as effective counterweights to the government. ***Civil society, including church-based advocacy groups, independent media, labor unions, and issue/advocacy organizations, is the most critical area of investment for USAID in this immediate post-conflict period.*** Recommendations include:

1. ***Foster increased civic advocacy and public debate:*** Continue support to civic advocacy and public debate, but focus on issue areas that are most relevant to a political transition: citizenship, transparent and accountable governance (including land tenure issues), and civil and political rights.
2. ***Expand geographic coverage:*** With expanded resources, USAID should intensify DG activities in USAID focus provinces.
3. ***Strengthen civil society:*** USAID's small grants program for civil society groups is financially constrained. If more resources become available, increased USAID investment in the civil society program is a priority.
4. ***Expand private media:*** Radio Ecclesia and VOA programming will be valuable alternatives to the state-run media. Should additional resources become available, USAID should support production of spots for independent programs in the provinces, news reporting from the provinces, and the translation of broadcast programs into local languages. VOA should be supported throughout the pre-election period.
5. ***Maintain planned support to elections:*** The team commends USAID for moving quickly to award the CEPPS grant so that pre-elections activities can begin. If additional funds become available, USAID should consider adding a small legislative strengthening component to the grant.
6. ***Strengthen civil society's role in reconciliation/conflict resolution:*** USAID should strengthen the role of civil society organizations, church groups, and peace networks/coalitions in reconciliation and community-building efforts. Participatory relations between local governments and communities should also be strengthened in resettlement areas.
7. ***Increase coordination and synergy:*** The U.S. Mission should increase coordination and synergy within and between USAID and Embassy programs. USAID should foster establishment of a DG donors' working group.
8. The assessment team ***strongly recommends that USAID/OTI re-establish a program in Angola,*** increasing USAID's ability to support civil society and foster the conditions for democratic reforms.

OTI presence in Angola would significantly build the capacity of civil society groups to interact with the GRA, advocate for improved governance responsiveness, and to push for a more democratic enabling environment prior to the elections. Such a program would enable USAID/Angola to re-target some of their assistance to support community-based approaches to reintegration and reconciliation.

7.3 Food Security

In order to meet household food security needs of the population over the next several years, USAID will need to integrate interventions that span the relief-to-development continuum. Four critical issues for the next 2-3 years are continued humanitarian food aid; access to seeds, tools, and training in improved techniques; broader assistance to restoration of livelihoods, involving income generation and marketing as well as agricultural production; and access to land/security of tenure. The team's recommendations are:

1. DCHA/FFP consider providing TDY support to USAID/Angola to provide technical support to the PVOs preparation of joint emergency/development proposals.
2. The Africa Bureau and DCHA/FFP consider assigning a USDH Food for Peace Officer in Luanda to monitor food aid programs. Further, following this assignment, USAID/Angola and DCHA/FFP consider executing an agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) with USAID/Angola giving it "delegated mission" status for the review and approval of annual PVO operational plans.
3. DCHA/FFP endorse the DCHA/Humanitarian Assessment recommendation for an additional food pipeline to be operated by an NGO consortium (to commence o/a January 2003). This pipeline will be funded by both DP/EP funds in order to facilitate a developmental-relief approach to food security. Based on needs assessments, activities may include general distribution, food-for-work, MCH, HIV/AIDS, institutional feeding, micro-credit/micro-enterprise, and agricultural development (particularly seed multiplication, extension services, and market linkages).
4. DCHA/FFP maintain strong financial support to WFP under the revised 2002 Consolidated Appeal and the forthcoming 18-month special Consolidated Appeal (2003-2004).
5. DCHA/FFP and USAID/Angola encourage PL480 Title II cooperating partners to expand current DAPs to the extent that activities are consistent with originally approved parameters. More specifically, cooperating sponsors should expand into areas of need during the resettlement process, with particular attention to USAID focus provinces.
6. Establish a FEWS office in Angola. RCSA has committed \$200,000 to establish the unit, but additional funding will be required to maintain the FEWS program beyond year one.
7. DCHA/FFP consider increased resource levels for, and expedited approval of, PL 480 Title II funded activities in Angola.
8. DCHA/FFP and DCHA/OFDA consider increased funding to support seed multiplication activities through FAO, PL480 Title II cooperating sponsors, and other NGOs.
9. USAID/Angola foster coordination/synergies between DAP partners and CLUSA in order to increase agricultural production and improve market linkages.
10. RCSA consider support for Angola's agricultural recovery, including funding to SMIP and SARRNET activities and general support through the Trade Hub.

11. USAID consider Angola a “priority country” under the U.S. Agriculture Initiative, with possible funding in FY 2004.
12. Increase focus on land tenure. The assessment team strongly urges USAID to maintain a focus on land issues, particularly through the civil society and media promotion activities of SO6. Critical questions remain unanswered concerning the relationship between communities and local administrations regarding tenure security and the means by which land disputes will be arbitrated. Any resettlement and reintegration activities should consider land issues as essential elements of community building.
13. Foster broad-based debate on new land law. At a minimum, the USG continue to apply political pressure to extend the public discussion period of the draft law. USAID should also directly support the public policy debate process. At least one year should be budgeted to permit more technical input, greater civil society consultation, a nation-wide discussion/debate, and the establishment of an iterative process for revision of the law.

ANNEX A

TEAM STATEMENT OF WORK

STATEMENT OF WORK

USAID Assessment in Angola

BACKGROUND: On April 4, 2002, representatives of the Government of the Republic of Angola (GRA) and of the National Union for the Independence of Angola (UNITA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that ended 27 years of civil war by providing for a cease-fire and peace agreement. The MOU reinstated the 1994 Lusaka Protocol that can now hopefully be implemented. Under the agreement, rebel soldiers are to be demobilized and reintegrated into civilian life, while UNITA will become a recognized political party. There is great hope that these peace accords will hold and that Angola will be able to make strides forward in a culture of peace.

In the short run, there is a greater need for humanitarian assistance. In addition to the continuing emergency needs of 1.9 million vulnerable people, newly accessible areas that were previously under rebel control or insecure and include approximately 800,000 additional people at risk for serious health consequences. Additionally, some 78,000 anticipated demobilized soldiers (out of the current 82,000 UNITA soldiers) and their families (approximately 250,000 people) are encamped in 35 quartering areas will require assistance. Approximately 400,000 refugees are living in neighboring countries, and it is anticipated that up to 80,000 refugees will spontaneously return over the next six months to Angola. The GRA and the international community are currently in the process of trying to assist those in greatest need, including internally displaced persons (IDPs), vulnerable populations in newly accessible areas, ex-combatants and their families, returnees and refugees.

USAID/DCHA recently sent an assessment team to Angola (June 08 – July 06) to assess the humanitarian situation in newly accessible areas, including IDP camps and quartering areas, and to recommend shorter-term emergency-humanitarian as well as transitional assistance strategy. Also USAID/Angola recently (June 08 – June 28) conducted an assessment to examine the existing P.L. 480 Title II Development Activity Projects (DAPS) and Monetization programs.

From July 29 through August 23 a USAID assessment team consisting of staff from the Africa Bureau (AFR), Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Food for Peace (FFP) and Global Health (GH) will conduct an assessment of how USAID's activities over the near to medium term can be modified and expanded where necessary, to take into consideration the changing country conditions. The USAID assessment team will review the DCHA and Monetization assessment findings and recommendations in light of the current USAID/Angola strategy (which combines emergency, transition and development activities). The team will review the three strategic development objectives 1) Enhanced household food security in target communities, 2) Constituencies promoting democratic governance strengthened and 3) Increased use of maternal/child health (MCH) and HIV/AIDS services and/or products and improved health practices – in relation to changes the country is undergoing due to the end of the war. The team will also provide guidance and recommendations on USAID/Angola's inactivated (due to lack of funding) Special Objective (SPO1): More Market-Oriented Economic Analysis Used in Decision-Making Process. The assessment will determine how AID's programs should be modified or changed in order to fulfill the strategic objectives for vulnerable Angolans – people who have remained in their villages, as well as reintegrating soldiers, and returning refugees and displaced persons.

PURPOSE: The purpose of the assessment is to review the current Mission program and make recommendations for modifications and or expansions of selected activities to better support Angola's transition from war to peace in an uncertain post conflict environment. Any program adjustments proposed will be made within the framework of USAID/Angola's FY 2000 through FY 2005 Country Strategic Plan (CSP). More importantly, the assessment will help USAID determine how to maximize its

contribution to one of the U.S. Government's key foreign policy objectives in Angola at this time – implementation of the Lusaka Protocol Agreement. The assessment will build upon and complement the previous humanitarian assessment in reviewing existing programs and approaches and planned activities that could best support Angola's resettlement and reintegration efforts and the transition to a more developmental program focus in the medium-term. In addition to necessitating an examination of USAID/Angola's programmatic adjustments over the medium term, the recommitment of the government and UNITA to the terms of the Lusaka Agreement signals an important political opening that may warrant support from OTI. The assessment will also help USAID determine what additional technical, human and financial resource support is needed over the remaining three fiscal years (FY 03 – FY 05) to fully implement the Mission's FY 2000 to FY 2005 Country Strategic Plan in the context of the new political environment.

SCOPE: In light of the prospects toward real transition and development, USAID is at an important development juncture to assess its support in maternal and child health, HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, land tenure, democracy and governance, food security and agriculture programs. Objectives under each program area are listed below. Program areas are under two categories: Near Term (6-12 months) and Medium Term (18-24 months).

Near Term:

1. Political Transition

Determine how well the current conditions match OTI criteria for programmatic engagement:

- Is the country significant to U.S. national interests?
- Is there a window of opportunity?
- Is the country in state of transition and does sufficient political will exist for OTI to support that transition?
- Is OTI best qualified to meet the particular transition needs of the country, make a substantive difference, and does OTI possess a comparative advantage over other U.S. Government offices?
- Is the operating environment sufficient to ensure the safety of OTI personnel and the proper monitoring of OTI funds?

If engagement is warranted, determine how OTI programming could best advance the peace process and lay a foundation for a democratic Angola. In particular, assess program opportunities in the following areas:

- Strengthening government accountability to its commitments for political reforms by broadening support to civil society and media outside major urban areas.
- Promoting a clear economic peace dividend to the population by improving the transparency of government economic dealings, especially with respect to primary commodities, improving economic management, and reducing corruption.
- Sustaining the transition to peace by piloting innovative community-based programs to re-integrate and reconcile war-torn communities, including reintegration of ex-combatants, internally displaced persons, and war-affected youth.

For any proposed programmatic options, determine:

- The degree of political will of the government and UNITA and the extent of popular support.

- Opportunities for collaboration or synergy with ongoing USAID programs and with activities sponsored by other development agencies or the private sector.
- Potential implementation arrangements, including funding mechanisms, local partners, OTI representation, and programmatic handover.
- A preliminary results framework.

2. Humanitarian

Visit newly accessible areas or provincial capitals where return and resettlement is likely to occur and where transition from emergency to development funding is likely to take place.

Establish benchmarks/framework with possible resource recommendations for reintegration/resettlement activities.

Assess commitment (government, donors) to repair critical infrastructure to permit overland delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Assess support to and/or coordination with NGOs, international organizations, and government for resettlement/reintegration (IDPs, refugees, ex-combatants).

Assess transition from emergency/recovery humanitarian assistance to development assistance designed to foster economic and civil society organization opportunities (democracy governance link).

Assess potential programming to assist kidnapped women and review programs of other organizations supporting these women).

Medium Term:

3. Maternal and Child Health

Assess current program and activities and determine where modifications and expansion are needed to support more vulnerable individuals.

Look at OFDA's maternal and child health programs and determine what capacity building is available from USAID/Angola resources.

Assess linkages between agriculture and maternal and child health.

4. HIV/AIDS

Assess the current program with PSI that focuses on high-risk groups for condom social marketing and behavior change communication, and explore possible geographic and programmatic expansion.

Assess leveraging opportunities with the private sector for HIV/AIDS activities.

Examine potential programming for school-age youth, orphans, children made vulnerable by HIV/AIDS, voluntary counseling and testing, and mother-to-child transmission activities.

Assess potential for multisectoral HIV/AIDS programs in Angola.

Provide recommendations on integrating HIV/AIDS as a cross-cutting theme for all Mission SOs.

Assess liaison with Center for Disease Control program.

5. Land Tenure

Assess linkages with democracy governance program to include advocacy, information dissemination, land legislation (legal and constitutional issues) and education activities.

Examine extension of NDI grant and potential sub-grant to Land Tenure Center or Rural Development Institute.

Review objections of Bright Ideas proposal (which was not awarded) for potential implementation under other activities.

6. Democracy and Governance

a. Civil Society

Examine support to civil society organizations working on reconciliation and promotion of tolerance at the provincial/municipal/local levels.

Examine support to civil society advocacy groups working for political reforms.

b. Media

Assess activities to strengthen the national independent media and VOA in the promotion of political reforms, peace and reconciliation.

Assess training opportunities for Angolan journalists to investigate and report on corruption.

c. Political Process – Elections

Assess establishment of a national peace and reconciliation commission to report and address human rights violations/abuses.

Assess the constitutional reform process.

Assess strategy for pre-election activities.

Assess need and assistance to civic advocacy organizations involved in the electoral process.

Assess implementation of SADC PF Electoral Norms and Standards.

d. Governance

Assess need for anti-corruption activities; implementation of SADC PF Anti-Corruption Protocol and other code of ethics and integrity protocols.

7. Food Security and Agriculture

Address major constraints to food security and suggest possible interventions to improve household access and availability, including the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.

Identify means to broaden the impact of USAID resources by specifically investigating appropriate food aid and food security interventions that can complement the health activities and those that can incorporate HIV messages.

Review the Mission Food Security and SO-5 concept papers on proposed activities for the future and provide recommendations and possible sources of funding for them.

Review the agriculture seed requirements for the country and the two current OFDA-funded programs (FAO and World Vision), and help articulate a strategy and program to ensure that most seed are produced or multiplied in-country over the next 2-3 years rather than relying on imported seed every year.

Assess potential of establishing a seed market system.

8. Program/Operations

Assess current USAID/Angola program financial records and project pipeline, and OE expenditure pattern.

Assess current USAID staffing pattern.

D. ITINERARY

Week One (July 29-August 2): AFR, OFDA, FFP, and GH team members arrive. Time in Luanda to consult with Embassy/Luanda, USAID/Angola, implementing partners and donors.

Week Two (Aug. 5-August 9): Site visits in Luanda and the Plan-Alto region (Huambo, Benguela, and Bie). OTI team members arrive and consult with donors, civil society and the government.

End of Week Two (August 9): Briefing on mid-assessment findings and sharing/exchange of information.

Week Three (August 12-16): Conduct additional meetings and discussions; finalize report from AFR, OFDA, FFP, and GH team members and present findings. AFR, OFDA, FFP, and GH team members depart.

Week Four (August 19-23): OTI team members conduct site visit and final consultations and present transitional program findings and draft report. OTI team members depart.

ASSUMPTIONS

USAID Assessment Team recommendations for modification and expansion of identified activities will form the basis of a formal submission on behalf of USAID/Angola in support of required additional resources for FY 2003-2005 to support the full implementation of the FY 2000 – FY 2005 Country Strategic Plan.

Peace and stability in Angola will continue, the situation in Angola will continue to improve and the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol will continue without major setbacks.

Access to previously inaccessible areas of the country will improve in terms of security, physical infrastructure rehabilitation and demining efforts.

In the context of the current assistance environment, the Country Strategic Plan and the related Performing Monitoring plan are still valid and provides a sound basis of shifting the program focus in the near to medium term from humanitarian assistance to more transition development assistance.

ANNEX B

LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

**ANGOLA TRANSITION AND DEVELOPMENT ASSESSMENT TEAM
LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED**

Private Sector and Non-Governmental Organizations

Acção Contra A Fome

Erick Forte, Country Representative

ADPCI

Carlos Gomes Sucani, Executive Director

ADRA – Angola

Luís Monteiro, Director

AFRICARE

Kevin Lowther, Africa Region Director
Samson Thaddeus Ngonyani, Country Representative
Pedro Chituku, Assistant Country Representative
Pedro Siloka, Bie Coordinator
Dr. Antonio Diaz, Medical Coordinator

ALSSA – Land Coalition (Huila Province)

Father Jacinto Pio Wacussanga, Ecclesiastical Assistant for ALSSA in the Land campaign
Cecília Gregório, Land Campaign Coordinator

CARE

Douglas Steinberg, Country Representative
Robert Jan Bulten, Deputy Director
Astrid Eisenlohr, Bie Province Medical Director

Catholic Relief Services, USCC

Scott Campbell, Country Director

CCF

Mary Claire Daly, Country Representative

CCG

Engracia Francisco

CDC

William E. Brady, Global AIDS Program, STD Prevention
Kim Marsh, Global AIDS Program, Informatics

CIDA

Yannick Hingorani

CLUSA

Alexandre Serrano, CLUSA Representative for Lusophone Africa

COIEPA (Inter-Ecclesiastical Committee for Peace in Angola)

Rev. Dr. Daniel Ntoni Nzinga, Executive Director

CONCERN

Mack Alison, New Representative

CORE

David D. Newberry, CORE Director

Lee Losey, Angola Country Representative

Development Workshop

Allan Cain, Country Director

ESSO Exploration Angola

Michael Dooley, Director of Public Relations

Helena David, Public Affairs Analyst

Frederic Erbert Foundation

Sabine Fandrych, Country Representative

GOAL

Robert Kevlihan, Country Representative

Health Partners Meeting – Huambo Province

Martinho Azeligdo, UAICA

Jorge Catinda, ADPP

Martinho Gehissingui, Alianca das ONGs

Emma Hernandez, IMC

Albino Mande, Development Workshop

Sonia Ontaneda, Provincial Coordinator, Huambo, Movimondo (Italian NGO)

Pedro Balanca Sagague; Save the Children/UK

Antonio Saralo; ADRA/Angola

Humpata Fruit Producer Association, Huila Province

ICRC

Allan Kolly, Country Representative

International Medical Corps

Robert Lueth, Country Director

Emma Hernandez, Huambo Coordinator

Susan Purdin, Technical Advisor (RHRC Monitoring and Evaluation Program, Mailman School
Of Public Health, Columbia University)

Instituto Português de Medicina Preventiva

Manuel Pedro, Medical Director

IOM International Organization for Migration

Nick Van Der Vyver, Country Representative

IPMP

Manuel Pedro

Jubilee 2002

Benjamin Castello

Management Sciences for Health (MSH)

Jaime Benavente, Country Director
Ondina, Coordenadora de Projecto
Gabriela Simas

MISA (Media Institute for Southern Africa)

Siona Casimiro, Member

Mississippi Consortium for International Development

Enrique Maradiaga, Country Director

National Democratic Institute

Isabel Emerson, Country Director

OXFAM UK

Frederick Kwame Kumah, Country Representative

Population Services International (PSI)

Susan Shulman, Country Representative
Lili Macille, Acting Country Representative
Don Soissan, Intern

PSI NGO partners meeting, Luanda

Ramos Adar, CELCSE
Educado Algonso, FISH
Justin Cuckow, GOAL
Emilia Dias Fernandes, Secretary General, Rede Mulher
Enida Jorgaxhi; GOAL
Pascalina Mingas; Rede Mulher
Cristiano Nkosi; AMSA
Manuel Pedro; Portuguese Institute for Preventive Medicine (IPMP)
Humberto Pick; LPV
Maria Pombal; Accao Humana
Armand Rosa; MAR
Pedro Santa Maria; AESA

Quihita Land Rights Group, Huila Province

Radio Ecclesia

Joao Pinto, Senior Journalist

Save the Children – UK

Diana Stevens, Country Representative

Save the Children – US

Ray McArdle, Country Representative

Sindicato dos Jornalistas

Ismael Mateus, General Secretary

VOA

Paolo Oliveira, Country Representative

VVAF

Thomas Petocz, Country Representative

Abby Russell, Project/Grant Accountant

Alex Rietveld

World Learning Incorporated

Fern Teodoro, Country Director

Anaclea Pereira, Program Officer

World Vision

John Yale, Country Representative

Jose Luis Fernandes, Malanje Base Manager and Agriculture Program Coordinator

Travol Quintino, Deputy Agriculture Program Coordinator

Political Parties

Democratic Liberal Youth

Joao Alfredo Adao, National Secretary

FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)

Ngola Kabangu, Secretary General

MPLA (Movement for the Liberation of the People of Angola)

Norberto Fernandes dos Santos, Political Bureau Information Secretary

Manuel Pedro Chaves, International Relations Division Chief

PDP-ANA (Democratic Party for the National Angolan Alliance)

Nfulupinga Lando Victor, President of Party and Member of Parliament (MP)

Sedjangani Ndimbi, Economist

Simon Macazo, Parliamentary and Constitutional Affairs

PLD (Democratic Liberal Party)

Analia de Victoria Pereira, President of Party and MP

POC (Civilian Opposition Parties)

Paulino Pinto Joao

PRS (Social Renovation Party)

Eduardo Kwangana

UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)

General Lukamba Gato

Abel E. Chivukuvuku, MP

Bilateral and Multi-Lateral Donors

British Cooperation

Jeremy Astill-Brown

European Union

Robert Steinlecher
Giuseppe Chio, ECHO
Raul Feio

Norwegian Embassy

Alida Endresen, Counselor

Spanish Embassy

Pablo Barbara Gomez, Second Secretary

FAO

Susan Mills, Country Representative
Ricardo Luna
Paulo Vicente
Marco Giovanoni, Emergency Coordination Unit (UCPE)

International Monetary Fund

Carlos A. Liete, Resident Representative

OCHA

Lise Grande, Head of Angola Unit
Paula Carosi
Claudio Lopes, Bie Province Coordinator
Philip Dive, Huila Province Coordinator
Manuel Gonazalez, Malanje Province Coordinator

UNAIDS

Alberto Stella, Country Director

UNDP

Eric de Mul, Resident Representative
Maggie Brown, Transition Consultant
Werner Van Der Berger

UNICEF

Mario Ferrari,
Dra. Melanie Luick, HIV/AIDS Advisor
Victor Lara, Child Health Project Officer
Ndoza Luwawa, UNICEF/Huambo and Acting OCHA Coordinator/Huambo

UNOA

Patrick Hughes, Deputy Chief, Human Rights Division

World Bank

Johannes Zutt, Country Program Coordinator: Angola, Malawi, and Mozambique

Sean Bradley, Senior Operations Officer, Demobilization
Ingo Wiederhofer, Operations Officer
Raja Jandhyala, Demobilization and Reintegration Specialist (DfID)

WFP

Oscar Sarroca, Acting Country Representative
Giovani Lacosta, Geographic Information System and Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping A
Coordinator

WHO

Pier Paolo Balladelli, Country Representative

UNAIDS

Alberto Stella, Country Representative

Government of Angola

Advisor to the President

Dr. Carlos Maria Feijo, Professor

FAA (Angola Armed Forces)

Colonel Francisco Ernesto, Health

**Ministry of Agriculture Program for the Development of Food Crops in Northern Angola
(PRODECA)**

Antonio Castame, Regional Director

Ministry of Social Assistance and Reinsertion (MINARS)

Minister Joao Baptista Kussumua

Ministry of Health

José Van Dunem, Vice-Minister of Health

National AIDS Program

Dr. Dulcelina Serrano

Province of Bie

Jose Amaro Tatti, Governor

Antonio Gomes Conceicao, Vice Governor for the Social Sphere

Province of Huambo

Agustinho Jacques, Governor i.a.

Province of Huila

Ramos da Cruz, Governor

Province of Malanje

Cristovao da Cunha, Governor

Province of Luanda, Provincial Health Delegation

Dr. Fergal
Izilda Neves
Isabel Massocolo

Ndele Quartering Area, Bie Province

Lt. Col. Faustin, Command of QA
Col. Enrado, Deputy Command of QA

Damba Quartering Area, Malanje Province

Assessment Team Members:

AID/W

Robert Hellyer, USAID/Angola Director, Co-Team Leader
Karen M. Poe, AFR/SA Director, Co-Team Leader
Laura McPherson, Strategic Planning Consultant, CRI Consult, Inc.
Neen Alrutz, Global Health, HIV/AIDS
Cathy Bowes, Global Health
Melissa Rosser, AFR/SD
Kevin Bohrer, AFR/SD
David Garms, DCHA/FFP
Robert Drapcho, DCHA/FFP
Larry Meserve, DCHA/OTI
Tjip Walker, DCHA/OTI

Regional Center for Southern Africa (RCSA)

Gary Mullins, Agriculture and Natural Resources Office

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Jeff Ashley, GDO
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Ken Lyvers, Transition
Jeff Bryan, OFDA
Heather Evans, OFDA
Elias Isaac, DG
Gomes Cambuta, Agriculture
Carla Queiroz, Program Assistant
Eveline Viegas, DG
Gilberto Ribeiro, Monitoring and Evaluation
Abdul Sumra, Financial Manager
Carlos Ferreira, Acting EXO

US Embassy

Ambassador Christopher Dell
Cheryl Martin, PAO
Shawn Sullivan, ECON/POL
LTC Kelly Langdorf, DATT

ANNEX C
SELECTED DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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SELECTED DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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- Humanitarian Situation Fact Sheet

- Update on Humanitarian Activities

- The Humanitarian Situation in Angola

- Assorted, very useful, maps

- IDP Fact Sheet

- Chart of Donor Geographical and Sector Preference

- Briefing Note: Emergency Response Fund – ERF

- Norms on the Resettlement of the Internally Displaced Persons

- Briefing Note: National Agricultural Campaigns

- Chart of 2001 and 2002 Appeal Requirements and Contributions by Sector

- Humanitarian Overview by Province

- Report to Donors

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- Core Humanitarian Issues in Bie Province

- Humanitarian Coordination Structures in Bie Province

- NGO Activity in Bie Province

- UN Humanitarian Activities in Bie Province

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Humanitarian Coordination Structure in Huambo Province

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ANNEX D

**SUMMARY OF
LUSAKA PROTOCOL,
LUENA MOU
AND
UN RESOLUTION 1433 (2002)**

THE LUSAKA PROTOCOL: SELECTED PROVISIONS

The protocol is very specific on modalities, although actual implementing procedures must still be worked out. The Joint Political and Military Commission (JPMC) will take the lead in this. The JPMC previous accord and in many instances, as with the case of the JPMC, takes up where the accord left off. The JPMC will be chaired by the U.N. and will be composed of representatives from UNITA, the government, and representatives from the official observer nations: the United States, Russia, and Portugal. It will undertake such activities as guiding compliance with the political and military understanding of the peace protocol.

Military Provision:

- (1) Reestablishment of the cease-fire;
- (2) The return of UNITA generals to FAA (which is to become a nonpartisan, civilian-controlled armed force and the integration of volunteers from UNITA forces, and reintegration into civilian society;
- (3) Demobilization, under UNAVEM supervision and verification, of excess UNITA forces, and reintegration into civilian society;
- (4) Repatriation of all mercenaries (largely South Africans and Zimbabweans); and
- (5) Incorporation of UNITA troops into the Angolan National Police (which will come under the Ministry of Home Affairs, but will retain its own organizational structure from the national to local level), and the prohibition of any other police or surveillance organization.

National Reconciliation:

- (1) Devolution of power from central government to provincial authorities to administer, tax, and control finances (including attracting foreign investment);
- (2) Most UNITA deputies who won seats in the parliament in October 1992 to take their seats in parliament;
- (3) UNITA members to be incorporated, to the extent possible, into government service, including positions as teachers, health workers, administrators, and in State media organs;
- (4) UNITA leadership to receive about 88 private residences, political facilities in each province, and one central headquarters;
- (5) Security protection for high-ranking UNITA members; and
- (6) UNITA members to hold the following posts: Ministers of Geology and Mines, Trade, Health, and Hotel and Tourism; Deputy Ministers of Defense, Home Affairs, Finance, Agriculture, Public Works, Social Reintegration and Mass Communication: six Ambassadorships, including Canada and Mexico: three provincial governors; seven deputy governorships; 30 municipal and 35 deputy municipal Administrators; and 75 Administrators of Communes.

Completion of the Electoral Process:

- (1) The presidential run-off, which would have been concluded after the September 1992 elections, to be held within 15 months; and
- (2) The National Electoral Council to be assisted in organizing and running the elections by the U.N. and international observers.

[End of Summary of Lusaka Protocol]

Summary: Luena Accord/Memorandum of Understanding

The “Memorandum of Understanding Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues Under the Lusaka Protocol” – hereafter referred to as the Luena Accord/MOU – was signed on April 4, 2002 by the GRA and UNITA.

The MOU covers establishment of a cease-fire and resolution of all pending military aspects of the Lusaka Protocol and reiterates the validity of the relevant legal and political aspects of the Lusaka Protocol.

Some of the important aspects of the MOU include:

- General Amnesty Law for all crimes committed within the framework of the armed conflict between the UNITA military forces and the Government.
- Disengagement, quartering and conclusion of the demilitarization of UNITA military forces.
- Integration of a certain number of UNITA officers and regular forces into the Angola Army.
- Full demobilization of the UNITA soldiers and the dissolution of the UNITA military force.
- Social and vocational reintegration of ex-combatants.
- Establishment of a mixed Military Commission to coordinate implementation of the MOU.
- ANNEX 1: quartering of UNITA military forces.
- ANNEX 1A: disarming and repatriation of foreign military forces under control of UNITA.
- ANNEX 2: integration of UNITA military into the Angolan armed forces.
- ANNEX 3: integration of UNITA military into the National Police.
- ANNEX 4: vocational reinsertion of demobilized personnel into national life.
- ANNEX 5: considerations regarding the conditions for the conclusion of Lusaka Protocol.
- ANNEX 6: considerations relative to special security under Lusaka Protocol.

[End of Summary of Luena MOU]



Source: UN Security Council

Date: 15 Aug 2002

Security Council authorizes establishment of UN Mission in Angola: resolution 1433 (2002)

Resolution creates follow-on mission to current United Nations presence

SC/7486

Security Council

4604th Meeting (PM)

Expressing the view that the United Nations presence in Angola could contribute to the consolidation of peace in that country, the Security Council authorized this afternoon the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA), as a follow-on mission to the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA), for a period of six months until 15 February 2003.

Unanimously adopting resolution 1433 (2002), the Council also expressed its intention in determining whether to extend, adjust or curtail the Mission, to take into account the Secretary-General's recommendations based on his Special Representative's assessment of progress in completing the Lusaka Protocol.

Also by the text, the Council endorsed the staffing of UNMA as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report, including the recommendation for a Child Protection Adviser, to assist the parties in concluding the Lusaka Protocol by chairing the Joint Commission, and leading the completion of the agreed list of tasks which remained pending under the Lusaka Protocol.

UNMA is also to assist the Angolan Government in undertaking, among other things, the protection and promotion of human rights and in the building of institutions to consolidate peace and enhance the rule of law; support for social and professional reintegration of the demobilized through appropriate United Nations agencies; and the promotion of economic recovery through relevant United Nations agencies.

In addition, the Council welcomed the appointment of a resident Special Representative of the Secretary-General to serve as the head of UNMA, and to oversee a coordinated and integrated approach to United Nations activities in Angola as reflected in the UNMA mandate.

Further by the text, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it when his Special Representative confirmed that the Joint Commission had determined that all remaining tasks under the Lusaka Protocol have been completed.

Beginning at 5:17 p.m., the meeting adjourned at 5:20 p.m.

Following is the full text of resolution 1433 (2002):

"The Security Council,

"Reaffirming its resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991 and all of its subsequent resolutions on the situation in Angola, in particular resolution 1268 (1999) of 15 October 1999,

"Emphasizing its commitment to preserve the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola,

"Reaffirming the importance of the 'Acordos de Paz', the Lusaka Protocol and the Memorandum of Understanding Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for the Cessation of Hostilities and the Resolution of the Outstanding Military Issues under the Lusaka Protocol (S/1991/1441, annex), as well as relevant Security Council resolutions,

"Recalling the statement of its President of 28 March 2002 (S/PRST/2002/7), which, in particular, stresses the willingness of the Council to support adjustments to the mandate of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA) which should take into account recent developments in Angola,

"Welcoming the [report of the Secretary-General of 26 July 2002 \(S/2002/834\)](#),

"Expressing its appreciation for the work of UNOA in support of the people of Angola,

"Expressing also its view that the presence of the United Nations in Angola can contribute to the consolidation of peace through the promotion of political, military, human rights, humanitarian and economic goals as set out in the report of the Secretary-General,

"1. Authorizes the establishment of, as a follow-on mission to UNOA, the United Nations Mission in Angola (UNMA) for a period of six months until 15 February 2003, to pursue the objectives and perform the tasks recommended by the Secretary-General in his report and reflected in paragraph 3 below, and expresses its intention in determining whether to extend, adjust or curtail this Mission, to take into account the recommendations of the Secretary-General based on his Special Representative's assessment of progress in completing the Lusaka Protocol;

"2. Welcomes the appointment of a resident Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to serve as the head of UNMA, and to oversee a coordinated and integrated approach to United Nations activities in Angola as reflected in the UNMA mandate described in paragraph 3 below;

"3. Endorses the staffing of UNMA as appropriate and as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report, including the recommendation for a Child Protection Adviser, with the following mandate:

A. To assist the parties in concluding the Lusaka Protocol by:

(1) Chairing the Joint Commission;

(2) Leading the completion of the agreed list of tasks which remain pending under the Lusaka Protocol;

B. To assist the Government of Angola in undertaking the following tasks:

(1) Protection and promotion of human rights and in the building of institutions to consolidate peace and enhance the rule of law;

(2) Provision of technical advice and support for mine action;

(3) Facilitation and coordination of delivery of humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups including internally displaced persons and families in quartering areas, with special concern for children and women;

(4) Support for social and professional reintegration of the demobilized through appropriate United Nations agencies;

(5) Promotion of economic recovery through relevant United Nations agencies;

(6) Mobilization of resources of the international community, to include international donors conferences, as appropriate; and

(7) Provision of technical assistance to the Government of Angola in the preparation of elections;

"4.Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council when his Special Representative confirms that the Joint Commission has determined that all remaining tasks under the Lusaka Protocol have been completed, and notes that upon the conclusion of the mandate, the United Nations Resident Coordinator resumes authority for supervising the above tasks, as appropriate;

"5.Requests the Secretary-General to provide an interim report to enable a three-month review of the work of UNMA by the Security Council;

"6.Decides to remain actively seized of the matter."

ANNEX E

SUMMARY OF OCHA PROCESS FOR RESETTLEMENT OF IDPS

Resettlement and Return Policy

The following is a preliminary diagramme showing the main aspects of UN involvement in resettlement and return.

UN Assistance Component

Step One

UN (OCHA and UNSECOORD) to confirm through Level 1 assessments that the basic pre-conditions specified in the Norms and regulamento in place at each site:

- voluntary movement
- no mine presence
- land allocations
- water availability
- State Administration presence
- accessibility

Step Two

Registration Committee to "register" IDPs for return or resettlement at IDP camps on the basis of the form agreed in the regulamento. Registration Committee to register refugee returnees at appropriate provincial centres. IDPs and returnees to receive a final food distribution prior to relocation.*

*IDPs who remain in camps will continue to receive food assistance on the basis of vulnerability assessments.

Step Three

Following movement of IDPs and returnees to new site:

- 1) WFP to provide food assistance at the new sites through Implementing Partners (IP).
- 2) FAO to provide seeds and tools at the new sites through IPs.
- 3) OCHA to coordinate provision of essential NFI at the new sites through Ips.
- 4) UNHCR to coordinate provision of assistance to refugee returnees.

Step Four

UNICEF, UNHCR, UNAIDS, WHO and UNFPA to work with Government counterparts to set standards and meet targets in social sectors at the new sites in compliance with the Norms and regulamento.

Coordination Component

Coordination Structure

Provincial: Provincial Sub-group on IDPs to oversee all aspects of the return process and to ensure compliance with the Norms and regulamento.

Site: Lead NGOs at each site to ensure effective implementation of assistance and to report all difficulties to Provincial Sub-group. OCHA and UTCAH to monitor compliance with the Norms and regulamento at each site and to report difficulties to the Provincial Sub-group.

ANNEX F

DG FUNDING OPTIONS

Narrative for DG Funding Scenarios

The following tables present programmatic priorities for the DG sector based on three levels of funding for FY 2003 and 2004. All amounts represent funds available for programmatic, as opposed to program management, uses.

- The *base level* is approximately \$6 million in each fiscal year. This represents the amounts already committed for FY03 and an assumption that a similar amount would be almost guaranteed in FY04.
- The *medium level* of \$8.6 million in FY 03 and \$9.0 million in FY 04 is based on the assumption that the Mission will successfully compete for additional ESF funding and access centrally managed DA funds dealing with conflict and victims of torture.
- The *high level* of funding of \$11.6 in FY 03 and \$12.0 in FY 04 assumes the start-up of a \$3.0 million OTI program focused on the more politically sensitive aspects of the DG program.

Further detail on each scenario follows.

Base Scenario

Under the base scenario, USAID's ongoing support to civil society (through World Learning), media (VOA), and commercial courts (Commerce) would continue in FY 03. However, the aim would be to focus activities on the key emerging transition issues: transparency, land, and civic education/citizenship. To further focus attention and funding on the key issues, no additional funding is planned for either the MCID program in FY 03 or 04 or the Commerce Department activities in FY04.

In recognition of the window of opportunity opened by the ceasefire and demilitarization process, USAID/Angola has already been awarded \$3 million in ESF funds that will be principally support preparations for elections anticipated for 2004. Providing an opportunity for all three CEPPS partners (NDI, IRI and IFES) to work in Angola is a welcome development.

Medium Scenario

The medium scenario is based on a realistic expectation that with the existing state of peace, USAID/Angola would be able to access \$2.5 to \$3 million in additional support from a number of centrally managed pools of funds. These include ESF, the soon to be established Africa Conflict Fund [ACF], and the Victim's of Torture Fund [VOT].

The aim here is not to simply to access additional resources, but to pursue funding that would support the strategic aims within the DG sector. Thus ESF would be a suitable source of additional assistance to increase the capacity of civil society and independent media or strengthen legislative deliberation. Similarly ACF or VOT funds would be a useful source of funding for programs that work in communities to provide counseling or peace-building and conflict management skills to the displaced.

High Scenario

The high funding scenario assumes that the Mission is able to access the additional funds identified under the medium scenario as well as assuming that OTI resumes a \$3 million program¹⁸ for each of an initial two years. To better match OTI's operational mandate with programming priorities, OTI resources would

¹⁸ In addition OTI would fund a US PSC to manage the country program and potentially additional FSN support staff.

be used to support the more overtly political aspects of the DG portfolio through a significant expansion of the small grant program to provide flexible and timely assistance to civil society and independent media around key transition issues, increase the deliberative capacity of existing political parties, and nurture participatory political process, whether in the form of a national dialogue, a constitutional debate, or consultation on major pieces of legislation. With OTI picking up these activities, other DG resources would be freed up to expand activities aimed at re-knitting and empowering local communities.

DG Programming: Base Funding Scenario

Program Priorities	Implementing Partner	Funding Sources (US\$ million)							
		For FY 03 Programming							
		02 DA C&T	02 ESF*	03 DA DG	03 DA C&T	03 DA ACF	03 DA VOT	03 TI OTI	FY 03 Total
Civil Society/Media									
Expand support for civil society advocacy and independent media with greater focus on key transition issues	World Learning		0.25	0.85	1.00				2.10
Continued support for VOA Portuguese programming	VOA		0.30						0.30
Political Processes/Elections									
Promote civil society involvement in political processes	CEPPS/NDI		1.00						1.00
Strengthen political parties	CEPPS/IRI		1.00						1.00
Develop a framework for free and fair elections	CEPPS/IFES		0.50						0.50
Reintegration and Reconciliation									
Survey ex-combatants	IOM	0.10							0.10
Promote community-based reintegration and reconciliation in target communes/camps	IOM or CCG	0.90							0.90
Governance									
Support to commercial courts	Commerce Dept.		0.20						0.20
Total		1.00	3.25	0.85	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	6.10

Note: * includes ESF FY01 carryover

DG Programming: Base Funding Scenario, cont.

Program Priorities	Funding Sources (US\$ million)						
	For FY 04 Programming						
	03 ESF	04 DA DG	04 DA C&T	04 DA ACF	04 DA VOT	04 TI OTI	Total for FY 04
Civil Society/Media							
Expand support for civil society advocacy and independent media with greater focus on key transition issues		1.00	1.00				2.00
Continued support for VOA Portuguese programming	0.40						0.40
Political Processes/Elections							
Promote civil society involvement in political processes	1.20						1.20
Strengthen political parties	1.20						1.20
Develop a framework for free and fair elections	1.20						1.20
Reintegration and Reconciliation							
Survey ex-combatants							0.00
Promote community-based reintegration and reconciliation in target communes/camps							0.00
Governance							
Support to commercial courts							0.00
Total	4.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	6.00

DG Programming: Medium Funding Scenario

Program Priorities	Implementing Partner	Funding Sources (US\$ million)							
		For FY 03 Programming							
		02 DA C&T	02 ESF*	03 DA DG	03 DA C&T	03 DA ACF	03 DA VOT	03 TI OTI	FY 03 Total
Civil Society/Media									
Expand support for civil society advocacy and independent media with greater focus on key transition issues	World Learning		0.25	0.85	1.00				2.10
Expanded support for VOA Portuguese programming	VOA		0.50						0.50
Material support to independent press	World Learning		0.30						0.30
Political Processes/Elections									
Promote civil society involvement in political processes	CEPPS/NDI		1.00						1.00
Strengthen political parties	CEPPS/IRI		1.00						1.00
Develop a framework for free and fair elections	CEPPS/IFES		0.50						0.50
Reintegration and Reconciliation									
Survey ex-combatants	IOM	0.10							0.10
Expanded support to community-based reintegration and reconciliation in target province(s)	IOM or CCG	0.90				1.00			1.90
Counseling and other support to victims of torture in target province(s)	TBD						1.00		1.00
Governance									
Support to commercial courts	Commerce Dept.		0.20						0.20
Total		1.00	3.75	0.85	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	8.60

Note: * includes ESF FY01 carryover

DG Programming: Medium Funding Scenario, cont.

Program Priorities	Funding Sources (US\$ million)						
	For FY 04 Programming						
	03 ESF	04 DA DG	04 DA C&T	04 DA ACF	04 DA VOT	04 TI OTI	Total for FY 04
Civil Society/Media							
Expand support for civil society advocacy and independent media with greater focus on key transition issues		1.00	1.00				2.00
Continued support for VOA Portuguese programming	0.50						0.50
Support to independent press	0.30						0.30
Political Processes/Elections							
Promote civil society involvement in political processes	1.40						1.40
Strengthen political parties	1.40						1.40
Develop a framework for free and fair elections	1.40						1.40
Reintegration and Reconciliation							
Survey ex-combatants							0.00
Promote community-based reintegration and reconciliation				1.00			1.00
Counseling and other support to victims of torture in target province(s)					1.00		1.00
Governance							
Support to commercial courts							0.00
Total	5.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	9.00

DG Programming: High Funding Scenario

Program Priorities	Implementing Partner	Funding Sources (US\$ million)							
		For FY 03 Programming							
		02 DA C&T	02 ESF*	03 DA DG	03 DA C&T	03 DA ACF	03 DA VOT	03 TI OTI	FY 03 Total
Civil Society/Media									
Expand support for civil society advocacy and independent media with greater focus on key transition issues	World Learning		0.25	0.85				2.00	3.10
Expanded support for VOA Portuguese programming	VOA		0.50						0.50
Material support to independent press	World Learning		0.30						0.30
Political Processes/Elections									
Promote civil society involvement in political processes	CEPPS/NDI		1.00					0.50	1.50
Strengthen deliberative capacity of parties in National Assembly	CEPPS/IRI							0.50	0.50
Strengthen political parties	CEPPS/IRI		1.00						1.00
Develop a framework for free and fair elections	CEPPS/IFES		0.50						0.50
Reintegration and Reconciliation									
Survey ex-combatants	IOM	0.10							0.10
Expanded support to community-based reintegration and reconciliation in target provinces	IOM or CCG	0.90			1.00	1.00			2.90
Counseling and other support to victims of torture in target provinces	TBD						1.00		1.00
Governance									
Support to commercial courts	Commerce Dept.		0.20						0.20
Total		1.00	3.75	0.85	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	11.60

Note: * includes ESF FY01 carryover

DG Programming: High Funding Scenario, cont.

Program Priorities	Funding Sources (US\$ million)						
	For FY 04 Programming						
	03 ESF	04 DA DG	04 DA C&T	04 DA ACF	04 DA VOT	04 TI OTI	Total for FY 04
Civil Society/Media							
Expand support for civil society advocacy and independent media with greater focus on key transition issues		1.00				2.00	3.00
Continued support for VOA Portuguese programming	0.50						0.50
Support to independent press	0.30						0.30
Political Processes/Elections							
Promote civil society involvement in political processes	1.40					0.50	1.90
Strengthen deliberative capacity of parties in National Assembly						0.50	0.50
Strengthen political parties	1.40						1.40
Develop a framework for free and fair elections	1.40						1.40
Reintegration and Reconciliation							
Survey ex-combatants							0.00
Promote community-based reintegration and reconciliation			1.00	1.00			2.00
Counseling and other support to victims of torture in target provinces					1.00		1.00
Governance							
Support to commercial courts							0.00
Total	5.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	12.00

ANNEX G

HEALTH ACTIVITY TABLES

TRANSITION MATRIX

Intervention	Maternal Health (MH)	Child Health (CH)	Reproductive Health	Immunization	Polio
Time Frame					
Current Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Implemented by MSH * Luanda based * Started in April 2002 * Major intervention Maternal Health * Developing IPT for malaria 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Implemented by MSH * Luanda based * Started in April 2002 * Major intervention Child Health * Developing IPT for malaria 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Currently no program 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Activities being carried out by OCHA grants * UNICEF grant ending Sept 2002 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * 2,100,000 for WHO * 500,000 for CORE 5 PVOs: Africare, Care, CRS, SCF/US, WV - Working in Benguela, Huila, Bie, Kwanza Sul & Norte, Luanda, Malanje - Doing social mobilization & logistics to support NIDS and surveillance
Transition Short Term FY 02 - FY 03	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Expand the MSH MH activities into Huambo, Bie and Benguela. * Support training of trainers (TOT) activities in maternal health for other provinces (yet to be specified). * Facilitate a standardization of MH messages and protocols in OFDA projects. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Review current IMC CS activities in Huambo to determine how MSH can assist in building and expanding in CS activities. * Facilitate a standardization of CSH messages and protocols in OFDA projects. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Obtain RH health monies * Develop and implement a USAID-funded RH program. * Work with FFP to incorporate RH into their health projects. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Request Core support to participate in the external evaluation for GAVI funds. * Continue activities in OCHA grants. * Explore option of using CORE polio grant to support routine immunizations. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Request permission to use CORE grant to work in routine immunization. * Support WHO/Afro (at lower levels)
Transition Medium/Long Term FY 04 and on	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Obtain additional CS monies * Expand the MSH MH activities into the other three USAID target areas. * Work closely with FFP to assure standard health messages, indicators and messages. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Obtain additional CS monies * Expand the MSH CS activities in to the other five USAID target areas. * Work closely with FFP to assure standard health messages, indicators and messages. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Support CORE with supplemental funding to work at community level in routine immunization. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Support WHO/Afro (at lower levels)

TRANSITION MATRIX

Intervention	Malaria	TB	HIV/AIDS	Disabled Children & Orphans Fund	Leahy War Victims Fund
Time Frame					
Current Program	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Focused in 3 provinces: Luanda, Huambo & Malanje. * Focuses on diagnosis and treatment in Huambo & Malanje - children & IDPs. * Do IPT in Lunda and IDPs in Huambo & Malanje. * Link with UNICEF/bed nets. * Strengthen capacity of NMCP in Luanda. 	* Currently no program	PSI program : -Luanda : condom sales; behavior change programs with adolescents, commercial sex workers and police	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * One activity currently funded till 2005 with Christian Children's Fund - focus on child centered spaces in Huambo, Huila, Bie & Benguela * Other activity being negotiated with Save Children/UK - focus demobilization & integration of child soldiers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * One activity with Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation till 2004. Have workshop in Luena where do provide prosthetics & rehabilitation. Working in Moxico, Lunda Norte & Sul and in Zambia.
Transition Short Term FY 02 - FY 03	* Continue activities		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Request add'l HIV/AIDS funds *PSI expand to 3 provinces: Benguela, Huila and Huambo for adolescents and training of NGOs to work in quartering, family areas and IDP camps *border areas: truckers and CSWs *core supported assessments in TB, condoms, care and support, and policy 	* Continue activities	* Continue activities
Transition Long Term FY 03-FY-05	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> * Obtain additional ID monies * Support NGO's to expand activities at the community level 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> *core-supported assessments in NGO capacity building and orphans and vulnerable children *Expand VCT *Explore expansion of MTCT 	* Renegotiate activities with Global & Africa Bureau	* Renegotiate activities with Global & Africa Bureau

Health/HIV Programming: FY03 (\$ 000)

	FY02		FY03-low		FY03-med		FY03-high
Program Priorities							
HIV/AIDS	2.5		3.0		3.5		4.0
Prevention	2.5		2.5		2.8		2.9
VCT	0.0		0.5		0.6		0.9
Care & Support	0.0		0.0		0.1		0.2
Child survival	3.8		4.1		4.6		5.1
Primary Causes	1.2		2.1		2.1		2.6
Polio	2.6		2.0		2.0		2.0
EPI			0.0		0.5		0.5
Population	0.0		0.5		0.5		1.0
Infectious Diseases	1.0		1.5		2.0		2.5
Malaria	1.0		1.0		1.5		1.5
TB	0.0		0.5		0.5		1.0
OVC	0.08		0.1		0.1		0.1
War Victims Fund	2.2		2.0		2.0		2.0
Displaced children and Orphans	2.3		2.3		2.3		2.3
TOTAL	11.88		13.5		15.0		17.0

Health and HIV Programming: FY04

(\$ 000)

	FY02		FY04-low		FY04-med		FY04-high
Program Priorities							
HIV/AIDS	2.5		4.0		4.5		5.0
Prevention	2.5		3.3		3.5		3.8
VCT	0.0		0.7		0.9		1.0
Care & Support	0.0		0.0		0.1		0.2
Child survival	3.8		5.1		5.6		6.1
Primary Causes	1.2		2.6		2.9		3.2
Polio	2.6		1.5		1.5		1.5
EPI	0.0		1.0		1.2		1.4
Population	0.0		1.0		1.0		2.0
Infectious Diseases	1.0		1.75		2.0		2.5
Malaria	1.0		1.0		1.25		1.5
TB	0.0		0.75		0.75		1.0
OVC	0.08		0.1		0.1		0.1
War Victims Fund	2.2		2.0		2.0		2.0
Displaced children and Orphans	2.3		2.0		2.0		2.0
TOTAL	11.88		15.95		17.2		19.7

Health and HIV Programming: FY05 **(\$ 000)**

	FY02		FY05-low		FY05-med		FY05-high
Program Priorities							
HIV/AIDS	2.5		5.5		5.5		6.0
Prevention	2.5		3.5		4.0		4.5
VCT	0.0		1.0		1.0		1.0
Care & Support	0.0		0.5		0.5		0.5
Child survival	3.8		4.5		5.25		5.5
Primary Causes	1.2		3.0		3.5		3.5
Polio	2.6		0.5		0.5		0.5
EPI	0.0		1.0		1.25		1.5
Population	0.0		1.5		1.5		2.25
Infectious Diseases	1.0		1.75		2.5		2.5
Malaria	1.0		1.0		1.5		1.5
TB	0.0		0.75		1.0		1.0
OVC	0.08		0.15		0.15		0.2
War Victims Fund	2.2		2.0		2.0		2.0
Displaced children and Orphans	2.3		2.0		2.0		2.0
TOTAL	11.88		16.9		18.9		20.45

ANNEX H

FOOD SECURITY ACTIVITY TABLES

Narrative for Food Security Programming in Angola

The following budget presents priorities under Food Security programming for FY 03 and FY 04. USAID/Angola would continue its agricultural marketing project with the Cooperative League of the USA and proposes to contribute each year to OFDA's seed and tool initiative. In addition to USAID/Angola resources, OFDA and RCSA plan joint funding for FEWS for FY 03 and FY 04. FFP is planning \$40 million for the emergency WFP program in Angola in FY 03 and the budget projects the same level of funding for FY 04. The budget highlights a new two-year program entitled Developmental Relief. This program would implement emergency/relief and agriculture, health and democracy and governance activities. Some of the activities of this program would be:

- Seed multiplication and provision of tools along with extension services so people can produce their own food within two cropping seasons and not rely on continuing food aid;
- Support to food-for-work efforts for the materials required for road and bridge repair, irrigation facilities, and other infrastructure like dispensaries and schools;
- Support for child survival, maternal child health, HIV/AIDS, polio, and advancing participatory and transparent governance including development of farmer producer and marketing groups;
- Limited expatriate technical assistance (TA) with more emphasis on local staff to both run and monitor program implementation.

The PVOs that would implement the Developmental Relief program are managing the agricultural development activities under the current Development Assistance Program (DAP). The DAP agreements were scheduled to expire in June 2003, however, FFP negotiated with the PVOs and all parties agreed that the DAPs would terminate on December 31, 2002. The new program would begin on January 1, 2003. The Developmental Relief program would represent a highly innovative program that would support direct distribution and emergency feeding activities and the reintegration and resettlement process by addressing medium to longer term needs in agriculture, health and nutrition, and democracy and governance. The program envisions a creative use of funding comprised of Title II food commodities and Development Assistance (DA) funds and could significantly contribute to the sustainability of the proposed activities.

The program resources for the current DAPs have come from monetization. This funding mechanism is awkward given that there is no robust market for imported commodities in Angola and uncertain because of the government's regulations on counterpart funds. In most countries, the benchmark for proceeds from the sales of Title II commodities is a return of 80%. In Angola, the benchmark is 65%. Under these circumstances, a recent DAP assessment team recommended that DA funds be used in the future for the program resources rather than monetization.

In developing the budget matrix, USAID/Angola developed three funding scenarios for the new Developmental Relief program, ranging from \$4.5 million to \$6.5 million. These figures are used because the \$4.5 million represents the proceeds going to the current DAPs at 65% of commodity valuation. This amount would enable the new program to assume the current activities under the DAPs, but with no programmatic or geographic expansion. The next two scenarios, an additional \$1 million and \$2 million, would represent funding levels that would gradually reach a program level that would have been supported if the desired benchmark of 80% of commodity valuation, or \$6.5 million, was reached allowing some expansion of the current program.

FFP funding to this program would total \$30 million and would include \$2 million to help cover administrative costs [202 (e)] with the remaining \$28 million to cover food procurement, shipping and internal transport, shipping and handling (ITSH) costs. The FFP resources, however, would not include any money for development program costs, i.e., TA, material, equipment (which were generated or covered by monetization under the current program). Since monetization is not planned under the new program, DA resources must be found to support the development program cost.

The matrix indicates the possibility of additional funding other than DA/AG if the Health and DG sectors were to receive medium to high funding plus-ups under their portfolios. In such a scenario, HIV/AIDS, Child Survival and MCH, Polio, and DG funding totaling \$2 million would be used to support the non-agricultural components of the new program, which would be implemented by the current Health and DG partners in coordination with the PVOs under the Developmental Relief program. If this funding is not available, however, and DA/AG funds are not sufficient to maintain activity levels similar to the current DAPs, that is, \$4.5 million, the activities of the PVOs would be curtailed. The program, as it is primarily funded with food commodities, also would take on more of a relief focus and could not meaningfully support the transition to development under the resettlement and reintegration process.

Angola - Food Security Programming: FY03 (\$US Million)

	FY02	FY03 Base By Funding Source							FY 03 Developmental Relief Plus-Up				
		Mission DA	RCSA	OFDA	DAP \$	416(b)	Title II	Total	0 Increase*	Plus \$1M AG	Other**	Plus \$2M AG	Other**
Program Priorities													
Administrative Support	0.48	0.50						0.50					
Agricultural Business Development	2.22												
CLUSA	1.22												
ACDI/VOCA	1.00												
Information Systems	0.00		0.20	0.20				0.40					
FEWS	0.00		0.20	0.20				0.40					
Food Security	105.48	1.25		2.00	0.85		70.00	74.10	2.90	3.90	[2.00]	4.90	[2.00]
Seed /Tools	3.35	0.50		2.00				2.50					
Emergency-PVO/Other	1.90												
Emergency-WFP	66.10						40.00	40.00					
Emergency-WFP 416(b)	28.70												
Development (DAPs)	5.43												
Developmental Relief	0.00	0.75			0.85		30.00	31.60	2.90	3.90	[2.00]	4.90	[2.00]
TOTAL	108.18	1.75	0.20	2.20	0.85		70.00	75.00	2.90	3.90	~ [2.00]	4.90	~ [2.00]

*Roughly \$4.5 million annually are generated from monetization to support the current PVO Title II food security development program. To continue the Title II developmental relief program at the same level, alternative sources of funds are needed to substitute for the monetization funds, as this program will not continue due to its inefficiency.

**Under a medium to high scenario for Health and DG programming, \$2 million could be available for Developmental Relief activities consisting of HIV/AIDS (\$500K), MCH (\$500K), Polio (\$600K), and DG (\$400K).

Angola - Food Security Programming: FY04 (\$US Million)

	FY02	FY04 By Funding Source							FY 04 Developmental Relief Plus-Up				
		Mission DA	RCSA	OFDA	DAP \$	416(b)	Title II	Total	0 Increase*	Plus \$1M AG	Other**	Plus \$2M AG	Other**
Program Priorities													
Administrative Support	0.48	0.50						0.50					
Agricultural Business Development	2.22	0.75						0.75					
CLUSA	1.22	0.75						0.75					
ACDI/VOCA	1.00												
Information Systems	0.00		0.20	0.20				0.40					
FEWS***	0.00		0.20	0.20				0.40					
Food Security	105.48	1.46		2.00	0.34		70.00	73.80	3.20	4.20	[2.00]	5.20	[2.00]
Seed/Tools	3.35	0.50		2.00				2.50					
Emergency-PVO	1.90												
Emergency-WFP	66.10						40.00	40.00					
Emergency-416(b)	28.70												
Development (DAPs)	5.43												
Developmental Relief		0.96			0.34		30.00	31.30	3.20	4.20	[2.00]	5.20	[2.00]
TOTAL	108.18	2.71	0.20	2.20	0.34		70.00	75.45	3.20	4.20	~ [2.00]	5.20	~ [2.00]

*Roughly \$4.5 million annually are generated from monetization to support the current PVO Title II food security development program.

To continue the Title II developmental relief program at the same level, alternative sources of funds are needed to substitute for the monetization funds, as this program will not continue due to its inefficiency.

**Under a medium to high scenario for Health and DG programming, \$2 million could be available for Developmental Relief activities consisting of HIV/AIDS (\$500K), MCH (\$500K), Polio (\$600K), and DG (\$400K).

***RCSA will provide FY 04 funding if bilateral funds are not available.